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Preface
This is a book about the intricate ways in which belonging and narrative condition 
each other, and about the ways in which their relation can elucidate our under-
standing of narrative art and of the art of the novel in particular. Belonging as 
I conceive it is not an anthropological given; it is continuously produced in and 
through narrative. I like to think of it as basic constituent of human being—the 
yearning for a place in the world without which both place and world would crum-
ble. Moreover, I think that much of narrative’s sweeping allure (it can be found in 
any culture) stems from its capacities to emplot and emplace our lives. The traction 
that narrative has gained in recent theories of identity is a powerful testimony 
to the fertile relation between belonging and narrative that is the concern of this 
book. And while life-stories are becoming more and more novelesque in our thor-
oughly mobilized, digitalized, and crisis-ridden age a popular fantasy of the self 
as a writer (enhanced by new possibilities of self-publishing) is that of the novelist.
We tell and we listen to stories because we yearn to belong, and ever since 
its modern inception the novel has become a viable testing ground in this mat-
ter. With its endlessly malleable form, its preferred tropes of quest and trial, and 
its oddly detached characters in search for meaning and mooring, the novel is a 
perfect candidate for such exploitation. If and how we belong—by way of leaving 
home, building new homes, dwelling in multiple homes (some of which might be 
imaginary), or dismissing the idea of home all together—depends largely on nar-
rative. This book argues that the novel, with its generic affinities to troubled states 
of belonging, has incessantly shaped both the yearning for a place in the world and 
the narrative vectors and affective currencies in which such a place can be forged. 
The final stretch of writing this book in the winter of 2015/16 coincided with the 
daily realities and reports of staggering numbers of refugees leaving their homes 
in search for a more salient future—mobilized by war, social injustice, and elec-
tronic media. Today’s world is a world in which rumors, news, stories, and images 
circulate in the blink of an eye to even the remotest corner of the globe, with vast 
impact on our sense of the near and the far, the neighbor and the foreigner. The 
geopolitical consequences of the recent upheavals are still unforeseeable, but from 
redrawing maps to charting itineraries and (de)regulating borders, and from re-
structuring places and communities to mending broken biographies narrative will 
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play a crucial role in the outcome. For better or for worse, the world we will inhabit 
in the future depends on the stories that we tell ourselves today.
Among scholars of literature and culture, however, narrative has yet to recov-
er from the bad reputation that it gained in the wake of poststructuralism. As 
a “structure of desire, a structure that at once invents and distances its objects 
and thereby inscribes again and again the space between signifier and signified” 
( Stewart ix) narrative is thought to be generative of symbolic order, and symbolic 
order is viewed as the executive branch of ideology. No doubt, narrative and ide-
ology are natural allies (not least because all ideology asserts narrative form). But 
narrative is also a practical component of dwelling in the world. We use it to con-
nect sense impressions and memories; to orient ourselves in the world and famil-
iarize us with places and people; to draw boundaries between inside and outside, 
public and private; to build institutions and regulate our attachments. Both socio- 
and psychogenesis relies on it. From an anthropological perspective narrative has 
been aptly described as “one of the large categories or systems of understanding 
that we use in our negotiation of reality, specifically […] with the problem of tem-
porality; [wo]man’s time-boundedness, and [her] consciousness of existence with-
in the limits of mortality” (Brooks xi). This is a useful starting point to think about 
the fertile relation between belonging and narrative for sure. But is narrative not 
just as invested in our existence in space? Our relation to space may be more tan-
gible than our relation to time, more pragmatic and this-worldly than our quarrels 
with mortality and the existential unknowability of our own death, but it is just as 
crucial to our sense of belonging, and certainly no less reliant on narrative.
My interest in narrative as a practical component of dwelling in the world 
thrives on my wish to complicate, and perhaps even move beyond representational 
assumptions about narrative that dominate our understanding of what narrative 
is and does to this day. I have learned much from structuralism and narratology, 
especially from their shared tendency to view literature as an integral and quan-
tifiable part of human signifying practice, and I owe a considerable debt to Peter 
Brooks’s psychoanalytic approach to narrative as a system of understanding that 
progressively unfolds over time, driven by the dynamics of memory and desire in 
its creation of meaning and form. But I disagree with a bedrock assumptions of 
these theories; namely, that narrative is superimposed retrospectively on an expe-
rience (or an entire existence) that is on some deeper level unmediated, and as such 
part of the non-narrative flux of the real. Based on my understanding of media 
as something that we both use and are—yes, our bodies are media, and they are 
places, too—I believe that no matter how deeply we delve into the fabric of our be-
ing, our experiences are never unmediated. Against the rigid oppositions between 
subject and object, or life and narrative that such (often tacit) implications about 
raw experience and secondary mediation bring to bear on our understanding of 
narrative, this study assumes that being in the world always entails being engaged 
with the world; that narrative is a basic mode and mediator of this engagement; 
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and that living and telling our lives are continuous and interdependent because of 
our deep-seated need to belong.
In short, this book is invested in moving beyond narrative as a mode of repre-
sentation to learn more about narrative use. Its job is to put forth an understanding 
of narrative as an endlessly useful resource of orientation and emplacement that 
both feeds and is fuelled by narrative art. Like any work of theoretical ambition 
(and, as it happens, like any novel), this book searches and squabbles rather than 
posits and proves. My endeavors to chart a narrative theory based on the human 
need to belong have led me to traditions as divergent as philosophical anthropolo-
gy, human geography and social psychology. Some of these traditions are explicitly 
engaged in ongoing efforts to rethink the relation of life and narrative. Others 
offer insight into the inherently progressive constitution of space and place, “the 
unutterable mobility and contingency of space-time” (Massey, Space, Place 5) 
that, in turn, prompts questions about narrative’s stakes in both propelling and 
coping with these dynamics. But what does all of this have to do with art? And 
what is the role that literature plays in these narrative operations? Taking my cue 
from social psychology, I argue that the stories we live by draw from those artistic 
(and often fictional) narratives that we consume when we read novels and comics, 
watch movies and television, play computer games, etc. The widely shared hun-
ger for narrative artifacts at work in this pattern made me wonder why our life 
stories gravitate so notably toward them. And when thinking about the matter in 
the light of this study it occurred to me that one thing that makes these artifacts 
so immensely attractive for someone who yearns to belong is an amplified sense 
of narrative agency. I use the term to describe the capacity to make choices about 
the telling of one’s story and impose them on, relate with, and ultimately be in the 
world. A main claim that I unfold in this book is that the novel exploits this kind 
of agency (which happens to be just as endlessly malleable as its searching form) 
to the end of suturing troubled life-worlds. In fact, since its modern inception the 
novel has been so conducive to dealing with troubled states of belonging that it 
became the main provider of the narrative frames and formulas that modern indi-
viduals need to dwell in the world.
But this book does not attempt to cover all the varieties or even the basic types 
of narrative forms and agencies that have gained shape in and through the art 
of the novel. Instead of writing a survey of this development, I chose four icon-
ic American sites—the frontier, the region, the ghetto, the homeland—to explore 
how four paradigmatic American novels give voice and form to concerns with 
belonging particular to these sites. Of course, there are other sites, novels, and 
concerns with belonging than those dealt with here, and as any student of nar-
rative knows, a different selection and combination would have amounted to a 
different story. The story that I tell through my examples takes us to a series of 
conflicted sites of U.S. cultural history that are prone to bring out both the salience 
and significance of having a place in a changing world, and the proactive role that 
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narrative assumes in the making und unmaking of this place. The letter, the sketch, 
the found object, and the brain-as-storytelling-machine are the main protagonists 
in this story, and their adventures revolve around mending and suturing troubled 
life-worlds. Charles Brockden Brown’s frontier gothic Edgar Huntly, or, Memoirs of 
a Sleepwalker (1799) exploits its narrator’s compulsive habits of letter-writing and 
sleepwalking to stage a narrative act of recovering a haunted ground previously 
traversed with no proper sense while uncovering a state of impossible belonging. 
Sarah Orne Jewett’s regionalist masterpiece The Country of the Pointed Firs (1896) 
endorses the “minor” art of the sketch in an exercise of familiarization and attach-
ment that destabilizes both the medium of the book and the genre of the novel at 
a time when defamiliarization and detachment become the hallmarks of narra-
tive art. Henry Roth’s Call It Sleep (1934), written with the ambition that ethnic 
literature should absorb the experimental impulse of modernism, mediates the 
experience of immigration through a fearful Jewish boy with a rare gift of gather-
ing objects, people, and stories to dwell in them. And Richard Powers’s The Echo 
Maker (2006) depicts the Midwestern homeland as a product of two interactive 
eco-systems: the life-sustaining environment and the nonstop narrating human 
brain, one geological, the other neurological, one endangered by global capitalism 
and post-9/11 trauma, the other threatened by a brain disease that spreads through 
colliding storylines.
At the end of my story I hope to have made tangible how the human need to 
belong operates as a driving force of literary production, and vice versa; and how 
the American novel, because it comes from a place where belonging is even less of 
a given then in other parts of the modern world, makes for a particularly rich field 
of study in this regard. Hence, much will be said in this book about what narrative 
brings to the human need to belong, and how narrative art and the art of the novel 
are involved with this need. But even if my story persuades its readers that narra-
tive is a practical component of dwelling in the world—can one actually be at home 
in it? My answer to this question is simple: To the tenuous degree that one can be at 
home at all, it is in and through narrative. There is no other way.

Writing this book in a language that is not my mother tongue has taught me a lot 
about not belonging, or not quite belonging—about the comfort that is lacking 
when being unable to tap into the secret wisdom of one’s own language where 
thoughts turn in circles or come to a halt. Writing this book as a member of an ac-
ademic institution made me aware of that institution as a place of support and care.
This book grew out of my Habilitationsschrift at Freie Universität Berlin, titled 
“No Place Like Home: The Ontological Narrativity of Belonging and the American 
Novel, 1799—1934—2006.” I am grateful to Winfried Fluck, whose unwavering 
support and intellectual guidance have been instrumental not only to completing 
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my Habilitation and this book but to my entire academic career. And I am grateful 
to Susanne Rohr, who has accompanied every stage of this book and the ques-
tions about belonging and narrative that it raised in its author, and who has be-
come a close friend along the way. I also wish to thank my colleagues at the John 
F.  Kennedy Institute for North American Studies at FU Berlin, where this book 
was conceived and most of it written, especially Heinz Ickstadt, Ulla Haselstein, 
Andrew Gross, Florian Sedlmeier, and Johannes Völz, for glorious years of collabo-
ration. The  German Academic Exchange Service generously funded a research stay 
at the University of California at Berkeley in 2011/12, and I am grateful to Anton 
Kaes for being an inspiring and generous host. Helmut Lethen invited me to IFK 
Internationales Forschungszentrum Kulturwissenschaft in Vienna in 2015/16, 
where I was able to revise my Habilitationsschrift for publication in conversa-
tion with him, Hartmut Böhme, Penelope Deutscher, Michael Hagner, and Katja 
Petrowskaja, and I am grateful for that. Sieglinde Lemke and Wolfgang Hochbruck 
have provided a home at the University of Freiburg for me at a crucial junction in 
my career, and I am immensely grateful for that as well. Over the years of working 
on this book, I have benefitted from the generous support of many people, among 
them Charles Altieri, Rita Felski, Frank Kelleter, Günter Leypoldt, Philipp Löffler, 
Ruth Mayer, Donald Pease, John Carlos Rowe, Ramón Saldívar, Joshua Shannon, 
and Hayden White. I am fortunate that many of those mentioned here not only 
offered their guidance in giving feedback on chapters and talks, writing support 
letters, and drawing my attention to unknown texts but also their friendship. 
Dominik Fungipani, Kalina Janeva, Rieke Jordan, Evelyn Kreutzer, and Anirudh 
Sridhar have been indispensible in proofreading and setting the manuscript in its 
various stages. And Daniel Bonanati and Anne Poppen at transcript have been 
miraculously suave and efficient in getting the manuscript published.
Some of the material in this book has appeared elsewhere in earlier form and 
is reprinted here with permission. A shorter version of Chapter 1 appeared in New 
Literary History 46.1 (2015). Portions of Chapter 5 appeared in Re-Framing the 
Transnational Turn in American Studies, ed. Winfried Fluck, Donald E. Pease and 
John Carlos Rowe (Dartmouth, NH: University Press of New England, 2011), and 
in Ideas of Order: Narrative Patterns in the Novels of Richard Powers, ed. Antje 
Kley and Jan Kucharzewski (Heidelberg: Winter, 2012). And a previous version of 
Chapter 2 appeared in Towards a Post-Exceptionalist American Studies, ed. Win-
fried Fluck and Donald E. Pease, REAL 30 (2014).
This book is dedicated to Dustin Breitenwischer, who is familiar with every 
thought processed in it, and who has shaped its final form through countless con-
versations in our various homes and en route between them. Belonging has gained 
a brighter and broader horizon with him in my life, and I thank him for that with 
my whole being.

1 Belonging, Narrative, and the Art of the Novel
Having mastered her adventures in Oz, Dorothy learns the secret of the ruby red 
slippers: There is no place like home. Repeating the phrase over and over, she calls 
her home into existence. There is indeed no place like home unless one calls for it. 
And there is no reason to call unless that place seems uncertain. But something is 
curious about this lesson, and this something becomes tangible in its repetition. 
Does the phrase mean that there is no place like home? This would attest to an al-
most sacred exclusiveness. Or does it mean that there is no place like home, which 
would attest to its elusiveness or even sheer absence? As one meaning dovetails the 
other, there is an eerie sense that home may be forever gone, or, once seen from Oz, 
turn out to never have existed. Alas, the return that stands at the end of Dorothy’s 
story does not put an end to the concerns with where, how, and to whom she be-
longs that made her leave home in the first place—and that are perhaps the single 
most powerful generator of narrative.
Belonging as I conceive it is an inescapable condition of human existence—“not 
just being, but longing” (Bell 1), the desire for a place in the world without which 
both place and world would crumble. To feel and direct this longing we need a 
mediating structure; narrative is that structure. Just think of the many people who 
write diaries in times of trouble, and stop once things have smoothened out. In 
turning to narrative, we grapple with unsettling experiences and conduct the se-
mantic, psychic, and geographic movements unleashed by them within the shifting 
parameters of space and time. Narrative’s sweeping allure (it can be found in any 
culture) thrives on its promise to give meaning and mooring to our lives (which 
may include the dissolution of old and obsolete ties). Where, how, and to whom we 
belong depends on the stories we tell (or do not tell) ourselves. Today, matters of 
belonging are most rigorously debated in the contexts of transnationalism, post-
colonialism, and queer and gender studies, usually to highlight states of troubled 
belonging caused by experiences of migration, diaspora, racist or sexist discrim-
ination. These debates have brought out the centrality of these experiences in the 
formation of modern cultures, and they have been crucial in replacing notions of 
belonging as set (and saturated) in stable (and unjustly distributed) correlations 
of place and self with an understanding of belonging as inherently fabricated and 
provisional. Salman Rushdie’s “imaginary homelands,” Homi Bhabha’s “third 
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space,” Mary-Louise Pratt’s “contact zones,” Paul Gilroy’s “black Atlantic,” Iain 
Chamber’s “impossible homecomings,” and James Clifford’s preference of “routes” 
over “roots” capture this critical impetus.
I have learned much from these debates, and I fully subscribe to their insistence 
on the tenuous, quintessentially performative nature of belonging, its contested 
and often precarious relation to space, race and gender, its nostalgic inclinations 
and cosmopolitan potential. For my own purposes, however, the (identity) politi-
cal framework of these debates is limiting. Rather than focusing on particular sets 
of experiences, their proper recognition, and their capacity to resist hegemonic 
renderings of belonging (the national homeland, the nuclear family), I want to 
consider belonging as an anthropological premise of narrative. Yet pursuing this 
interest against the backdrop of these debates throws into sharp relief the racist, 
sexist, and imperialist implications that are couched in the notion of the human in 
part through its relation to narrative. In fact, narrative art, and the art of the novel 
in particular, were essential to creating the sense of self that (with its enlightened 
capacities of inner growth, rational conduct and critical interrogation) has come 
to define what it means to be human in the modern age. So yes, the human is a 
haunted point of reference, far easier dismissed from a position of white privilege 
than from one of systematic exclusion (to this day black activism gains force by 
insisting on its share of the human)—and hence vexed with the very dynamics of 
belonging that this book sets out to explore.1
In pairing belonging and narrative I hope to gain a new angle from which to 
address what narrative is and does; or rather, what we do with it, what it does with 
and for us, and why we are so endlessly inclined to engage with it.2 With this focus, 
I am less concerned with narrative as a mode of representation and more with 
narrative use. In foregrounding the practical and pragmatic dimension of narra-
tive, my study aligns itself with the work of scholars such as Barbara Herrnstein 
Smith, James Phelan, and, more recently, David Rudrum, in its conviction that 
“any definition of narrative that ignores the importance of use is […] incomplete” 
(200). While our engagement with narrative can certainly not be reduced to use in 
a utilitarian sense, it always occurs “on a particular occasion” and “for some pur-
pose” (Phelan, Rhetoric 218). This also means that engaging with narrative always 
1 From the f irst slave narratives written in support of the abolitionist movement to Ta-Nehisi 
Coates’s recent protest essay Between the World and Me, “being human” serves as a rallying point 
against racial discrimination and injustice. The main reason for this insistence is, of course, the 
fact that modern slavery was based on a systematic denial of humanity to those degraded to the 
status of property. I discuss how Edward P. Jones’s neo-slavery novel The Known World exploits 
these vexed aspects of belonging in my essay “Property, Community, and Belonging.”
2 The heightened attention that narrative has recently gained in theorizing identity, social action and 
agency is a powerful testimony to the conundrum of belonging and narrative that is the concern of 
this book. See Somers, Ezzy, Gergen and Gergen, Taylor, Ricoeur, “Narrative Identity,” Cavararo.
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has practical value—a value that exists in relation to those who use it and their 
everyday needs. Based on these premises, what I put forth in this opening chapter 
is an understanding of narrative as an endlessly useful resource of orientation and 
emplacement on which we draw to shape, order, and sustain our relation with the 
world and everything in it. I argue that we engage in narrative to reach a more ad-
ept state of belonging; and that, in this basic sense, narrative is foundational to our 
being in the world, especially to our practical need for emplacement.
Moreover, building on this anthropological approach to narrative, I propose 
an understanding of narrative art in which the novel, with its endlessly malleable 
and searching form, assumes a special place. The following four chapters are med-
itations on this place, each based on one novel with its own situational and for-
mal ramifications for the project of theorizing narrative use based on the human 
need to belong, and conjointly reaching across four centuries in probing narra-
tive modes of emplacement and agency. These novels are American novels, which 
means they come from a place where belonging is even less of a given then in other 
parts of the modern world. They will take us to four iconic and conflicted sites 
of U.S. cultural history—the frontier, the region, the ghetto, the homeland—that 
are prone to bring out both the salience and significance of having a place in a 
changing world, and the proactive role that narrative assumes in the making und 
unmaking of this place.
Uses of Narr ative
In a most basic sense, narrative is a kind of language use in which an act of telling 
serves the end of interconnecting dispersed elements across space and time, gen-
erally to reconstruct what has happened. And just as any other kind of language 
use, narrative is inherently dialogic—which is, of course, crucial to its use. It is 
geared toward a receiver with the hope of engaging her in an act of exchange. This 
exchange is never neutral; on the contrary, it always entails a desire for change in 
the receiver, be it of opinion, feeling, or mood. But change will not occur unless 
the receiver gets in on the narrative act. Participation can be light and wavering, a 
cruising through a narrative to grasp the plot and indulge in select passages (Bar-
thes, Pleasure 10-13), but ideally it takes the form of playing along with the de-
mands put forth by a specific mode of exchange. Yet no matter how we participate, 
it is the particular and concrete form of a narrative that regulates the terms of 
participation and exchange.
Theorists have described the dialogic dimension of narrative in terms of con-
tract, transfer, transference, transaction, and feedback loops (Barthes, Pleasure 95-
96; Iser, Fictive 236-48; Fluck (building on Iser), Romance 365-84; Brooks, Reading 
216-37; Schwab, Subjects 22-48; Phelan, Fiction 5), and they have defined its pur-
pose or use in terms of pleasure, desire, imaginary self-extension, and inner growth. 
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In all of these cases, time is the implied measure of purpose and use. Engaging in 
narrative can yield a pleasure that either confirms or disrupts the continuity of 
one’s self (Barthes, Pleasure 14). It can keep the boundaries of the self open over 
time (Iser, Prospecting 242-248; Schwab, Subjects 22-28). And in progressing from 
beginning to end, it can cultivate of judgment (Phelan, Fiction 133-148), advance 
fictional justice and recognition (Fluck, Romance 389-400; 446-449), and endorse 
and suspend the death-bound logic of time (Brooks, Reading 107-112). Given the 
widely accepted understanding of narrative as a representation (and hence recon-
struction) of events that have happened in the past, and given the vast body of 
theoretical work dedicated to the structural and philosophical problems that arise 
from this retrospective mode of engaging with the world, this inclination is hardly 
surprising.3 Some of the most sweeping and philosophically ambitious narrative 
theories (Paul Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative, Peter Brooks’s Reading for the Plot) 
conceive narrative as a dialogical model of understanding that is especially useful 
to grapple with the problem of human temporality and time-boundedness. They 
examine, for instance, how narrative, in both structuring time and progressively 
unfolding over time, teaches us basic lessons about the difference between past, 
present and future, or time and memory; and how narrative provides a virtual 
playing field for staging conflicts between Eros and the death drive, ultimately to 
the end of confronting our mortality (Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Vol. 3.; Brooks, 
Reading 90-112).
So yes, narrative is an immensely useful resource when it comes to grappling 
with the complex and intangible realities of time, and in unfolding over time it 
can generate such marvelous things as insight, awareness, affirmation, and joy. But 
are the ties to human temporality as exclusive in determining narrative use as it 
appears through the lens of this scholarship? Consider, for instance, that narrative 
creates spatial (with Mikhail Bakhtin we may say “chronotopic”) orders without 
which it would be incomprehensible. Such orders are always symbolically laden 
through hubs of power, areas with restricted access, conflicting regions (country 
vs. city), or journeys to foreign places. According to Jurij Lotman, whose narrative 
theory displays a rare awareness of matters of space, “[a] plot can always be re-
duced to a basic episode—the crossing of the basic topological border in the plot’s 
spatial structure” (Artistic Text 238).4 But space not only organizes narrative, it 
also drives and directs it. Moreover, and crucially, the medial and material form in 
3 If Lessing arguing in the Laocoon that literature a temporal, and hence more sophisticated art than 
the spatial art of painting is an early expression of this conundrum, Seymour Chatman’s Story and 
Discourse and Paul Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative are narratological and philosophical monuments. 
For more recent work on the topic see Currie, About Time; Grethlein; “Narrative Configuration.”
4 The works of Bakhtin and Lotman are two notable exceptions to the negligence of space by nar-
rative theorists. See Zoran, “Space” for an early attempt to assess the significance of space for 
narrative theory.
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and through which we engage with narrative is always extended in space. The size 
of a book in our hands, the layout of letters on a page or a screen, the space between 
individual words, paragraphs or images, all this directly affects our mode of en-
gagement. Narrative’s relation to space becomes even more basic when we consider 
that storytelling presupposes emplacement. Narrative acts are always conducted 
from somewhere, and this somewhere has a concrete spatial form (the face-to-face 
situation of oral storytelling, a particular desk at a particular place in time). And 
because narrative is inherently dialogic, it reaches out from that place toward an 
interlocutor who engages with it at an equally particular place (a favorite reading 
chair, a beach, a subway car, a prison cell). The transformative effects aimed for by 
any narrative act materialize in the space unfolding from this extended “narrative 
situation.”5 They are bound to change the mode of emplacement on either side 
of the dialogical bond, and the storyworld harbored by a narrative is the space 
in which the terms and trajectories of this transformation are laid out. There is 
indeed a complex network of spaces and places produced and interlinked in any 
narrative act that determine its use.
Hence, an important claim that I make in this book is that narrative does not 
merely engage us in ways that resemble real-life experience.6 Positing that one’s 
state of belonging can effectively change through narrative engagement implies 
that life and narrative are somehow continuous, that the boundaries between the 
storyworld and the actual world are more porous and permeable than it is usual-
ly assumed. Rethinking the relation between space, place and narrative is key to 
substantiating this point, which Edward Casey squares as: “No implacement with-
out implotment” (461).7 Perhaps inspired by the heightened currency of matters of 
space and place in literary and cultural studies, yet certainly under the influence of 
“postclassical” extensions of their field, narratologists have recently begun to pay 
more attention to the underrated relation between space and narrative.8 Sparked 
by the advance of cognitive narratology, there is, for instance, a sizable interest in 
the spatial metaphors that we use to describe what narrative is and does. Scholars 
5 The term is drawn from Stanzel, who uses it strictly to describe structural features of a narrative text.
6 This would be the constructivist approach embraced by narratoligists such as Monika Fludernik, 
Ansgar Nünning, and Meir Sternberg, and recently reinvigorated in the burgeoning f ield of cog-
nitive narratology, especially by David Herman and Manfred Jahn.
7 As much as I like how Casey’s formula captures the f irst-person-perspective of phenomenology 
through the repeated “i,” for the purpose of theorizing narrative it makes more sense to stick 
with the term “emplotment” and the corresponding “emplacement.”
8 Among these extensions of classical narratology are inclusions visual and oral media, non-fic-
tional genres such as memoir and autobiography, and rhetorical theory and cognitive sciences. 
The term “postclassical narratology” was f irst coined by David Herman in his book Narratologies 
and quickly gained traction thereafter. For a recent overview of this development see Alber and 
Fludernik, Postclassical Narratology and The Living Handbook of Narratology.
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have described the cognitive work of expressions such as “plotline,” “thread,” and 
“circularity” as translating the notorious elusiveness of time and meaning into the 
more tangible realities of distance and direction, and they have described the “nar-
rative is travel” metaphor as converting temporal progress into spatial sequence 
and as mobilizing space under the impact of reading and writing it.9 Yet sage and 
important as these revaluations are in broadening our understanding of narrative 
use by complicating narrative’s privileged relation to time, in the end they remain 
limited in the degree to which they shed light on narrative’s spatial dimension. The 
main reason for this is that they stick to a representational model of narrative that, 
due to its core premise of narrative being a retrospective mode mediating objects 
and events across time, does not allow for any direct transaction between physical 
space and narrative use.10
Bridging this divide is key to the project to theorizing narrative based on the 
human need to belong. Step one in this endeavor is to complicate, and possibly 
part with received notions of narrative as a stable backdrop to the messiness of life.
Life aNd Narr ative (aNd) art
Approached in the traditional way, narrative’s capacity to mend troubled states of 
belonging is strictly retrospective. Categorically removed from life, it elucidates 
what already has been lived; in fact, it can only function as a basic form of human 
understanding because it re-creates (and thus recovers) life from a safe distance. 
This also means that narrative is viewed as a cognitive instrument to impose mean-
ing and order on the natural disorder of human existence.11 But recently scholars 
9 See Kemp, “The Inescapable Metaphor;” Mikkonen, “The Narrative as Travel Metaphor.” I discuss 
their positions at greater length in my article “Spatial Forms.”
10 This tendency also persists in more general reassessments of the significance of space in our 
understanding of narrative, of which Marie-Laure Ryan may be the most prolif ic proponent. Her 
work on the topic offers a typology of dif ferent manifestations of space in narrative, it traces 
these manifestations across dif ferent media, and it explores the relation of space and narrative 
together in collaboration with two geographers. But throughout this series of comprehensive 
and nuanced studies, and especially in the most recent, interdisciplinary one, the two domains 
remain clearly separated: There is space as an object of narrative representation, and there is nar-
rative as a means of dealing with space. See Ryan, “Space;” “Narration in Various Media;” “Space, 
Place;” Narrating Space. I discuss her position at greater length in my article “Spatial Forms.”
11 This understanding of narrative, which Metetoja aptly calls “epistemological” for its primary fo-
cus on understanding the world, rejects assumptions about “the nature of reality” including the 
ontological dimension of narrative, while indeed making a strong ontological claim in positing 
“a deeper level at which human, lived experience is immediately given, and human existence in 
general—as part of the f lux of the real—is nonnarrative in character” (“Human Existence” 91). 
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from fields as diverse as sociology, anthropology, psychology, political philoso-
phy, legal theory, feminist theory, and organizational theory have come to claim 
something vastly different about narrative; namely, that narrative is “an ontolog-
ical condition of social life.” In abrogating the received division between life and 
narrative, scholars aligning themselves with this position assert “that stories guide 
action; that people construct identities (however multiple and changing) by lo-
cating themselves or being located within a repertoire of emplotted stories; that 
‘experience’ is constituted through narratives; […] and that people are guided to act 
in certain ways, and not others, on the basis of the projections, expectations, and 
memories derived from a multiplicity but ultimately limited repertoire of available 
[…] narratives”. And if “everything we know from the making of families, to cop-
ing with illness, to carrying out strikes and revolutions is at least in part a result of 
numerous cross-cutting story-lines in which social actors locate themselves” our 
common understanding of action and agency is in dire need of revision (Somers 
613-14, 607).
For Margaret Somers, who I am quoting here, the “cross-cutting story-lines” 
that orchestrate social relations are strikingly spatial (as is Somers’s entire “rela-
tional and network approach”). Addressing these same social relations from the 
perspective of human geography, Doreen Massey claims that they “always have 
spatial form and content: they exist, necessarily, both in space (i.e. in a location-
al relation to other social phenomena) and across space.” In fact, Massey defines 
space as “the vast complexity of the interlocking and articulating nets of social 
relations.” Conversely, “a ‘place’ is formed out of the particular set of social rela-
tions which interact at a particular location.” Delving deeper into the social mech-
anisms of place-making, Massey expounds: “the singularity of any individual 
place is formed in part out of the specificity of the interactions which occur at that 
location […] and in part out of the fact that the meeting of those social relations at 
that location […] will in turn produce new social effects” (Space, Place 168). So yes, 
the places in which we dwell are formed out of ever-shifting sets and networks of 
social relations. But how do the social effects that, in altering these constellations, 
continuously make and remake these places materialize, take hold, and spread? 
Because social actors locate themselves and draw on an available repertoire of sto-
rylines—which is another way of saying that narrative plays a formative role in the 
production of space and place.12
See also Metetoja, Narrative Turn, which reconstructs the troubled career of storytelling from the 
postwar crisis to its recent return.
12 If it makes a lot of sense to assume that narrative plays a crucial part in the production of space 
and place it is important to stress that practically none of the thinkers of the spatial turn—Henri 
Lefebvre, Edward Soja and Doreen Massey come to mind—have given thought to this nexus. A 
notable exception is the opening chapter of Massey’s For Space, which I discuss at length in my 
essay “Spatial Forms.” The few works that do engage with both space and narrative—such as 
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Recent developments in social psychology confirm these ideas.13 For Kenneth 
and Mary Gergen, two of its leading proponents, “[t]he present analysis stops short 
of saying that lives are narrative events. […] Stories are after all forms of account-
ing, and it seems misleading to equate the account with its putative object. How-
ever, narrative accounts are embedded within social action. Events are rendered 
socially visible through narrative, and they are typically used to render expecta-
tions for future events.” I find this argument highly compelling: Events “become 
laden with a storied sense” because our daily lives are immersed in narrative; they 
“acquire the reality of a ‘beginning,’ a ‘climax,’ a ‘low point,’ an ‘ending’ and so 
on,” and in turn, they are experienced in accordance with how they are indexed, 
both individually and collectively. Tying this back to the question of how narrative 
participates in the production of place, the social effects that drive this operation 
materialize, take hold, and spread in part because life is imbued with narrative. “In 
a significant sense, then, we live by stories—both in the telling and the doing of 
the self” (18). And this is where narrative art enters the picture. According to the 
Gergens, the stories by which we live are taken more or less directly from the realm 
of art—not in the sense of life copying art but in the sense of art being “the vehicle 
through which the reality of life is generated” (18). The Gergens do not say more on 
this issue, but if art is assigned with the role of a privileged creator of scripts for our 
everyday use, it must be conceived as a separate realm in which we can experience 
things without pragmatic consequences (there is no need to call the police when 
reading about a mass murderer in a novel).
So yes, the stories by which we live are deeply pervaded with all those nov-
els, memoirs, graphic narratives, films, television series, computer games, in short, 
with the narrative art and media that we routinely engage with. But how to account 
for the quizzical fact that the stories by which we live seem to gravitate toward 
these artistic forms, and what does this mean for the ties between belonging and 
narrative that are the topic of this study? It means, first and foremost, that narra-
tive art is more directly invested in matters of belonging than it might seem at first 
sight. In being one step removed from the messiness of life (and thus committed to 
representing rather than living it), it stages and explores the narrative drive engen-
dered by the need for a place in the world as a life-sustaining “need to tell.” And by 
this I mean that human beings (for reasons to be further explored in the following 
section) interpret their surroundings and articulate their being in the world in re-
lation to them, hoping that someone is listening. The most practical way in which 
Nye’s Space and Narrative and Psarra’s Architecture and Narrative—refrain from conceptualizing 
their interlocking productivities. The Special Issue on “Space, Place and Narrative” of Zeitschrift 
für Anglistik und Amerikanistik, ed. by Nicole Maruo-Schröder and myself aims at f illing this gap.
13 For further examples see Narrative Psychology, ed. Sarbin; especially Sarbin’s own contributions 
to this volume; Hermeneutics and Psychological Theory, ed. Messer, Sass, and Woolfolk; Advances 
in Experimental Social Psychology, ed. Berkowitz.
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concerns with belonging play out in narrative art is indeed in such interlocking 
acts of articulation and interpretation. These acts can take on an endless array of 
different forms, but they all share one basic feature: the assertion of narrative agen-
cy. And if agency is usually understood as the capacity to act within a given social 
world by making choices and imposing them on that world, narrative agency is 
the capacity of a narrating agent to make choices about the telling of her story and 
impose them on the (story)world.
Narrative agency is not unique to narrative art; on the contrary, it is an in-
herent feature of all narrative. But in the realm of art the choices that a teller has 
in terms of selection and combination multiply.14 And if we conduct our lives in 
and through stories (rather than merely recounting them), social and narrative 
agencies converge in far-reaching ways. Think, for instance, of the forms of agency 
asserted through written correspondence, emails and text messaging in our pres-
ent age, letter writing in earlier days and on special occasions still today. Early 
novels turned to the epistolary form to stage and explore this kind of agency. In 
fact, Charles Brockden Brown’s Edgar Huntly, or, Memoirs of a Sleepwalker makes 
for such a productive read in the context of this study because the agency that 
comes with the form of the letter is both asserted and perverted in this novel (the 
letter-writing narrator is a sleepwalker). But narrative agency does not exist in a 
vacuum. As a mode of engaging with the world by imposing choices on the world, 
it brushes against given orders, be they real or imagined. And this is precisely 
how narrative agency is a staple of narrative art: Within the confines of a liter-
ary work, it takes shape against the backdrop of distinctive—chonotopic—con-
junctions of psychic and spatial orders or imaginaries. Tracing these interlocking 
constellations and agencies is a primary aim of the following chapters, which take 
us to places as different as the post-revolutionary frontier, a remote and enchant-
ed stretch of coastal Maine, an urban ghetto at the peak of immigration, and a 
Midwestern homeland haunted by environmental destruction and 9/11. And as 
my readings will show, four different models of the human psyche—based on the 
skeptical empiricism of John Locke and David Hume, Swedenborgian mysticism, 
Freudian psychoanalysis, and present-day neuroscience—are couched in these 
settings in ways that determine the actions performed in them and the dwelling 
places emerging from them.
14 While Butler conceded this much in her essay “Giving an Account of Oneself,” she insists that this 
kind of (narrative) agency has severe limitations. Iser discusses the narrative modus operandi of 
selection and combination with regard to “fictionalizing acts,” but the basic pattern of receptive 
engagement drawing from both the world of the text and the word of the reader to actualize a 
text and its meaning can be applied to reading in general. Fictionalizing acts, and by extension 
narrative acts in general, make themselves and their strategies of world-making “observable” 
through the necessity of selection and combination. See Iser, “Fictionalizing Acts.”
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In tracing how narrative agency evolves amidst the places and people in which 
and from whom belonging is sought, I assume that the forms that such agency 
gains within a literary text—in the novels considered here through the letter, the 
sketch, the found object, and the brain-as-storytelling-machine—can travel be-
yond the confines of the text. Caroline Levine has recently made similar claims 
about form. To assess form in both its social and aesthetic dimensions and capture 
the complex relation between the two, she borrows the concept affordance from 
design theory, where it describes “the potential uses or actions latent in materi-
als and designs” (Forms 6) resulting from the limits and restrictions that make a 
particular form distinctive. Narrative agency as I conceive it is latent in narrative 
materials and designs in precisely this way—“carr[ying] its affordances with it” (19; 
emphasis in the original) when moving back and forth between the social and the 
literary world. However, my own thinking on the social relevance and mobility of 
narrative forms is invested in reception aesthetics rather than formalism, especial-
ly in Wolfgang Iser’s notion of the articulation effect of fiction. For Iser, fiction has 
the power to express and make available to experience what would otherwise be 
diffuse and mute. If structuralism has taught us that these articulations are con-
demned to reiterate the codes and conventions in and through which they operate, 
I have no intention to refute this view. But giving account of uncertain states of 
belonging involves a struggle with the unsayable that almost by default pushes 
narrative toward and across the limits of the sayable. Narrative is, through this ex-
periential disposition, equipped with an inherent drive toward exposing and trans-
gressing its own conventionality, and this drive can unfold with fewer constraints 
in the depragmatized realm of art. Why? Because this realm is “bound to mobilize 
the imaginary in a different manner, for it has far less of the pragmatic orientation 
required by the subject, by thetic consciousness, or by the socio-historical, all of 
which channel the imaginary in quite specific directions” (Iser, Fictive 224).
The performative “play of the text” (Iser, Prospecting 249-61) that becomes tan-
gible here opens up a space in between the world of the text and the world of the 
reader, between what is imagined and what is real. And when a reader inhabits this 
space, the two worlds become permeable. It is for this reason that engaging with 
fiction—which Iser defines as an activity, fiction as shorthand for “fictionalizing 
acts”—can lead to a revision of the narrative frames and formulas by which we 
live. Narrative thus reinvigorates itself in and through art, and in doing so, it per-
petually refurbishes its potential use. Paul Ricoeur speaks of a “life of narrative ac-
tivity” to describe this autopoetic thrust of narrative: Sustained by an ever-chang-
ing repertoire of experiences brought to language, it thrives on a tension between 
sedimentation and innovation that creates ever-new forms (“Life in Quest” 24). 
Note the point of convergence here: Both Iser and Ricoeur contend that new nar-
rative forms become available beyond the realm of art in the fusion of the world 
of the text and the world of the reader. And this leads Iser to insist that narrative 
art is always invested in use. Its “pragmatic significance […] for action becomes 
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unmistakable” once we acknowledge this dimension (The Fictive 168). Dorothy’s 
call epitomizes this kind of action: it gets her home and ends the story. But if nar-
rative is both produced and consumed out of the yearning for a place in the world, 
the main attraction of engaging in it may reside less in the promise to get home, 
and more in the promise to go on a journey—not necessarily to get home but to en-
counter new modes of dwelling, and to try out new forms of agency along the way.
In proposing that narrative is a practical component of dwelling in the world, 
the larger goal of this book is to unsettle prevailing views of narrative as a mere 
mechanism of ideology. To this day, such views dominate literary and cultural 
studies, especially my field, American studies, in which narrative is mainly of in-
terest to find out how a literary text fits into a larger discursive field, and particular-
ly how it collaborates in regulating the subject positions contained in this field. But 
this interpretive framework comes at a cost, for it presupposes a relation between 
a literary text and its reader that is located, first and foremost, on a conceptual 
(or cognitive) level. A resistant reception penetrates its object intellectually while 
affective mobilization is seen as manipulation. From such a perspective, aesthet-
ic experience is reduced to a mere function of interpellation, and conversely, art 
produces “aesthetic regimes” that the critic must resist and unravel.15 Yet if we 
have come to take it for granted that even the most idiosyncratic, incoherent, or 
open-ended account of where, how, or to whom one belongs is conducted within 
ideological constraints, how can radical proclamations of non-belonging (polit-
ically desirable as they may seem) be fundamentally different? Is the refusal to 
belong not just another narrative of belonging, another way of using the form-giv-
ing power of narrative to carve out a place in the world for oneself, tenuous and 
provisional as it might be?
Giving an account of where, how, and to whom one belongs is indeed nearly 
impossible to resist; it is too deep-seated a psychic and social need.16 Suspicions 
of this need take us to a well-known terrain: As a subject-forming power to be 
exposed and disseminated at almost all costs, the prescriptive aspects of narrative 
are an all-too-familiar target in the “resistance paradigm.” But while there can 
be no doubt that narrative is inclined to bring disparate elements into a social-
ly intelligible (and thus at least somewhat coercive) whole, using narrative as the 
mediating structure through which we feel and direct our need for a place in the 
world is bound to extend and revise existing forms and norms simply because they 
do not seamlessly fit. In a narrative theory based on the human need to belong a 
15 The term “aesthetic regime” is drawn from Rancière. For strong critiques of the resistance para-
digm see Fluck, “Theories of American Culture;” Ickstadt, “Pluralist Aesthetics;” Voelz, Transcen-
dental Resistance.
16 Judith Butler has taken up this issue in her aforementioned essay “Giving an Account of Oneself.” 
See also Ricoeur, “Narrative Identity;” Ezzy, “Theorizing Narrative Identity.“ A good example of the 
critical desire for radical states of non-belonging is Pease, “Remapping the Transnational Turn.”
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double bind of coercion and transgression thus emerges as a motor force connect-
ing narrative use and narrative art. From such a perspective, the need to tell that 
stems from and gives shape to the human need for a place in the world becomes 
a critical resource for tracing concerns with and limits of belonging at particular 
conjunctions of time, space, and social being. In confronting the subject-forming 
power of narrative as a symbolic structure with an interest in the human need to 
tell that operates in and through this structure, the experiential dimension inher-
ent to any regimic mode of “distributing the sensible” (Rancière 13)—its eccentric 
involvement with making and unmaking this structure—gains critical weight.
sUbjec ts of beLoNgiNg
If this theory defines narrative primarily in terms of use we need to know more 
about the user in this equation: about the human being—which is, almost by de-
fault, conceived in terms of its being a subject—engaging with narrative out of an 
existential need to belong, and about how this disposition defines its relation to 
the world. Acknowledged or not, assumptions about human being and subjectivity 
subtend any theorization of art and culture (either by way of endorsing or by way 
of rejecting notions of human expressivity). Narrative theory is no exception, and 
for one that is based on the human need to belong, spelling out these assumptions 
is a must. Moreover, it provides an occasion to explicate the anthropological prem-
ises of some other narrative theories. My own search for theoretical models has led 
me to the anthropological philosophy of Helmuth Plessner, especially to his notion 
of “eccentric positionality,” which I want to briefly introduce before broadening 
the discussion.17
For Plessner, all matter can be defined by the ways in which it is positioned in 
the environment, and the first distinction he introduces is that between live and 
dead matter: Live matter has bodies, and these bodies not merely have contours, 
they have boundaries. Moreover, and crucially, the traffic across these boundaries 
defines their place (or positionality) in the world. Plants, for instance, are living 
17 Plessner’s work has been subject to a remarkable rediscovery in recent years, but remains little 
known outside of the German-speaking academic world because only a fraction of it has been 
translated. An English translation of Plessner’s monumental Stufen des Organischen und der 
Mensch, originally published in 1928, is currently in the making. A f irst effort to present Pless-
ner’s philosophical anthropology to the English-speaking academic world is de Mul, Plessner’s 
Philosophical Anthropology. See Horstmannshoff, The Loop for an insightful discussion of Pless-
ner’s model of subjectivity and its ramifications for the study of human space-boundedness. In 
stressing the “ecstatic” dimension that engenders human consciousness by pulling it out of itself, 
Judith Butler’s recently republished reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit in Subjects of 
Desire is engaged with related concerns.
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bodies with no special relation to their boundaries, and this makes their position-
ality open. Animals do have a special relation to their boundaries; in fact, their 
high-strung nervous system makes their positionality closed. Human beings have 
a self-reflexive relation to their boundaries; they not only live and experience their 
lives, but they also experience the experience of their lives. And this decenters their 
positionality, making it eccentric. In Plessner’s words, “[wo]man is not in an equi-
librium, [she] is without a place, stands outside time in nothingness, is character-
ized by a constitutive homelessness (ist konstitutiv heimatlos). [She] always still has 
to become ‘something’ and create an equilibrium for [herself].” And because this 
state is “unbearable” it becomes the “ultimate foundation of the technical artifact 
(Werkzeug) and that which it serves: culture.” In fact, the eccentric positionality 
of human beings is what makes them “artificial by nature” (Schriften IV 385; my 
translation, emphasis in the original).18
Based on this model, I contend that human beings are incomplete—non-sus-
tained—without narrative; that in engaging with narrative, they assert— create, 
build—a place in the world. In substantiating this claim, I want to broaden the 
discussion. Defining human being via a fundamental lack, and assigning art and 
culture with a primary role in remedying this lack grew into a sprawling discourse 
in the twentieth century, with philosophical anthropology, phenomenology and 
psychoanalysis as its main intellectual venues. Plessner’s “eccentric positionality,” 
Martin Heidegger’s assumption that human beings are “thrown” (geworfen) into 
a world without meaning, Jean-Paul Sartre’s notion of the “absolute freedom” to 
which man is condemned, Sigmund Freud’s notion of “the uncanny” (das Unheim-
liche) haunting us where we feel most secure and familiar, Jacques Lacan’s “mirror 
stage” as a primal scene of a subject formation based on misrecognition, these 
are all figurations of the modern subject, uprooted and alienated, some of them 
“paranoid, even fascistic” (Foster, Return 226).19 What they all have in common 
18 In the f inal chapter of Stufen des Organischen, Plessner deducts three anthropological laws from 
human beings’ eccentric positionality: (1) that human beings live in a state of “natural artif icial-
ity” that give occasion to the production of culture; (2) that they live in a state of “mediated im-
mediacy,” condemned to express themselves again and again to f ind themselves; and (3) being 
the animal with a utopian standpoint, they are always searching for a secure place—thus the 
monopoly of religion—yet unable to ever reach it.
19 “Ghosted in his theory,” writes Hal Forster about this implicit historicity of Lacan’s mirror stage, 
“is a contemporary history of which fascism is the extreme symptom: a history of world war and 
military mutilation, of industrial discipline and mechanical fragmentation, of mercenary murder 
and political terror. In relation to such events the modern subject becomes armored—against 
otherness from within (sexuality, the unconscious) and otherness without (for the fascists this 
can mean Jews, Communists, gays, women), all f igures of this fear of the body in pieces come 
again, of the body given over to the fragmentary and the f luid” (Return 226). I f ind this observa-
tion more than apt. Set into perspective like this, Lacan’s theory of subject formation becomes 
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is a conflicted and uncertain sense of belonging—and this tell us that theoretical 
vogues are bound up with concerns with belonging as well. One can only specu-
late about why poststructuralist models, with their alleged relativism and their re-
spective marginalization of existential concerns have exhausted their explanatory 
power while materialist approaches such as object-oriented ontology, speculative 
realism and cognitive linguistics are on the rise today, but it seems safe to say that 
our thoroughly globalized, mobilized, and digitally mediated world has given new 
relevance to questions of belonging.
This book is part of this zeitgeist, but contrary to the new materialisms, which 
tend to deemphasize or even level the significance of the human, its goal is to think 
beyond the postmodern without eliminating its “residual humanism” (McGurl, 
“Geology” 380). And for this project, anthropological philosophy and phenome-
nological hermeneutics offer useful alternatives to the psychoanalytical models 
of subject-formation (grounded in Lacan’s mirror stage and Althusser’s notion of 
ideological interpellation based on Lacan) that have come to dominate critical dis-
course in the wake of the linguistic turn.20 My point of departure in assessing these 
models is something they have in common: They all base their notion of what it 
means to be human on the idea of a constitutive lack. But this lack is conceived in 
different ways, with vast implications as of how human beings are shaped by this 
lack, and of narrative’s role in shaping—constituting—human beings.
In psychoanalytic models, narrative springs from the experience of losing 
an undifferentiated state of wholeness: the state of being one with the nurturing 
mother. Driven a relentless desire (Peter Brooks even calls it a narrative desire) 
for something irretrievably lost, narrative generates projections that range from 
nostalgic regress to utopian transgression. As such, it is immensely productive, a 
force that coerces us to imagine and act in order to make up for what is perceived 
as lacking. These operations are irreducible to expressing and giving coherence to a 
mere want, for they are backed by a visceral need to belong not unlike the irreduc-
ible needs of the material body.21 In fact, the primordial experience of loss creates a 
tangible as a historically conditioned radicalization of the Freudian, narcissistic loss of undiffer-
entiated wholeness—a conceptual move with far-reaching implications for the possibilities of 
entertaining a sense of belonging within the frame of this particular model.
20 See McGurl, “Geology” for a lucid discussion of how speculative realism and object-oriented on-
tology endorse an amplif ied antihumanism as a means of thinking beyond the latent human-
ism of the postmodern. For recent returns to Heidegger and Plessner see, for instance, the 2017 
Modern Fiction Studies Issue on “Dwelling in the Global Age” and de Mul, Plessner’s Philosophical 
Anthropology.
21 This need-and-demand structure of “narrative desire” follows Lacan’s reinterpretation of the 
Freudian concept, in which desire is born from a split between need (for nourishment/the moth-
er’s breast) and demand (for love). It is “irreducible to need, for it is not in its principle relation to 
a real object, independent of the subject, but rather to a phantasy; it is irreducible to demand, in 
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psychosomatic sense of incompleteness that narrative seeks to mend, for Brooks by 
enlisting the rivaling forces (or desires) of Eros and the death drive for engender-
ing plot. And since narrative desire is ultimately the desire for the end (death, qui-
escence, non-narratibility), narration serves as the tool with which to emplot one’s 
life “toward [that] end under the compulsion of imposed delay” (Brooks, Reading 
295).22 Read along these lines, Dorothy’s act of calling her home into existence 
promises verbal eloquence and psychic enchantment but no material gratification. 
And by the same token, maturing in matters of belonging increases the capacity to 
transform material need into psychic demand. But the underlying need is never 
replenished. It leaves “memory traces” (55) that seek—demand—realization in the 
realm of the imaginary, in places like Oz. From a Lacanian perspective, such places 
are imaginary in troublesome ways: As phantasmatic images of wholeness they 
reiterate (and thus keep alive) the primal scene of loss. Where a Freudian desire 
to belong is quintessentially the desire of one’s death (prompting Brooks to argue 
that narrative desire is ultimately the desire for the end, for a promised state of 
quiescence), the Lacanian counterpart is essentially circular, leading to ever more 
desire, and never to more belonging.
So yes, there are different psychoanalytical models, but in one aspect they 
all agree: The yearning subject may dream of, yearn for, or even contest having 
a place in the world—but it cannot build such a place, for the place that is longed 
for is quintessentially phantasmatic. It may have been these implications that led 
 Gabriele Schwab, in her psychoanalytical model, to D. W. Winnicott rather than 
to Freud or Lacan. For Winnicott, the mother’s absence creates a “transitional 
space” that functions “as a space for the imagination’s testing and mastering of 
the demands and tasks posed by the gradual development of intersubjectivity”—a 
process that makes this space potentially generative of poetic speech with the effect 
of alleviating the subject’s entanglement with the symbolic order (Subjects 22-48; 
here 28).23 In fact, the psychic space of “transference” invites the subject to continu-
ally reshape its boundaries through an imaginary encounter with others. This also 
means that narrative use does not necessarily create misrecognition (as it does for 
Lacan); it can indeed lead to valuable transformation. Narrative art assumes a spe-
cial role in this model that points toward Schwab’s affiliation with Wolfgang Iser 
and the Constance School. In providing protected versions of this psychic space, 
that it seeks to impose itself without taking account of language and the unconscious of the oth-
er, and insists on being absolutely recognized by the other” (Laplanche and Pontalis, Vocabulaire 
de la psychoanalyse 122; quoted in Brooks, Reading 55).
22 Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle is the “masterplot” of Brooks’s narrative theory. See Chap. 2, 
which was separately published before as “Freud’s Masterplot.”
23 See also Schwab, Mirror 1-46. Coming out of the Constance School, Schwab casts her notion of 
reading as an act of “transference” deliberately against Iser’s notion of “transfer,” which she 
f inds too schematic in its intersubjective engagement with the other.
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narrative art assures that the experience of breaking down the boundaries between 
the real and the imaginary can be reenacted throughout a person’s life. For Schwab, 
narrative gravitates toward poetic expression and fictional boundary-crossing be-
cause human beings yearn for an “other.” This understanding of narrative corre-
sponds with a psychic structure that is highly amenable to change and explicitly 
geared toward imaginative culture. And yet, the transformation that it envisions 
remains confined to a logic of internalization and projection: The yearning subject 
may keep readjusting its boundaries when engaging with narrative art time and 
again, but it cannot transform what lies beyond them.
Peter Brooks argues along similar lines when proposing that all narrative acts 
are bound to “discover, and make use of” the intersubjective and inherently di-
alogic nature of language itself (Reading 60). Embedded in this discovery is the 
secret of “narrative transference”—Brooks’s ruby red slippers. “The motivation of 
plotting is intimately connected to the desire of narrating, the desire to tell, which 
in turn has to do with the desire for an interlocutor, a listener, who enters into the 
narrative exchange” (216). Turning to Roland Barthes’s notion of the “contractual” 
nature of all storytelling—its asking for something in return for what it supplies—
Brooks contends that contract is too static a term to conceive of this exchange; 
unsuited to acknowledge the degree of transformation invoked by it. I could not 
agree more with this assessment, especially of the yearning for a receiving other 
that is both expressed and pursued in and through narrative. But I also cannot fail 
to notice how close these ideas are to the basic premise of reception aesthetics,: that 
narrative is incomplete without a willing receiver, and that theorizing narrative 
must thus account for the insurmountably (inter)subjective and provisional di-
mension of transfer and exchange. Schwab makes a similar move when combining 
Winnicott’s transitional space with George Poulet’s phenomenology of reading to 
substantiate the transformative capacities of consuming narratives (Mirror 25-
27).24 It is worth pondering over these phenomenological proxies here for another 
moment, for they bring out a striking disposition of the psychoanalytical model 
of subjectiviy: Without at least a hint of the decidedly spatial positioning of the 
subject envisioned by phenomenologists (and especially without the thetic move 
toward the world that this school of though tends to stress), engaging in narrative 
is a self-serving operation of desire. What it engenders is nothing but a mere symp-
tom of an insurmountable state of lack. And while the results of this relentless pro-
cess may be interesting or even innovative manifestations of the basic lack of and 
from which they speak, their only remedy is to “love” or “enjoy” one’s symptom.25
24 Another important point of reference for Schwab is Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language. In 
this early monograph, Kristeva, who is usually steeped in psychoanalysis and poststucturalism, 
turns to Husserl’s idea of the “thetic” to conceptualize signification’s inherent positionality, its 
indispensable and processual working across space.
25 This last formulation evokes Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom!
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What, then, do phenomenological models have to offer? They, too, assume that 
narrative is born out of lack, but this lack is not the result of a primary experience 
of loss; it is in and by itself foundational. Human beings are not hardwired to the 
environment like other animals, and the lacking connectivity marks the world 
(when perceived by this “impaired” life-form) with a fundamental lack of meaning. 
Which is why human beings experience themselves as “thrown” (geworfen) into a 
world that is infinite and opaque. At the same time, however, realizing this lack of 
meaning and connectivity sets in motion a life-long activity of interpretation, to 
which the unknowability of one’s death poses the greatest challenge.26 This is the 
basic set-up of Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics and, acknowledged or not, it 
has vast repercussions on the works of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, and 
the Constance School. All of them assume, in one way or another, that interpreta-
tion (which I view as a mode of narrative engagement) is a basic constituent, “an 
anthropological modality […] that achieves a never-completed mediation between 
human beings and the world.” For Gadamer, texts are the intermediary objects 
(Zwischenprodukte) of this activity, “their manifestation as writing operates as a 
temporary stasis in an ongoing dialogical process” (Schwab, Mirror 17). And al-
though not a direct influence on these phenomenological hermeneutists, Plessner’s 
model of “eccentric positionality” is seamlessly compatible with their ideas on this 
matter. Moreover, and crucially, Plesser’s model links concerns with embodiment 
to the sources and trajectories of narrative use that become tangible here. To reit-
erate a point that I have made above, for Plessner, it is the self-reflexive relation of 
the human body to its boundaries that generates the recurring need to express its 
being in the world in relation to the environment. Narrative forms and practices 
exist for this very purpose.
It is important to stress that the lack of meaning and connectivity in phenom-
enological models is just as insurmountable as the lack of wholeness in psychoan-
alytical models. However, in not going back to a traumatic experience of loss (the 
lost state of wholeness with the nurturing mother), it is less inclined to produce 
hermetic states of mourning such as nostalgia or melancholia, or other self-en-
amoring desires. Rather, it is a type of lack that draws its bearer out of herself and 
into the world, forcing her to engage with the world. In Paul Ricoeur’s words: “It is 
because there is first something to say, because we have an experience to bring to 
language, that conversely language is not only directed towards ideal meaning but 
also refers to what is” (Interpretation 21). The phenomenological type of lack thus 
leads directly to a yearning for voice and form—to language, which assumes its 
referentiality (and its narrative capacity) through the existential yearning to make 
the world over in terms that are meaningful. And because of this entanglement 
26 See Heidegger, Being and Time, esp. chapters 4-6. Da-sein, Heidegger’s term for this existential 
reality of human being, is not an unmediated basis of being, but in arising from its own projec-
tion, it is already the result of interpretation.
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with the ontological condition of being in the world, human language is, according 
to Ricoeur, “not a world of its own. It is not even a world. But because we are in the 
world, because we are affected by situations, and because we orient ourselves com-
prehensively in those situations, we have something to say, we have an experience 
to bring to language” (Interpretation 20-21). (Perhaps we turn to etymology for 
precisely this reason: to decipher the changing character of experience brought to 
language from its shifting reference to what is.)
“Orientation,” “situation,” these are traces of narrative’s spatial dimension. In 
Heidegger’s notion of “dwelling,” this dimension is much more pronounced. The 
experience of being thrown into a world that fundamentally lacks meaning (and 
thus lacks a securely given place) not only triggers a fundamental need for inter-
pretation (and thus for narrative); it also leads to the realization that dwelling is 
not a given but a matter of learning to dwell. For Heidegger, being in the world 
assumes a place and sense of self through building—an activity that, if correctly 
performed, gathers dispersed aspects of the environment and sets human beings 
in relation to the world thus opened up for them to dwell. It is indeed the realiza-
tion of this lack that “calls mortals into their dwelling” (“Building” 159; emphasis 
in the original).27 And while it would, of course, be foolish to dispute Heidegger’s 
deep-seated concern with human temporality, in his later work (starting in the 
postwar years) the experience of temporal contingency leads straight to an in-
vestment in place-making. But building may or may not succeed; in fact, it is the 
ability to think that enables both building and dwelling.28 And this ability is tied 
to a sensuous mode of perception. Placed in a semantic field with terms such as 
“being let into” (einlassen), “being turned toward the world in a friendly manner” 
(der Welt freundlich zugewandt sein) and “nursing” (hüten) (Heidegger, “Was heißt 
denken?”; my translation), thinking is the primary means of becoming immersed 
in the world’s lack of meaning.
27 In what reads like an anticipation of the spatial turn, Heidegger contends in this essay that we 
can only think of space as space used by human beings (and thus as social space), given to them 
through their need to dwell, and constantly changing under their building efforts. Here is one 
particularly iconic passage in this regard: “When we speak of man and space, it sounds as though 
man stood on one side, space on the other. Yet space is not something that faces man. It is neither 
an external object nor an inner experience. It is not that there are men, and over and above them 
space; for when I say ‘a man,’ and in saying this word think of a being who exists in a human man-
ner—that is, who dwells—then by the name ‘man’ I already name the stay within the fourfold 
among things. […] Spaces, and with them space as such—‘space’—are always provided for 
already within the stay of mortals. Spaces open up by the fact that they are let into the dwelling 
of man” (“Building” 154-55).
28 See Harris, Ethical Function for an extensive discussion of Heidegger’s trialectic of building, dwell-
ing, and thinking.
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Moreover, and crucially, thinking can make present what it perceives. In a lat-
er essay, “… Poetically Man Dwells …,” these romantic implications are ampli-
fied in the move from thinking to poiesis, a hermeneutic practice that is assigned 
with the capacity to transform the world into a suitable dwelling place by means 
of taking imaginative measures.29 For Heidegger, Hölderlin’s poetry exemplifies 
these forth-bringing capacities of verbal art (the title of the essay is borrowed from 
Hölderlin), but is Dorothy’s act of calling not a similar attempt of taking mea-
sure? Of exploiting the imagination to express and direct her longing for that place 
called home, and to realize and embrace its inherently evocative, provisional, and 
mediated nature? Two correlated trajectories become tangible here that I will fur-
ther explore in the final section of this chapter. If Dorothy’s call gives voice to a 
quintessentially modern sense of being in the world, what we discover at the end 
of her journey is an enhanced tie between belonging and narrative art. And if one 
of the challenges of modern life is that home often lacks a stable referent whose 
evocation could make this place present (like a passe-partout), calling out for that 
place may not be not enough. More often than not, it has to be built, word by word, 
sentence by sentence, storyline by storyline.30
29 The forth-bringing capacitiy that poiesis brings to dwelling resonates with Heidegger’s general 
notion of art making present that which is not yet present and can only become present through 
art. See Heidegger, “Work of Art.”
30 If heightened concerns with belonging in our present age make it worth returning to Heidegger 
today, such a move must reject his reactionary longings to return to an Arcadian place untouched 
by modernity at all cost. Plessner provides a wholesome counterweight here. For him, yearnings 
for a place in the world should resist the bourgeois overexpansion of inwardness that looms 
large in Heidegger’s thinking (and in existence philosophy in general), and instead turn the con-
stitutive inscrutability of human being into a political obligation. Writing against the backdrop 
of the Great War, the faltering Weimar Republic, and the rise and fall of Nazi totalitarianism, his 
Jewish background made him an ardent cosmopolitan where Heidegger wrote and dreamt about 
preserving his Black Forrest hut. The fault line between the private and the political that become 
tangible here (and that Plessner explores in his later work, especially in Macht und menschliche 
Natur and “Schicksal der Deutschen”) is resurfacing today from a vastly dif ferent constellation, 
yet with undeniable force. How to deal with the injustices inflicted upon so many by a rampant 
f inancial capitalism and environmental recklessness, with religious and expansionist wars, and 
with the millions and millions of people left anxious and uprooted under these circumstances, 
mobilized not only by immediate threat or hardship, but also by digitally mediated notions of a 
better life circulating around the globe? If living in today’s world has indeed lent new relevance 
to existential matters, a return to existence philosophy is only feasible when its traditional con-
cerns with private wellbeing and self-realization are opened up to larger social responsibilities. 
See, for instance, the conference on “Political Existence” at the Centre for Studies in Practical 
Knowledge and Philosophy Department at Södertörn University, Sweden in November 2015.
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A hermeneutics of dwelling, in the poetic sense suggested here, is not a genu-
inely phantasmatic enterprise. It is a practical function of narrative, and perhaps 
even its primary use. That this use gravitates to the realm of art to give meaning 
and mooring to our lives makes it an especially potent remedy; in fact, without this 
drift, the stories by which we live would soon become stale and our dwelling places 
out of sync with our needs.31
Historic aL tr a jec tories
Expanding narrative into the ontological realm is a contestable enterprise, which 
is why I want to revisit and contextualize this claim. According to Stephen White, 
whom I will follow here for a moment, the recent “turn” toward ontology gained 
traction once the term no longer referred to a restricted field of philosophical scru-
tiny into matters of being but to a more general questioning of what “entities” are 
presupposed by our theories. Ontological concerns have hence migrated from phi-
losophy to other fields, among them cultural and literary studies, where they have 
surfaced in claims about affect, language, narrative, objects and subjects.32 And if 
the sense of uncertainty brought about by the crisis of late modernity has affected 
many of the things taken for granted in the modern world, the new interest in 
ontology may very well be “the result of a growing propensity to interrogate more 
carefully those ‘entities’ presupposed by our typical ways of seeing and doing” (4). 
In the proverbial front row of these interrogations are “enlightened” ideas about 
the human subject, sustained by the familiar subscriptions to its self-reliant and so-
cially disengaged autonomy. Ontological commitments growing out of the waning 
certainty about the “Teflon” constitution of the modern subject hence seek to re-
place it with a “stickier” one, with the effect of stressing its manifold dependencies 
on natural, social, and cultural worlds. Conceiving the subject through an existen-
tially imposed and narratively sustained need to belong is such a commitment.33
31 Riceour uses the term pharmakon to describe this alleviating, healing dimension of narrative. 
Interpretation Theory 43; quoted in Valdés, “Introduction” 6.
32 For the f irst development see, for instance, Hemmings, “Invoking Affect;” McDonald, “Language 
and Being,” and “The Ontological Turn.” Some key texts of the second development are Deleuze 
and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus; Meillassoux, After Finitude; Gabriel, Transcendental Ontology; 
Bennett, Vibrant Matter; Latour, Reassembling the Social; Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics.
33 It is worth stressing that this line of reasoning is seamlessly compatible with posthuman revi-
sions of this “entity,” for it locates the life-form in question in a thoroughly hybrid space between 
its being and its environment. And if the network (with its familiar challenges to nature-technol-
ogy and subject-object dichotomies) has become the dominant mode of life-world, the life-form 
in need to belong may or may not be human anymore; yet it is still quintessentially weak and 
mortal, and still inclined to use its narrative capacitates to deal with these basic vulnerabilities.
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For White, the new commitments go hand in hand with a shift from “strong” 
to “weak” ontologies—ontologies that, rather than positing foundations of human 
being whose validity is categorically unchanging and of universal reach, operate 
upon a basic set of conceptualizations that are at once fundamental and contest-
able. Instead of postulating fixed ideas of “human nature or telos,” they present 
context-bound “figurations of human being in terms of certain existential reali-
ties.” And while these realities are “in some brute sense universal constituents of 
human being” (9), their meaning, even when analyzed in the most clearly defined 
correlations, is categorically indeterminable (no matter how closely we scrutinize 
language, life, or death, we will not find a discernible essence or terminal mean-
ing). My contestable claim, then, is that human engagement with narrative is one 
of these existential realities; that narrative springs from the eerie feeling that we 
are weak and mortal, and that using its mediating capacities is imperative if life 
is to be moored and meaningful. The ways in which we feel weak and mortal are, 
of course, never fully articulable, and they change over space and time, place and 
lifespan. But modern life has amplified these feelings, and in doing so it has boost-
ed narrative productivity. For when the old keepers of certainty (such as feudalism 
and theology) lost their coercive powers, narrative offered itself as a viable tool 
to counteract the vastly multiplying, accelerating, and often persistent feelings of 
uncertainty that people now had to face. An increased and increasingly metamor-
phosing engagement with narrative has thus been generated as the articulating, 
structuring, and implementing agent of belonging.
The etymological history of the term bears traces of these developments. At 
first, “belonging” was strictly used in the substantive plural to refer to objects of 
possession (“my belongings”), but by the mid-eighteenth century this use was 
complemented by the abstract singular (“belonging”) that denotes the existential, 
emotional state that concerns us here. This semantic drift away from substantive, 
unilateral claims of ownership (and, by extension, to a secure and proper place in 
the world) points toward a profound restructuring in the social organization of 
property: In the emerging market economy, material possessions began to take on 
a supplementary rather than a stabilizing function; as “goods” they were perpetu-
ally consumed rather than securely possessed. In this situation, belonging assumes 
a new meaning (“to belong”) that testifies to an increased need to make use of the 
verbal capacity to bind and cohere. This capacity was further enhanced by the fact 
that the new term was intransitive: It reaches out and moves toward something (a 
place, a person) to become complete, and this quality enhances its use for orienta-
tion.34 In sum, the change was substantial. “Belonging” now functioned as a rela-
tive rather than an absolute marker of position, which also means that it became 
34 This etymological assessment is based on The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1933 
reprint 1961); The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology (H.W. Wilson, 1988); The Oxford Dictionary 
of English Etymology. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1966); A Concise Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, Second Ed. 
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inherently deictic. Indeed, the structural incompleteness marking it now served to 
enhance and proliferate the practical ties between belonging and narrative.
Once again, the relation between space and narrative offers itself as a viable tra-
jectory along which to expound these ideas further. Following Edward Soja, I take 
the recurring “recomposition[s] of space-time-being in their concrete forms” that 
are the result of modernization as constitutive of the ever-shifting, heterogeneous 
fabric of social being that Soja calls modernity (Postmodern Geographies 27). And 
from this notion of modernity as modernization, and modernization as a dynamic 
compound of temporal, spatial and social forces, it is just a small step to arguing 
that the perpetual transformations thus unleashed are conducted to a substantive 
degree through narrative. Which brings me to Henri Lefebvre’s famous model of 
space as produced in a trialectic of perceived space (espace perçu), conceived space 
(espace conçu), and lived (including represented) space (espace vecu): Lefebvre does 
not mention narrative in his model of spatial production, but from the perspective 
of this study there can be no doubt that it features prominently throughout. In the 
conceptual mode of producing space, it plays a key role in architectural planning, 
legal discourse, building instructions, and so forth. It pervades the perceptual 
mode of producing space in the manifold processes of cognitive mapping, espe-
cially the correlation of perceptions and memories. And it essential for the lived 
mode of spatial production, for instance in the fabrication of tales and images that 
charge space with habitual, symbolic, or ritualistic value, and that are indispensi-
ble to making it familiar and meaningful. Spelling out these transactions has vast 
repercussions for matters of narrative use, especially for the aspect of narrative 
agency. In fact, an important claim that I make in this book is that the frequent re-
compositions of time, space and social being caused by modernization have turned 
this kind of agency into a crucial skill—and, respectively, into a highly desirable 
good for consumption and consummation.
Even so, it would be wrong to assume that modernity invented belonging. 
Rather, it laid open a fundamental uncertainty in the human condition that was 
formerly covered up by the coercive epistemologies of religion and feudalism, and 
that now prompted a relentless narrative productiviy. The “modernized” need to 
belong is indeed thoroughly mobilized, inclined to build ever-new homes, often 
by turning inward rather than outward, or by attaching itself to a series of homes 
rather than to just one that is thought to be singular and irreplaceable. In our 
own—global, digital—age, the spatial correlatives of belonging have become in-
creasingly vexed as geographical and social spaces are less and less congruent, and 
dwelling practices are potentially ever more deterritorialized.35 In fact, modern life 
(New York: Macmillan, 1916); Dictionary.com Unabridged, based on the Random House Dictionary, 
http://dictionary.reference.com; Middle English Dictionary, http://quod.lib.umich.edu.
35 See, for instance, Beck, “Vorwort.” Arjun Appadurai goes so far as to argue that dwelling in the 
world has become so drastically deterritorialized and infused with imagining one’s life based on 
Belonging, Narrative, and the Ar t of the Novel 35
has gradually dematerialized the modalities of belonging, shifting them away from 
beloved and presumably stable landscapes, dwellings, and social bonds, away from 
a soil that has been cultivated by one’s family for generations, away from durable 
and secure possessions, away from struggles over ownership and dispossession—
and toward the world of letters and the imagination.
These claims are at once vastly general and decidedly limited. My argument 
is, first and foremost, an argument about the changing uses of narrative in the 
ever-changing fabric of modern life. Specifically, I suggest that within the un-
even continuum of modernity, the advent of Neuzeit opened up new trajectories 
for the structural and practical ties between belonging and narrative. Powered by 
the “discovery” of the Americas, the emergence of global trade systems, the rise 
of individualism, instrumental reason, and the “enlightened” formation of knowl-
edge, the conditions of life changed substantially in the Western world around 
the time of the Renaissance, with the effect of enhancing the need for orientation 
and emplacement on a massive scale. In this situation, the demand for new stories 
to live by leaped to unprecedented heights, causing a sheer explosion of narrative, 
“whether in fiction, history, philosophy, or any of the social sciences,” which de-
throned theology and established history “as the key discourse and central imagi-
nation” (Brooks, Reading 5-6). The pertinence that historical storytelling gains at 
this time is a powerful token of narrative’s altered function to mend troubled states 
of belonging in the modern world. The development was driven by a loss of prov-
idential plots and their capacity to settle doubts about the existential constituents 
of human being, and it absorbed, as Hayden White has forcefully argued, the basic 
modes and conventions of literary storytelling, with the effect of blurring the line 
between factual and fictional narrative in its scientific quest for meaning.36
 The other significant change occurred in the realm of literary storytelling, 
most notably through the emerging form of the novel. The story of the novel as 
the paradigmatic literary form of modern life has often been told—so often that 
the offerings of globalized mass media that “ethnography must redefine itself as that practice 
of representation which illuminates the power of large-scale, imagined life possibilities over 
specif ic life trajectories” (“Ethnoscapes” 200). However, he then only gives a most rudimentary 
sketch of what ethnography as a practice of representation may amount to, leaving aside how 
notions of representation are currently rethought in ontological terms. Similarly, Doreen Massey 
who, when contemplating the present state of “[t]hat place called home” in the light of these 
current challenges, insists that it “never was an unmediated experience” (Space, Place 164), but 
then does not care to address any of the further implications that this basic necessity of media-
tion has for matters of emplacement and belonging.
36 Applying Northrop Frye’s formalist model to historiography, White argues that writing history 
follows the same basic narrative modes as f iction (comedy, tragedy, romance, satire), which are, 
in turn, inclined to use dif ferent kinds of f igurative language (tragedy to metonymy, romance to 
synecdoche, satire to irony). See White, Metahistory, and “Literary Artifact.”
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is has become deeply engrained into the history of modernity itself. For Walter 
Benjamin, the rise of the novel bears testimony to an emerging state of alienation, 
brought forth by the capitalist rationalization of work routines. The resulting death 
of oral (and thus communal) storytelling solidifies this unfortunate state.37 Argu-
ing along similar lines, Georg Lukács sees in the novel the quintessential expres-
sion of a “transcendental homelessness” (Theory 41), “the epic of a world that has 
been abandoned by God” (88), “of an age in which […] the immanence of meaning 
in life has become a problem” (56). Its prototypical hero is a “product of estrange-
ment from [an] outside world” (66) that has become internally heterogeneous and 
fractured. The novel responds to this unhomely world by turning the search for 
form into its primary artistic end, and in doing so, it “transform[s] itself into the 
normative being of becoming” (72-73, my emphasis). Mikhail Bakhtin, although 
diametrically opposed—enthusiastic—in judgment, confirms these observations. 
For him, the novel is “a genre-in-the-making” that we find “in the vanguard of all 
literary development (11).” Its “peculiar capacity to change” stems from “a very 
specific rupture in the history of European civilization: its emergence from a so-
cially isolated and culturally deaf semipatriarchal society, and its entrance into 
international and interlingual contacts and relationships” (11)—in short, from the 
modernizing processes launched by Neuzeit.
That the novel “is determined by experience, knowledge and practice (the fu-
ture)” (15) must have compelled an audience struggling with a profound loss of 
familiarity, with finding new ways of doing and making while facing a structur-
ally uncertain future. There is no need to venture further into these well-known 
accounts to grasp how unanimously they insist on the novel’s functional relation 
to modern life. For all of them, the new genre springs from a heightened sense of 
37 See Benjamin, “The Storyteller.” To cite two iconic passages from the essay’s well-known argu-
ment: “The earliest symptom of a process whose end is the decline of storytelling is the rise of the 
novel at the beginning of modern times [Neuzeit in the German original]. What distinguishes the 
novel from the story (and from the epic in the narrower sense) is its essential dependence on the 
book. The dissemination of the novel became possible only with the invention of printing. […] 
The storyteller takes what he tells from experience—his own or that reported by others. And he 
in turn makes it the experience of those who are listening to his tale. The novelist has isolated 
himself. The birthplace of the novel is the solitary individual, who is no longer able to express 
himself by giving examples of his most important concerns, is himself uncounseled, and cannot 
counsel others.” (363). Respectively, the model situation of oral storytelling is a pre-modern, ar-
tisan workplace that becomes extinct in the modern age: “The resident master craftsman and the 
traveling journeymen worked together in the same rooms; and every master had been a traveling 
journeyman before he settled down in his home town or somewhere else. If peasants and seamen 
were past masters of storytelling, the artisan class was its university. In it was combined the lore 
of far away places, such as a much-traveled man brings home, with the lore of the past, as it best 
reveals itself to natives of a place” (364-65).
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instability, which it sutures by means of its extraordinarily amendable capacities 
of narrative form-giving. A mechanically facilitated printing process, the rise of 
an aspiring class of professional writers, and a fiction-hungry (largely bourgeois 
and often female) audience paved the novel’s road to success, soon turning its 
comparatively unrefined, long form of storytelling into the most popular literary 
genre of the modern age. There were, however, initial suspicions against the se-
ductive power on which the rise of the novel to become the first modern mass 
medium thrived. Heated debates revolved around the unpredictable effects that 
reading novels might have on the imagination—which had until then been strictly 
synonymous with mere illusion, just as fiction (which meant mostly sentimental 
fiction at the time) had the reputation of transporting its readers to make-believe 
worlds with the looming threat of forever corrupting their sense of morals and 
reality. Now these assumptions became porous, and novelists had their share in 
overhauling them.
In the transatlantic world, a small yet influential group of writers—among 
them Mary Wollstonecraft, William Goodwin, Thomas Holcraft, Robert Bage, 
Helen Maria Williams, and, in America, Charles Brockden Brown—began to 
claim that fiction harbored, precisely because of the imaginative power that it in-
voked, vital capacities for creating a better society.38 The reformist ambitions of 
these writers were inspired by contemporary efforts to rethink the human mind, 
particularly those of John Locke and David Hume, who began to envision an au-
tonomous psychic realm with new “demands” for the imagination. A fundamental 
rift (uncomfortable for Locke, insurmountable for Hume) was now assumed to sep-
arate an individual’s inner and outer worlds, and the imagination seemed perfectly 
suited to bridge this gap: to correlate perceptions (sensory data stemming from the 
outer world) with memories (sensory data stemming from the inner world) and to 
mediate present and past experience.39 I read the the parallel success stories of the 
38 The early phase of the American novel in the crossfire of these debates is discussed in Davidson, 
Revolution of the Word, and Tompkins, Sensational Designs. For the abovenamed writers, new 
ideas about the imagination and its relation to sentiment served as a touchstone for a reformist 
literature. Strong emotion, they came to believe, could encourage moral behavior, and imagi-
native literature could thus become instrumental in fostering democratic societies. For work on 
these writers and their beliefs see Kelly, The English Jacobin Novel, and English Fiction; Clemit, The 
Godwinian Novel; Shapiro, Culture and Commerce.
39 To briefly rehearse the basic steps of this “remodeling” of the human mind: In his Essay  Concerning 
Human Understanding, Locke claims that the human mind does not process innate ideas (as it 
does for Descartes) but begins its life as a tabula rasa on which sensory perceptions leave im-
mediate and lasting imprints. Yet if this shift in thinking about the human mind—from a safely 
enclosed, self-contained entity to a genuinely vulnerable target of random impressions—cor-
responds to an uncertain, irritated sense of belonging of the subject to whom this mind belongs, 
Locke also pairs the mind’s new vulnerability with a strong instinct for survival. Not only can the 
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novel and the imagination as a remarkable token of the era’s heightened stakes of 
orientation—which is, after all, a successful correlation of perceptions and mem-
ories. In a situation in which the outer world must have lost much of its familiar 
appearance (and perceptions were almost by default strange and distorted), the 
newly designated faculty of the imagination equipped the inner world (and thus 
the very site where memories and perceptions were to be meaningfully connected) 
with a powerful yet precarious tool of recovery.
When the novel emerged as the preferred food for the imagination at right 
around this time, it populated these inner worlds with a sheer endless roundel 
of characters in search for something that might give meaning and mooring to 
their troubled lives. And as we move through the nineteenth century and beyond, 
ever-new genres and sub-genres, artistic forms and devices emerged, with visual 
storytelling (in both still and moving images) becoming an increasingly pertinent 
and creative force of narrative production. That many of the new forms were seri-
alized bears an obvious attraction in light of the continuous need for narrative that 
is a staple of modern needs to belong. Scholars have recently stressed the distinct 
forms of purpose and use afforded by serial narrative (Kelleter, Serial Narrative), 
and the serial publication of novels in popular magazines that often preceded their 
book publication underscores this point. In one of the texts considered here,  Sarah 
Orne Jewett’s The Country of the Pointed Firs, serial publication had a feasible im-
pact on the shifting form of the tale (it first appeared in a magazine, then as a book, 
then in a number of editions, all with different chapter numbers and arrangements). 
Pointed Firs is indeed an especially interesting case for this study, for it brings into 
view how profoundly these material and medial aspects change the terms of the 
narrative use. More importantly, however, the new narrative forms were all chil-
dren of the novel: They responded to the amplification and pluralization of mod-
ern needs to belong with a proliferation of narrative form. Ever since the novel’s 
modern inception in the eighteenth century, its structurally unrefined, endlessly 
malleable form (for Lukács, its “normative being of becoming,” for Bakhtin the 
mind repeat the simple ideas that it derives from sense perception but it also has the capacity 
(albeit still quite mechanical) to rearrange, alter, and fuse the separate elements that it receives 
almost infinitely. Assessing the same set of problems a generation later in his Treatise of Human 
Understanding, Hume dismisses the stability of the external world, which was the last resort of 
certainty in Locke’s model. The mind now responds to experiencing the world so strongly ac-
cording to its own fears and desires that any certainty about it is rendered intangible. The “inner 
world,” now the crucial site of gaining a sense of belonging, is assumed to have no rigid barriers, 
and the most significant mental activity occurred when “reason” and “passion”—stimulated 
by the imagination—mix so thoroughly that distinguishing them became impossible. As this 
quintessential enabler of mental life, the imagination could never not be part of human under-
standing, but its tendencies to exaggerate or tone down the emotional effect on an idea made it 
potentially treacherous. For further reading see Engell, Creative Imagination; Iser, Fictive.
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contagious effect of “novelization”) turned out so conducive to engaging with con-
cerns with belonging that it became the main provider of the narrative frames and 
patterns that modern individuals use to stay orientated and emplaced in the world.
The history of the novel in the U.S. is an especially fascinating case. Perhaps it 
was because the New World contained so little that was familiar for its colonizers 
that not the novel but the more speculative genre of the romance was long viewed 
as the paradigmatic form in American literature.40 Whether one agrees with this 
judgement or not, the romance-typical quest for elusive goals sought in unknown 
territories, the resulting move beyond everyday experience, paired with celebra-
tions of common sense are emblematic of a life-world in which ways of doing and 
making (including the ways of doing and making literature) depended more than 
elsewhere on their capacity to creatively adapt and improvise in the face of the rad-
ically unfamiliar.41 The romance, in its generic endorsement of the unknown, am-
plifies precisely those imaginative capacities to cope with change that, for Bakhtin, 
define the novel—with one crucial difference: In the American context, the “nov-
elization” of narrative art in which romance and novel participated side by side 
was not engaged with a world that had shed itself from a previous state of cultural 
deafness and social isolation as it was the case in Europe. It was engaged with the 
vastly heterogeneous and genuinely modern contact zone opened up by colonizing 
the “world island” of the Americas.
The novels to which I turn in the following chapters all spring from disruptive 
moments in the social fabric that was the outcome of the encounters occurring 
at this site. A site that, from the moment of its inception existed both as spatial 
reality and as a mythical construct, with the nexus of belonging and narrative 
fueling the production of both. With novels that take us across four centuries and 
to four iconic sites in the cultural geography of this contact zone—the gothic fron-
tier, the enchanted region, the immigrant ghetto, the Midwestern homeland—I 
aim to show how the searching form of the novel and the ever-shifting need to 
belong have shaped each other in and through this series of proto-modern settings. 
Specifically, I aim to show how the four novels assembled here are paradigmatic in 
40 An important part of these claims was the assumption that the romance was a distinctively 
American literary form and thus a proper foundation for a non-derivative national literature. See 
Chase; Trilling.
41 Without downplaying the injustices of settler colonialism, Breen insists that “[t]he tale of peo-
pling the New World is one of human creativity” (195). And while many settlers aspired to re-
produce the life they had known, once removed from the “rich particularity of the past” (216), 
the familial ideals and communal norms were anything but well-worn traditions. In Europe, the 
advent of Neuzeit seemed to threaten a familiar and predictable world from the outside; in the 
American context, such an external threat was only conceivable for the indigenous population 
while all other groups were facing a radically unfamiliar world. For the corresponding situation 
in Europe see Kittler 153-68; Gebhardt, Geisler and Schröter 13-18.
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their ways of exposing and transgressing contemporary limits of belonging in and 
through their artistic practice. Tracing the staged agency of the letter, the tactile 
agency of the sketch, the cyclical agency of the found object, and the networking 
agency of the brain-as-storytelling-machine within and beyond the storyworlds of 
the four novels is key to this aim. And it is key to making palpable how the need to 
belong operates as both a driving force of literary production and as an eminent, 
shape-shifting touchstone of narrative use.
2 Poisoned Letters from a Gothic Frontier
 Charles Brockden Brown’s Edgar Huntly
Published in 1799 and set in the mid-1780s, Edgar Huntly; or, Memoirs of a 
 Sleepwalker speaks from a place of utter disruption. During Brown’s short life-
time—he was born in 1771 and died of tuberculosis in 1810—the American, the 
French, and the Haitian Revolutions swept up the Atlantic world. The  Declaration 
of  Independence and the Federalist Papers were published. The Ordinance of 1785 
and the Northwest Ordinance became the legal blueprints for colonizing the 
North American continent. The U.S. Constitution was signed, and soon thereafter 
 Federalists and Republicans found themselves in a fierce battle over the nature 
of the democratic order that had just been ratified. Outside of established cir-
cles and political elites, dissatisfaction with the new order erupted in Shay’s and 
the  Whiskey Rebellions. The Fugitive Slave Law and the Alien and Sedition Acts 
were ratified to regulate undesired movements of non-citizens. The Napoleonic 
Wars broke out and produced a power vacuum that overseas tradesmen (many of 
them American) readily seized. The Louisiana Purchase multiplied the territory 
of the young nation, expanding it into parts of the continent completely unknown 
to its non-indigenous population, which were quickly settled due to increasing 
immigration.
What happened was indeed a “revolution of massive proportions” (Watts, 
 Romance 3). Its perhaps profoundest effect was the breakup of a republican order 
that had rested on values such as the common good, the public sphere, and civil 
responsibility, and its replacement by a liberal-capitalist order inclined to promot-
ing individualism, mobility, self-made success, and the private sphere.1 For a short 
while, coinciding with Brown’s most creative years (between 1797 and 1800), the 
two orders co-existed, forming a “culture of contradictions” (Hedges 107). Edgar 
Huntly responds to this situation by imagining a protagonist who falls out of his 
1 Among the best historical works on this shift are those by Appleby. The republicanism-literalism 
debate has also become a major trajectory of scholarship on early American literature. Warner, 
Zif f, Gilmore, and Dillon stress the active role that the rise of the novel played in bringing about 
the gradual fading of the Early Republic’s republican ideology and its publically oriented literary 
culture.
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familiar life-world. After going to bed one night, he awakes in a pitch-dark cavern, 
barely dressed and miles away from his uncle’s farm, where he has been living with 
his sisters since his parents were killed in an Indian raid. In one terrible instant, the 
world around him grows strange and unfamiliar. The shock of this “fall” haunts 
the tale, constituting a threshold of uncertainty, a liminal space where action—
both physical and narrative—becomes imperative if life is to remain meaningful. 
The rehabilitation of the protagonist depends on restoring meaning and mooring, 
incoherence and unfamiliarity after his “fall,” and he tells his story to this very end. 
Brown’s novel bundles and personifies the need for narrative recovery in the figure 
of the letter-writing protagonist who must tell his story to resume his place in the 
world. But this protagonist is also a sleepwalker, and this means that the actions he 
performs to this end are in a quintessentially deviant, erring state.
The result is a letter of epic proportions. Addressed to his fiancée Mary and 
several hundred pages long, it tells the story of Edgar’s adventures, including the 
trailing of a sleepwalking Irishman whom he suspects of having murdered Mary’s 
brother and his beloved friend, killing and eating a ferocious panther, slaughter-
ing numerous Indians, rescuing a girl from captivity, sleeping in an impressive 
number of beds, escaping an ambush by jumping into a river from impossible 
heights, and fainting several times out of exhaustion along the way. It also tells her 
about Edgar’s encounter with a stranger named Weymouth who made credulous 
claims about the money that Mary had unexpectedly inherited upon her brother’s 
premature death, urging her to return it. And eventually, it tells her that Edgar 
is also a sleepwalker, and that it was his sleepwalking that brought him into the 
wilderness and made him a stranger to himself. Loosely framed by the epistolary 
form, the tale is restless and inconclusive, containing stories within stories, chang-
ing narrators, characters that emerge out of nowhere, elaborate plotlines that are 
suddenly dropped. It is indeed “a charmingly, a maddeningly disorganized book, 
not so much written as dreamed” (Fiedler, Love and Death 157). For a long time, 
the lacking coherence of Brown’s novels was viewed as a major weakness; the sit-
uation could hardly be more different today.2 Brown is now widely celebrated for 
2 Conjointly f ixed by New Criticism’s normative aesthetics and the predominantly “exceptional-
ist” concerns of Cold War American studies, Brown’s reputation as an artistically f lawed writer 
remained f irmly in place until the early 1980s. It was not until the transnational reconfiguration 
of early American studies that his reception underwent a profound revision. Three major shifts 
undergird this development: the breakup of the consensus view of early American ideological 
history and its underlying assumptions about the relation between the individual and society 
through the republicanism-liberalism debate; the programmatic reevaluation of formerly disre-
garded genres such as the sentimental and the gothic, and the general expansion of the literary 
f ield in the wake of the canon debates. Ironically, by 2009 the tides had turned to such an ex-
tent that Waterman, introducing an Early American Studies Special Issue on Brown, wondered if 
‘Brown studies’ had taken over the f ield of early American studies.
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the artful “complexity of his response and exploration of key concerns and issues 
in early national culture,” among them the intersecting debates on republicanism, 
nationalism, and expansionism, the rise of bourgeois liberalism and its impact on 
gender dynamics. And he is praised as an author whose “achievement […] lay in 
his ability to radically challenge both form and content of contemporary writing” 
(Barnard, Kamrath, and Shapiro x). In assuming that “Brown’s work adequately, 
deliberately, and often intelligibly engages or represents a coherent early national 
culture,” the revisionist scholarship inverts the assumptions of earlier criticism, 
which tended “to see Brown as a prototypical Romantic author and framed him 
as writing against his culture rather than typifying it” (Waterman, “Introduction” 
236). In consequence, features such as the maddening incoherence and excessive 
sentimentality of Brown’s novels are now read as historical symptoms whose 
“problematic” forms are artistically sound and innovative means of expressing a 
sense of disorientation engrained into their contemporaneity.3
Building on, and yet departing from these revisions, my own engagement with 
Brown’s work does not aim at producing historical “evidence” about the larger dis-
cursive field in which it is situated and about the subject positions contained in it, 
nor does it seek to determine whether this novel is acting out or striving against 
the premises of its ideological context. Rather, in assuming that uncertain states 
of belonging create a need for narrative recovery that manifests itself in the realm 
of narrative art, this chapter traces how the novel gives voice and form to con-
cerns with belonging at its time. Brown’s fiction is, in fact, deeply entangled with 
the foundations and limitations of dwelling in its nook of the modern world: It 
quarrels with established authorities (Enlightenment ideas of reason, traditional 
gender roles, and the paternalistic order), and is anxious about material insecurity 
and moral corruption in a world mobilized by self-made success. But while all 
of these themes have a recurring presence in Brown’s narrative universe, Edgar 
Huntly adds a new one: the frontier. In fact, the frontier enters American fiction 
with this novel—as a space with a guilt-ridden past that haunts all future prospects 
of dwelling.
3 Garbo’s Coincidental Art was instrumental in bringing about this revaluation. His structuralist 
readings of Brown’s major novels contended that, whatever one might think of Brown’s prose 
style, his plots were intricately crafted rather than hastily improvised. Later critics extended 
this revision with the use of narrative discourse and performance theory. See, for instance, Wall 
Hinds, Barnard, Bellis, Downes, Hagenbüchle, and Hamelman.
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froNtier PaterNaLism meets Liber aL caPitaLism
Edgar Huntly’s frontier is not the mere allegory of a disturbed psyche that a former 
generation of scholars has found in it. It is a “recognizable landscape” (Jehlen 162). 
Moreover, and crucially, this landscape is not portrayed as a “virgin land” innocent-
ly awaiting its defloration but as a site of bloodshed and dispossession.4 Carefully 
modeled after the western parts of Pennsylvania at the time, Edgar Huntly’s frontier 
“provides the literal premises for the possibilities and trajectory of narrative action—
inscribing, describing and circumscribing an extrapolative or speculative […] 
world and giving that fantasized world a significant and visibly signifying shape 
and temporal dimension” (Sobchack 123). It has been rightfully argued that the 
gothic gains psychological depth in Brown’s fiction; this novel adds site-specificity. 
The brutal killings of Edgar’s parents and infant sibling, the resulting move of the 
remaining Huntly children to their uncle’s farm, which has been built at a site for-
merly occupied by a Delaware village, and the killings of Edgar’s uncle and his close 
friend Waldegrave (a cartoon name avant la lettre) spring directly from the violence 
inflicted by settlers taking possession of their non-native land.
The troubled state of belonging engrained into this setting gains voice and 
form in the first-person account of a figure that becomes this story’s narrator out 
of profound experiences of insecurity and loss. Coming to terms with this troubled 
state is the narrative’s primary motivation, motif, and theme. Moreover, imagining 
the novel’s setting in these concrete terms inscribes the dwelling places envisioned 
by it with historical remnants of betrayal and guilt that deeply trouble the ways in 
which these places are suitable dwelling places. It has often been pointed out how 
intensely Edgar Huntly’s depiction of frontier violence draws from historical re-
cord, most notably from the infamous Walking Purchase of 1737, a fraudulent land 
deal between European/Quaker settlers and a Delaware tribe, which took place 
precisely at the site Brown chose as the setting of his story, and which is known 
for having stirred a series of violent revenge raids.5 But while the historical refer-
4 For Jehlen, the novel is “at once seminal and terminal, the f irst to envision a specif ically  American 
psyche and also more or less the last to represent taking possession of the continent not as des-
tined fulf illment but […] as conquest” (161). Earlier readings had valued it primarily for its psy-
chological dimension. Ringe was the f irst to praise Brown for adding a psychic dimension to the 
gothic genre. In fact, for him the “Americanness” of Brown’s f iction was not primarily a matter of 
its setting but of psychologizing narrative techniques. The most influential psychological read-
ing of the novel stems from Fiedler, for whom the protagonist ’s destructive desires are forces 
of the id, which he, in turn, interprets as a token of the conservative underpinnings genuine to 
American gothic f iction in general.
5 Initiated by William Penn’s sons John and Thomas, the Walking Purchase resurveyed a tract of 
land measured on the basis of what could be walked by a man along a windy river in a day and 
a half. Penn’s sons manipulated these conditions by previously clearing straight paths into the 
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ences made by the novel are strikingly accurate and complex (and contemporary 
readers would have been familiar with them), it is important to note that these 
references are implied rather than explicated. In stressing this point, I do not want 
to dismiss the importance of tracing and contextualizing these historical markers. 
However, for the narrative operations performed by the novel, their muteness is 
just as significant. The violence, injustice, and guilt of conquest and dispossession 
with which they are endowed remain silent throughout the novel. In fact, it makes 
sense to assume that relegating these troubled aspects of belonging in between the 
lines was the only way of including them in the story; that they could indeed only 
become part of what was narratable at the time in this muted way.
This point is further underscored by the fact that the mise-en-scène of the fron-
tier is one of gradual domestication. Whenever it is described, this is done by draw-
ing on the picturesque, an aesthetic regime that correlates and binds seemingly 
random and irrelevant parts together with the effect of containing the “unruly” 
features of its object of depiction.6 The houses that Edgar passes on his way from 
the cavern back to civilization illustrate this spatial logic of domestication. Schol-
ars have read these houses as mirroring a progression in Edgar’s behavior, which 
is most violent at the site closest to the wilderness (Garbo 65; Slotkin 384-93), as 
visual markers in the frontier landscape that enhance the domesticating implica-
tions of the picturesque (Berthold 79-83) that “symbolically reiterate the social 
order that they host” (Wall Hinds, “Brown’s Revenge” 56), or as manifesting the 
process of remodeling the period’s notions of national identity (Faherty 56-66). 
What I want to add to these interpretations is that these houses, all allegories of 
wilderness, hiring several walkers in particularly good shape and equipping them with support 
teams. What would under regular conditions have added up to a walk of about twenty-five miles 
was thus extended to sixty-four miles and a resulting territory of 1,200 square miles of tribal land 
that the Delawares then lost to the Pennsylvanian settlers. Scholars have identif ied “the Elm” 
(consistently capitalized throughout the novel), which ironically marks the site of Waldegrave’s 
murder, as a reference to the tree at which the founding of the state was sealed in a peace treaty 
between Quakers, led by William Penn, and Lenni Lenape/Delaware Indians in 1782. For in-depth 
accounts of Brown’s use of this event, see Krause, Luck, and Sivilis. Rowe discusses the Walking 
Purchase as a key event of the rise of U.S. imperialism, in which Brown’s novels participate by 
providing a respective imaginary.
6 For a longer discussion on the importance of the picturesque in the visual appropriation of the 
North American continent, see my essay “Transatlantic Landscapes.” In “Frontiers of Discourse” 
Wall Hinds also stresses the imaginative conquest of space thus performed, supporting Mitchell’s 
claim that landscape can be understood as enacting the “‘dreamwork’ of imperialism, unfolding 
its own movement in time and space from a central point of origin and folding back on itself to 
disclose both fantasies of the perfected imperial prospect and fractured images of unresolved 
ambivalence and unsuppressed resistance” (10). For discussions of the picturesque in Edgar 
 Huntly, see Bertold and Lueck.
Belonging and Narrative46
either precarious or failed dwelling, turn the frontier into a social space—a space 
that becomes visible as produced by the “interlocking and articulating nets of so-
cial relations” (Massey, Space, Place 168) that exist among those who live in these 
houses and those who contest their presence in the frontier landscape. And this 
also means that the houses depicted in the novel turn the frontier into a place 
formed out of a particular set of social relations interacting at a specific locale, and 
deformed by the corrosive forces inscribed into the process of colonialization—a 
process that is problematized by letting the most lavish house degenerate, or by 
using the dwelling sites as a stage for recurring revenge violence.
Countering this western frontier is another, rarely acknowledged but no less 
foundational fiction of modern America: the eastern frontier of the Atlantic, em-
bodied by the figure of the immigrant or “alien other,” and imagined as an unsta-
ble contact zone of possible contagion.7 Gibbons notes that, “[i]n terms of historical 
grievances and political trajectories, both frontiers represent very different pres-
ences on the political landscape: the Native American is territorially defined and 
seeks to retain—or regain—tribal land; the immigrant, by contrast, has forsaken 
the homeland and has chosen to reinvent himself or herself in the New World” (25). 
And because this is so, the two frontiers provide opposing frames for imagining 
potential dwelling places. In the first scenario, these places are to be gained in a 
territorial conflict with roots in the past that haunts all possible forms of belong-
ing with the question of where do we come from. In the second scenario, they are 
to be gained in a social conflict about future mobility that haunts future forms of 
belonging with the question of where do we go.
In Edgar Huntly, the two frontiers overlap and seep into each other, with the 
result of complicating the possibilities of belonging imagined in the novel. Three 
of the dwellers at the western frontier—the drunkard in the dilapidated mansion, 
the nameless builder of the hut on the outer edge of the province, and the murder 
suspect of Edgar’s friend, Clithero, who lives in this hut for a while—are Irishmen, 
and the Native American woman who stays behind when her tribe moves west 
temporarily lives in the same hut, too. I will return to the indigenous character in 
the final section of this chapter, but now I want to take a closer look at the mys-
terious Irishman who most fully embodies the uncertainties associated with the 
eastern frontier. When “conn[ing] over the catalogue” of his neighborhood, Edgar 
7 My reading is inspired by Gibbons, from whom the terms of the “eastern frontier” and the “alien 
other” are drawn. For further discussions of this topic, see Slotkin, Rowe, and Garner. Garner 
specif ically elaborates on how the racializations of these multiple others (including the millions 
of involuntary immigrants brought from Africa as slaves) and their legal regulation through the 
Alien and Sedition Acts played a distinctive role in forging an American identity. Irish immigrants, 
whom the Alien and Sedition Act particularly targeted and who play a key role in providing mys-
terious, potentially evil others in Brown’s novels, are employed as instrumental f igures not only 
in forging that identity but also in threatening to destabilize it.
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singles him out as “the only foreigner among us,” quickly adding that, in the patri-
archal scheme of his community, “this was an exception to the rule. Clithero was 
a stranger, whose adventures and character, previously to his coming hither, were 
unknown to us” (14).8 In the paternalistic order embodied by Edgar’s home com-
munity, the “alien other” without a past is an unpredictable, potentially dangerous 
intruder. What Edgar does not acknowledge, however, is the uncanny resemblance 
of Clithero’s position to his own, orphaned and with no prospect of inheriting land 
as both of them are. But the paternalistic order is vanishing. Its mode of spatial 
production, which used to be the predominant mechanism of domesticating the 
western frontier, is doomed to fail for refusing to integrate those who—like its 
“native son” Edgar and the “alien other” Clithero—fall outside of the scheme of 
land inheritance and thus threaten the cohesion of the settler community. This is 
the spatial predicament of the eastern frontier. The paternalistic order fails again 
because it is haunted by the collective guilt of conquest and dispossession that 
culminates in Waldegrave’s death and the course of destruction following it. This 
is the spatial predicament of the western frontier. Moreover, and crucially, the fail-
ing frontier paternalism does not create any nostalgic longings for its Old World 
predecessor. Even its modernized version, embodied by the Irish noble lady who 
marries the proto-Enlightenment man of reason and multiple skills (ranging from 
surgeon via intellectual and teacher to businessman), is doomed for failing to so-
cially reproduce itself.
Against the vanishing “old-fashioned, even feudal” (Wood, Radicalism 40) 
economy of landownership and inheritance, the emerging order of liberal capi-
talism is cast. This new order is depicted as a vertically and horizontally mobile 
“economics of paper currency and speculation” that is run by an equally emerging 
entrepreneurial class (Wall Hinds, “Brown’s Revenge” 52). In picking up on these 
issues, the novel responds to the unprecedented wealth sweeping the country at 
this time, substantially raising the average level of prosperity and fostering wide 
acceptance of the newly emerging entrepreneurial spirit—not by supporting it but 
by articulating the anxieties stirred by these transformations.9 Even more so than 
the space of the frontier with its wild scenery in need of domestication, the space 
unfolding from this new order is imagined through the figures that embody it. 
And as these figures are strikingly mobile, the space unfolding from their relations 
is marked by the surprising twists and turns of individual itineraries. Weymouth 
8 Charles Brockden Brown, Edgar Huntly; or, Memoirs of a Sleepwalker, ed. Krause and Reid. All fur-
ther references are based on this edition and given in brackets in the main text.
9 For historical work on these developments see Appleby, Capitalism and Liberalism; Watts,  Republic 
and Romance. For work on the cultural implications of this shift, see Schmidtken, Property. See 
Wall Hinds, Private Property for an in-depth discussion of these issues in Brown’s f iction, with a 
special emphasis on their implications for contemporary constructions of gender.
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is the figure that embodies the liberal-capitalist order to the fullest.10 He appears 
out of nowhere at the Huntly farm to ask for Edgar’s help in retrieving a substan-
tial sum of money. In a heartbreaking account of his misfortunes, he tells Edgar 
how he had asked Waldegrave to keep his money for him while embarking on a 
trade adventure across the Atlantic. In fact, he had put everything he owned into 
this adventure to maximize his possible gain—except for the money (a fortune 
substantial enough to secure his existence) that he left with Edgar’s friend. Hoping 
to return with abundant means to provide for his old father, the wife taken during 
his travels, and himself, he suffers a shipwreck, imprisonment, and a life-threat-
ening illness, and ends up losing everything—including legal proof of the money 
transfer—but his own life.
Edgar recounts this story in a passage stretching over several chapters, in which 
the other is portrayed not as a cruel capitalist but as a farsighted, responsible, and 
trustworthy victim of a reckless system. Weymouth’s misfortune and the insecure 
place to which it has brought him are construed as the collateral damage of the 
emerging liberal order, not as the outcome of false ambition or a flawed character.
Is such the lot of those who wander from their rustic homes in search of fortune? Our countrymen are 
prone to enterprise, and are scattered all over the sea and every land in pursuit of wealth which will not 
screen them from disease and infirmity, which is missed much oftener than found, and which, when 
gained, by no means compensates them for the hardships and vicissitudes endured in the pursuit. (154)
But Weymouth’s fate is tragic not only for his own sake. The money that he gave 
to Waldegrave for safekeeping (and that Edgar promises to help restore) is the 
same money the Edgar’s fiancée miraculously inherited upon her brother’s death. 
The prospect of material security for her (and for Edgar) dissolves through the 
appearance of its “rightful owner” (154) just as unexpectedly as it materialized 
through Waldegrave’s untimely death. In this ironic twist of fate, the future place 
envisioned by Edgar and Mary on the basis of Mary’s inheritance turns out to be 
a chimera arising from the unlikely conjunction of two impossible spatial orders: 
the blood-drenched grounds of the paternalistic frontier and the unpredictably 
shifting grounds of the emerging liberal order. Their future relationship is not only 
bound up with Waldegrave’s murder but also with Weymouth’s financial wreck-
age. In fact, the second order proves to be equally as hazardous in this scenar-
io: It “infects” the old, presumably stable prospect of securing one’s place in the 
10 In Arthur Mervyn (1799), Brown’s skepticism concerning this newly emerging order and its rep-
resentatives reaches an extreme in the f igure of Welbeck. Initially coming across as generous, 
well-meaning and committed, behind this calculated façade hides an unscrupulous liar, manip-
ulator, and murderer willing to do anything for his own advancement. The novel’s young protag-
onist Arthur, who becomes a victim of the other’s evil schemes, is yet another f igure embodying 
the emerging order of liberal capitalism with irresolvable ambiguity.
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world by means of inheritance with the contagious instabilities of entrepreneurial 
capitalism.
ePistoLary tr aNsgressioNs
If the world in which belonging is sought in this novel emerges from two conflict-
ing orders and their respective modes of spatial production, both are rejected in the 
figure of its protagonist.11 Edgar is excluded from the patriarchal scheme not only 
once but twice (first by orphanage, then by screwing up the prospect of becoming 
Mrs. Lorimer’s heir), and he does not show any professional aspiration. His two 
outstanding talents—storytelling and box-making—are used for non-commercial 
ends only, his actions are completely devoted to leisure, and he shows no desire to 
change his bohemian life. Edgar’s distinctive (self-)positioning outside of the two 
available orders constitutes the space of enunciation from which the story evolves. 
However, the yearning to belong that drives the narrative is not geared toward 
emplacing its teller in either one of those orders, as both of them are imagined as 
unsuitable for dwelling. Rather, it is geared toward asserting a sense of belonging 
in and through the act of narration itself. 
The novel opens programmatically in this regard—by staging an allocative verti-
go that generates its momentum directly from an ailing state of incoherence, so that 
“narration [becomes] the only viable form of ‘explanation’” (Brooks, Reading 54).
I sit down, my friend, to comply with thy request. At length does the impetuosity of my fears, the 
transports of my wonder permit me to recollect my promise and perform it. At length I am somewhat 
11 In construing the novel’s central f igure as an orphan with f luctuating f igures of authority, Edgar’s 
lacking position within the available social orders is tied to a resentment against patriarchal 
authorities that was not uncommon at the time of the novel’s production. For Elliott, this crisis of 
authority is closely intertwined with the waning influence of religious, and particularly Puritan 
authorities. He sees the emergence of professional writers like Brown in direct response to this 
development. Fliegelman delineates how Lockean and Rousseauean ideas of authority unsettled 
traditional modes of parental care, romantic courtship, and family life. New pedagogical ideals, 
such as the cultivation of affective individualism, fostered a less authoritarian, more contractual 
understanding of social relations. The novel clearly resonates within these reframings, yet it 
preferably features social contracts that are canceled rather than ratif ied or productively altered, 
thereby stressing an atomization of social life and adding to the general trend of mobilization 
and the sense of instability and precariousness of existence conveyed by it. Sarsefield, for exam-
ple, breaks with Edgar because the latter did not adhere to his advice; Edgar cancels his engage-
ment to Mary as the f inancial circumstances on which it was founded change. Both relations are 
dissolved on the basis of a written exposition explaining the altered grounds legitimizing the 
termination of the “contract.”
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delivered from suspense and from tremors. At length the drama is brought to an imperfect close, 
and the series of events that absorbed my faculties, that hurried away my attention, has termined 
in repose. (5)
Yet if these opening lines assert the form of a letter, Edgar Huntly is not an episto-
lary novel (unlike Brown’s later novels, Clara Howard and Jane Talbot). Rather, it 
uses the form of the letter in artful and intricate ways, a topic virtually untouched 
by the abounding scholarship on this novel. In fact, it is through the epistolary 
form that this novel discovers some of its most effective (and potentially abusive) 
strategies for the narrative pursuit of belonging. The force of these dynamics is 
directly tied to the epistolary novel as the first popular subgenre of the novel in 
the mid-eighteenth century. The immense success of Samuel Richardson’s Pamela 
(1740) and Clarissa (1748), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Die Leiden des jungen 
Werther (1774), or Laclos’s Les Liaisons dangereuses (1784) is indeed so closely tied 
to the rise of the novel that it makes a lot of sense think of it as evolving from 
the epistolary form. Approaching this genealogy of modern literary forms with 
an interest in the narrative productivity engendered by the need to belong makes 
tangible some rarely acknowledged yet crucial aspects of the creative adaptation 
from which the novel’s rise departs. The ingenious move of epistolary novel was 
to fictionalize a pragmatic form of writing whose raison d’être was to maintain a 
sense of belonging in an increasingly mobilized world. This move was ingenious 
indeed, for it emancipated the dialogic structure inherent to actual letter writing 
from the needs to wait and to respond. The epistolary novel turned the self-suffi-
ciency afforded by fiction into a main source of gratification. Readers were invited 
to participate in an epistolary exchange without having to create their own narra-
tive accounts. Instead, they could fully immerse themselves in the reception—and 
consumption—of a narrative exchange. In fact, replacing a real (and in this sense 
demanding) form of intersubjective exchange with the imagined, non-reciprocal 
intersubjectivity of the fictional tale was the lure of this new kind of literature.
Edgar Huntly’s use of the epistolary form stages and reenacts this artistic 
emancipation. From its first paragraph onward, it simultaneously borrows from 
and bends the conventions of epistolary storytelling. Yes, the reader is directly 
addressed, but the formal line of address and indications of place and time that 
are a staple of the genre are omitted, so that we have to wait, just like in a regular 
novel, for further clues about characters, place, and time. And once the epistolary 
form has been “out-used” for the task of initiating the act of telling and estab-
lishing a basic frame for it (the narrator has experienced something so disturb-
ing that he can only now begin to tell about it, and needs a “real” interlocutor 
to be able to tell his tale), the narrative becomes epic in its desire to assume a 
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totalizing completeness in its own right.12 There is indeed a remarkable contrac-
tion engrained into the novel’s epistolary pretensions and borrowings: It uses the 
epistolary form to depart from the addressee’s request to stay informed about its 
writer’s life, and ends the epic letter stemming from this request with the prom-
ise that he will visit her “as soon as [he has] seen Sarsefield” and “discuss with 
[her] in conversation […] [his] schemes for the future” (282). Yet despite the epic 
proportions of Edgar’s letter to Mary and the novelistic pose of self-sufficiency it 
asserts (for example, through its division into chapters), the story is far from com-
plete without the three short letters dovetailing it. This correspondence between 
 Edgar and Sarsefield not only introduces a new interlocutor but it also grants him 
a voice of his own. In fact, it leaves the novel’s final pages to someone who explicitly 
challenges the narrative authority that has ruled sovereignly so far. Making up a 
total of just ten pages, the final correspondence overturns many of the most vital 
conclusions reached in Edgar’s long letter to Mary. We learn, for example, that 
Clithero is not on his way to recovery, but has turned into the dangerous maniac 
about whom  Sarsefield warned Edgar all along. And that, in his obsessive desire 
to relieve this man from the ill-guided belief that he has murdered his former pa-
troness (who is now  Sarsefield’s wife), Edgar himself has become entangled in the 
other’s evil schemes (murdering her to set the record straight) by telling him Mrs. 
Lorimer’s whereabouts. Now he pleads for Sarsefield’s forgiveness, but the other’s 
response shatters any hope for reconciliation. In a strikingly matter-of-fact tone 
(especially when read back to back with Edgar’s highly sentimentalized writing 
mode), Sarsefield reports only basic information: that he left his home immediately 
upon receiving Edgar’s warning about Clithero being on his way with “mysterious 
intentions” (283); that while supervising the latter’s deportation to a psychiatric 
asylum, he witnessed him drowning; and that Edgar’s second letter arrived in 
Sarsefield’s absence, was read by Mrs. Lorimer, and caused the loss of the child 
she was carrying. The “Farewell” concluding Sarsefield’s letter leaves no doubt that 
their relationship will not be resumed in the future.13
12 This silencing has a clear gender bias: None of the female characters—Mary, Mrs. Lorimer, 
 Clarice, Shelby’s wife, Old Deb/Queen Mab—are allowed to speak for themselves, and the latter 
is even said to speak in unintelligible tongues. For an in-depth discussion of the silenced women 
in Brown’s f iction, see Person.
13 Luciano (7-9) reads the f inal correspondence as showcasing the novel’s juxtaposition of Edgar’s 
sentimental/feminized and Sarsefield’s rational/masculine way of dealing with texts (both as 
readers and writers). Throughout the novel, not Edgar’s actions but his letters/stories have the 
gravest effects, but as much as he is a teller, he is also a receiver of stories. The problem is 
that “Edgar reads like a woman” (7), meaning that he becomes so emotionally involved with 
his reading that his moral judgment gets impaired (precisely in the way in which he fears that 
 Waldegrave’s heretic letters would affect his sister). Echoing an Enlightenment-inflected hierar-
chy of reading methods, the novel employs Sarsefield’s “emphatic preference of logic” (7) as an 
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And yet, the twists leading up to the end produce a sense of non-closure rath-
er than a sense of an ending (in Frank Kermode’s sense), with vast implications 
for Edgar’s future prospects of belonging. The novel’s hybrid mode of epistolary 
and conventional storytelling—one projecting a series of present moments into 
an open future, the other reconstructing what has happened in the past—is gen-
erated by two conflicting yearnings.14 The retrospective parts are driven by the 
desire to resume a place at and through which meaning and familiarity are at least 
provisionally restored, while the epistolary parts are driven by a desire to keep 
all questions of belonging pending. The result is a narrative that simultaneously 
stages a yearning for recovery and its rejection. And while the retrospective mode 
makes up the largest part of the narrative, the most powerful moments of asserting 
narrative agency are spurred by the epistolary deviations from the dominant mode. 
But the opening paragraphs unmistakably warn their readers that this agency is 
impaired. Edgar’s claim of finally being calm enough to give account of what has 
happened is soon relativized: Full recovery may eclipse the events and experiences 
that need accounting. The sneaky way in which narrative agency is hence at once 
assumed and deferred deserves a lengthy citation:
Till now, to hold a steadfast pen was impossible; to disengage my senses from the scene that was 
passing or approaching; to forbear to grasp at futurity; to suffer so much thought to wander from the 
purpose that engrossed my fears and my hopes, could not be.
implicit critique of Edgar’s sentimentalized listening and reading habits. In the f inal letter ex-
change this opposition is brought to a climax: Edgar’s fateful “misreading” of Clithero’s character 
does not do any harm in his f irst, brief letter, but does in the second, sentimental one, whose 
reading causes Mrs. Lorimer to lose her child. The f inal word of the novel is given to Sarsefield’s 
rational didacticism that sharply contrasts with Edgar’s voice. Yet despite the harmful effects 
Edgar’s f inal letter had and the implicit judgment it casts upon his character, there is no conclu-
sive celebration of “enlightened reasoning” as Sarsefield’s authority is questioned by his possibly 
premature judgment that Clithero is dead. Has he forgotten that not long ago he was certain to 
have seen Edgar drown only to f ind out a bit later that he was alive and well? Sarsefield’s position 
is further weakened by his being severely damaged by Edgar’s storytelling. In fact, his superior 
rationality does not protect him where he is most vulnerable: in his desire for social reproduction. 
In a larger perspective, the weakness of his position can be read as a general weakness/absence 
of father/authority f igures, to which several scholars have dedicated their attention. For work on 
this topic see Keitel, and Scheiding.
14 See McArthur for an in-depth discussion on the non-closural dynamics of the epistolary novel. 
For the closural drive of conventional novelistic storytelling, see Brooks and Miller. The retro-
spective narration of Edgar Huntly’s main letter has been read in terms of a “quest romance,” an 
“epistemological novel” or a “novel of ideas,” all traditions with a strong, yet usually disappointed 
longing for meaning and closure. See Schulz; Hamelman; Frank; Berthoff.
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Yet am I sure that even now my perturbations are sufficiently stilled for an employment like this? 
That the incidents I am going to relate can be recalled and arranged without indistinctness and con-
fusion? Time may take away these headlong energies, and give me back my ancient sobriety. But this 
change will only be effected by weakening my remembrance of these events. In proportion as I gain 
power over my words, shall I lose dominion over my sentiments; in proportion as my tale is deliberate 
and slow, the incidents and motives which it is designed to exhibit will be imperfectly revived and 
obscurely pourtrayed. (5-6)
The double movement of at once claiming narrative agency and insisting on its 
insurmountable limitations creates a tension that pervades the narrative both for-
mally and structurally, drawing the reader into a thick web of ambivalences and 
contradictions. Moreover, and crucially, realizing the limitations of his capacity to 
tell his story does not diminish the need to tell. On the contrary, Edgar knows that 
he must tell his story, not so much because he has made a promise to his fiancée, 
but because he needs to separate himself from a haunting experience to resume a 
place in the world. Alas, our narrator is caught between two equally unappealing 
choices: Revisiting this experience may thrust him back into confusion, while dis-
tancing himself too far from it may forever eclipse the possibility to reconstruct 
what has happened.15
In explicating this troubling state, the novel engages a kind of narrative agency 
that is inherent to all acts of remembering. As the narrator sets out to tell his story, 
he discovers a discrepancy between the object of remembrance as it was and his 
15 For Bray, the epistolary form is particularly well-attuned to exploring this troubled state since its 
narrative conventions evolved side by side with eighteenth century concerns about the human 
mind, and hence generically incorporates the tensions between past and present selves (16). This 
issue harks back to last chapter’s discussion about the human mind, specif ically to Hume’s as-
sertion that memory and imagination cannot be distinguished with certainty. Taking up Locke’s 
basic categorization of simple and complex ideas (simple ones being the imprint of immediate 
sense perception, complex ones the result of further mental reflection), he writes: “When we 
search for the characteristic, which distinguishes memory from the imagination, we must imme-
diately perceive, that it cannot lie in the simple ideas it presents to us; since both these faculties 
borrow their simple ideas from the impressions, and can never go beyond these original per-
ceptions. These faculties are as little distinguish’d from each other by the arrangement of their 
complex ideas. Since therefore the memory is known, neither by the order of its complex ideas, 
nor the nature of its simple ones; it follows that the dif ference betwixt it and the imagination 
lies in its superior force and vivacity. A man may indulge his fancy in feigning any past scene of 
adventure; nor would there be any possibility of distinguishing from a remembrance of a like 
kind, were not the idea of the imagination fainter and more obscure. […] We are frequently in 
doubt concerning the ideas of the memory, as they become very week and feeble; and are at a 
loss to determine whether any image proceeds from fancy or the memory, when it is not drawn 
in so lively colours as distinguishes that latter faculty” (85).
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mental image of it now. The novel exploits this discovery—a common gap between 
the object and the subject of remembrance, and as such a constant site of herme-
neutic inspection—as its primary narrative motor force. What makes this narra-
tive situation so endlessly productive is the split between the experiencing self and 
the narrating self, one mobilizing the narrative and driving it into the future, the 
other contemplating this process and making sense of it through emplotment.16 
And if an essential part of creating a viable sense of belonging hinges on asserting 
a form of narrative agency that is able to reconcile the two selves, Edgar Huntly’s 
opening passage stages no less than a war between them. The narrator longs to tell 
his story, but at the same time he has the greatest difficulties to separate himself 
from his experience—to let the narrating self take over. The truce that is achieved 
between the two selves comes at the expense of drawing someone else into the 
conflict: the recipient of the letter. His opening words, “I sit down, my friend, to 
comply with thy request,” draws the addressee into a binding commitment, and 
what she is asked to give in return is made perfectly clear: to let the narrative take 
possession of her.
Thou wilt catch from my story every horror and every sympathy which it paints. Thou wilt shudder 
with my forboding and dissolve with my tears. As the sister of my friend, and one who honors me with 
her affection, thou wilt share in all my tasks and all my dangers. (6)
If one thinks (with Peter Brooks) of the desire to tell as “the desire for an inter-
locutor, a listener, who enters into the narrative exchange” (Reading 216) and ex-
pects something in return, this novel does not discover this contractual nature of 
storytelling as it approaches its end (as it is often the case). Rather, it departs from 
this idea, establishing a contract between teller and listener in the first paragraphs. 
Moreover, and crucially, it creates a teller who does everything in his power to 
bend the terms of the contract. He expresses a yearning to have her as his sympa-
thetic listener, yes, but there is another desire at work in this narrative. And as the 
novel’s long first letter progresses, it becomes increasingly clear that Edgar wants 
to have Mary as a listener to bequeath the past while not wanting to belong to her 
in the future. In fact, he longs to separate himself from her once she has received 
his story.
16 The terms are drawn from Stanzel. Although not seamlessly compatible, the terms correspond 
to Roland Barthes’s dif ferentiation between a “proairetic code” (also called the “code of action”) 
and the “hermeneutic code” (also called the “code of enigmas and answers”). See Barthes, SZ. 
In his discussion of these terms, Brooks point out that “Plot might then be best thought of as 
an ‘overcoding’ of the proairetic by the hermeneutic code, the latter structuring the discrete 
elements of the former into lager interpretative wholes, working out their play of meaning and 
significance” (Reading 18).
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What he tells her to this end is certainly inconclusive and confusing. The mys-
tery around Waldegrave’s murderer is lost out of sight, then abruptly picked up 
again, and halfheartedly resolved by turning him into the victim of a random act 
of revenge violence. The story of the Nartive American Old Deb/Queen Mab, first 
elaborately built up, is resolved by having her arrested, without resistance, for her 
inflammatory actions. The narrator’s own sleepwalking is never really reflected. 
More examples could easily be found. Against the backdrop of this maze of loose 
ends and incoherent plotlines, the future of Edgar and Mary’s relationship—its 
end—is clearly projected. In a long passage of direct address, situated almost ex-
actly halfway through the narrative, Edgar exploits his letter-writing agency to 
the fullest: He cancels their engagement. In the fabric of this utterly inconclusive 
narrative, this is a rare moment of closure. Interrupting the retrospective mode 
for four entire pages, it is by far the longest passage of direct address. The cir-
cumstances, rhetoric, and effects of this bold and abusive narrative act deserve 
closer scrutiny: Directly preceding this passage is the Weymouth episode, whose 
quintessential role for describing and rejecting the liberal order has been discussed 
in the previous section. Listening to the stranger convinces Edgar that he is the 
rightful owner of Mary’s inheritance, and that she must return it to him. The sit-
uation is delicate, however, since neither legal proof nor private documentation 
exists to substantiate Weymouth’s claim—which means that Mary has to base her 
decision on Edgar’s retelling of the other’s story. Despite the lack of “hard evidence” 
and in full awareness of the gravity of the consequences—returning the money 
would thrust her back into poverty, dissolve the financial basis of their marriage, 
and leave Edgar and his sisters homeless in the near future—Edgar urges her that 
returning the money is the right thing to do. And as if to authorize his bold advice 
with personal sacrifice, he stresses his own share of the burden before announcing 
his withdrawal from their engagement.
I know the precariousness of my condition and that of my sisters, that our subsistence hinges on the 
life of an old man. My uncle’s death will transfer the property to his son, who is a stranger and an 
enemy to us, and the f irst act of whose authority will unquestionably be to turn us forth from these 
doors. Marriage with thee was anticipated with joyous emotions, not merely on my own account or 
on thine, but likewise for the sake of those beloved girls, to whom that event would enable me to 
furnish an asylum.
But wedlock is now more distant than ever. My heart bleeds to think of the sufferings which my 
beloved Mary is again fated to endure, but regrets are only aggravations of calamity. They are perni-
cious, and it is our duty to shake them off. (156-57)
The use of the substantive form—“precariousness”—stresses the severity of  Edgar’s 
concern. Yet although the first paragraph speaks about the future, the verbs are de-
termined rather than speculative. Adding “unquestionably” amplifies the passage’s 
closural force. And while Edgar’s breakup is drenched in a rhetoric of sacrifice, the 
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term “wedlock” turns the prospected marriage into a mere technicality that does 
not seem to have anything to do with his loving feelings for her. Pitted against an 
impersonal legal entity, the shared sense of duty offers a vision of unity beyond 
their disengagement. The decisiveness of his announcement that “wedlock is now 
more distant than ever” makes the concluding outlook—“[t]hese considerations 
[…] will be weighed when we meet” (156)—have a hollow ring to it.
The force of the narrative action undertaken here stems from it being at once 
veiled and direct: Edgar wants Mary to return the money even though this means 
the end of their planned union; he is indeed quite outspoken about his willing-
ness to manipulate her to this end. “I will exert all my influence, it is not small, to 
induce her to restore [the money]” (144), he tells Weymouth—and thus also tells 
her since his promise to the stranger is part of his letter to Mary. But changing the 
contractual terms of their relationship also changes the terms of narrative transfer. 
Edgar does not tell this story in order to arrive at a point where they will belong 
together; he tells it to dissolve the prospect of belonging to her. The motive he gives 
for his actions is strictly moral: They cannot build their future on money that does 
not rightfully belong to her. But the epistolary form creates a narrative surface too 
opaque to offer any real insight into the narrator’s psychic life. Had he only consid-
ered marrying her as long as she had money? Or had he begun to have doubts about 
marrying her prior to finding out that the money may not be rightfully hers, so 
that Weymouth’s plea came as a handy excuse to cancel the wedding? In rendering 
these questions indeterminable, the epistolary mode employed in the passage lays 
open the limits of asserting stable meanings and predictable conduct with this nar-
rative mode. For no matter how disturbed this letter-writing narrator may be, we 
must assume that what he says, and how he says it, is carefully weighed against the 
effects he hopes to produce in his correspondent. And hence the epistolary form 
both exposes and veils the narrator’s psychic state: Stating how one feels and what 
one thinks lends a letter credibility for sure, but what one says and how one says 
it is always weighed against the anticipated response and judgment of one’s cor-
respondent. Everyday letter writing is (or was) subject to the same strategies and 
calculations, but being embedded in lived rather than fictional relations relativizes 
their potentially distorting effects through other forms of interaction beyond the 
lettered exchange.
Literary adaptation amplifies these effects by putting the recipient in a position 
in which both sides, both psyches have to be imagined with none of them being 
that of the reader. And if the epistolary borrowings and pretentions of the novel 
make it impossible to gain any definite insight into Edgar’s “true” or “private” state 
of mind, the timing of his most decisive and brutal turn to narrative action is all 
the more striking: It happens right after his retells Weymouth’s story—from which 
we not only learn that Mary will most likely be poor again, but also that she seems 
to be pregnant—and right before Edgar’s mysterious awaking in the pitch-dark 
cave. In fact, the letter to his fiancée is plotted in a way in which Weymouth’s visit 
Poisoned Let ters f rom a Gothic Frontier 57
causes Edgar’s sleepwalking into the wilderness, connecting this event directly to 
Edgar’s transformation into the fearless Indian fighter that he becomes after this 
“rebirth” in the cave, and with his odyssey home, where home means not a home 
with Mary. Placing the termination of their engagement in between these two 
life-changing events assigns it with a key function in the narrative design of the 
novel. It separates the first part, dedicated to the search for Waldegrave’s murderer, 
from the second, dedicated to Edgar’s horrifying experience of awaking in the cave 
and its disconcerting aftermath, while also binding the two parts together. From 
this fault line within the errant plot of the novel, the narrative changes radically 
its course, with the effect of disrupting a no-longer-desired trajectory of belonging.
Yet there is more to this abusive and self-serving assertion of narrative agency: 
Cancelling his engagement with Mary is the narrator’s ultimate act of dismissing 
any prospect of belonging through material means. And if the passage of his letter 
that executes this breakup exposes the degree to which any prospect of belong-
ing depends on narrative agency, from now on it is channeled to the retrospective 
parts of the story, to which Edgar happily dedicates himself for the remainder of 
his letter. Prolonging the act of telling is indeed his most vital desire.
beLoNgiNg as UnterhaltUng
It is no surprise to find an internal drive toward narrative mobilization in a novel 
in which belonging is primarily sought in prolonging the act of telling: To the 
extent that the possibility (or desire) of restoring the narrator’s unsettled senses 
of place and self in actual moments of arrival or return is dismissed, the promise 
of recovery is shifted to the realm of imaginative self-assertion—where it is most 
effectively realized by means of staging and asserting the act of storytelling itself. 
Assuming narrative agency and testing its capacity thus becomes a practical rite de 
passage in this tale, a ritual prone to lift the narrator to a more comfortable state 
of belonging. But since the agency employed to this end is impaired, the consoli-
dation pursued with it cannot aspire to mastery in any conventional sense. Rath-
er, engaging the limits of the narratable becomes the primary means and end of 
narrative form-giving. In fact, belonging as narrative self-assertion is sought at 
these limits: in the semantic grey zone where the imagination fades and falters, 
and where mobilizing rather than stabilizing the narrative offers itself as a viable 
course of action.
Throughout the novel narrative mobilization has strikingly physical quali-
ties. All main characters are constantly on the move, delivering, spreading and, 
merging their stories whenever they meet. It is hardly a coincidence, then, that 
Edgar’s adventure begins on the road, on a walk home from a rendezvous with his 
correspondent. As his nocturnal journey makes him melancholic, he abandons 
his route to revisit the site of his friend’s recent murder, not minding that “[his] 
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journey would, by these means, be considerably prolonged” (9). In the account 
that follows, Edgar barely rests. Driven by his quest to find his friend’s murder-
er, he walks back and forth between his uncle’s house and the site of the crime, 
pursues his sleepwalking suspect all over the countryside for nights on end, takes 
more long walks as he waits for the much desired interview, and even in those 
rare moments in which his movements are arrested, Edgar paces. So yes, physical 
movement is a narrative motor force, but this narrator is frequently dissociated 
from consciousness, through either reverie or sleepwalking. At once propelling 
and impairing narrative agency, these dissociated physical movements turn out to 
be the most effective vehicle to push against contemporary confines of belonging. 
I will return to this issue in the concluding section. For now, I want to consider 
it as part of a larger strategy of narrative mobilization. The sentimentalism that 
comes in tow with a letter-writing protagonist recovering from threat and terror 
is an enormous resource in this regard.17 For only to the extent that his narrat-
ing self feels can he begin to reconnect with the experiencing self, and only if the 
connection holds, can the protagonist narrate himself back into having a place in 
the world. And because of this sentimental causality, his feelings function as the 
throbbing pulse of the narrative. They determine the intensity and direction of 
every action performed or accounted for, and they are the coercive force that holds 
together the meandering and inconclusive plot.18 Edgar reports, for example, to 
have left the road home to revisit the site of the murder when his “recollections 
17 The revaluation of sentimental storytelling has been a substantial part of recent revisionism of 
early American literature. Jane Tomkins’s Sensational Designs was an early landmark study in this 
regard. Brown is one of the authors she discusses. Most recent accounts have been particularly 
interested in sentimentalism’s concern with the body as a primary resource of imaginative mobi-
lization. See especially Luciano; Burgett; Dillon.
18 Hedges notes about this narrative mode that “Few novelists of any stature have been so much of 
the time so unconcerned as him [Brown] with the sensuous reality of the life they were depicting. 
We sometimes have to wait for several paragraphs before getting hints of how his characters 
look or sound.” Voloshin goes so far as to account Edgar Huntly (not Brown!) with an “affective 
narrative theory” that, “like his moral theory,” is grounded in “late eighteenth-century aesthet-
ics and ethics, owing of course a great deal to the Lockean emphasis on sensation as a source of 
knowledge and motive to response. […] the coherence and indeed the very possibility of his tale 
are intimately associated with the coherence of consciousness” (267-68). In Locke’s words: “First, 
our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct 
perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And 
thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all 
those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, 
they from external objects convey into the mind what produced there those perceptions. This 
great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by 
them to the understanding, I call SENSATION” (33-34; emphasis in the original).
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once more plunged [him] into anguish and perplexity” (7); when arriving there, 
the “mighty anguish” and “heart-bursting grief” of the half-naked stranger whom 
he finds suspiciously digging at this site moves him so profoundly that “[e]very 
sentiment, at length, yield[s] into sympathy” (11).
Edgar’s feelings have a strikingly physical quality in this passage and elsewhere 
it: They plunge, they burst, they yield. Sympathy is the feeling that guides Edgar’s 
actions in the first half of the novel, for instance, in his nocturnal pursuit of the 
stranger whom he finds digging at his friend’s grave through the province’s west-
ern wilderness, his quest for an interview, his explorations of the cave into which 
the other has disappeared, and his provision of food for him. In amplifying the 
mediating capacities of compassion as the narrator’s primary form of attachment 
to the world, the narrative taps into contemporary beliefs about the pedagogical 
merits of sentimental fiction (not without warning of the “dangers” involved).19 
In doing so, it engages David Hume’s idea that “passions” are an indispensable 
ingredient of any mental activity: They stimulate the imagination and hence make 
it possible to integrate new thoughts and impressions into the realm of the already 
familiar. Just as in Hume’s model, sense can be made when feelings intermingle 
with the ideas that the narrator relentlessly generates in a search for meaning that 
is habitually acted out across space.20 Following this basic pattern, the narrator’s 
19 Based on their reception of sensationalist models of the human mind, specif ically those of Locke 
and Hume, progressive writers such as William Godwin, Mary Wollstonecraft, Thomas Holcroft, 
Robert Bage, Helen Maria Williams, Thomas Paine, and Brown had come to believe that emotions 
can encourage moral behavior and that imaginative literature could be used with the aim of 
fostering a more democratic society. For further discussion, see Clemit, and Kelly.
20 For Hume, the imagination conditions all mental activity, be it directed toward external objects 
or toward introspection, just as it is impossible to know with certainty whether impressions or 
memories derive from a supposedly external object or are produced by the creative power of the 
mind (84-85). In one of the many passages in the Treatise of Human Nature (1734) dedicated to 
this matter, he writes: “Let us f ix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chace 
[sic] our imagination to the heavens, or the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance 
a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which 
have appear’d in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any 
idea but what is there produc’d. The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, 
when supposed specif ically dif ferent from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, 
without pretending to comprehend the related objects. Generally speaking we do not suppose 
them specif ically dif ferent; but only attribute them different relations, connections and dura-
tions” (67-68). In this at once enabling and veiling conception, the imagination could become a 
counterforce to Hume’s skepticism: If all relations made by the imagination are incomprehensi-
ble, the laws of causality and principles of cognition (especially those still taken for granted by 
Locke) turn out to be “fictions of the mind.” Hume uses the expression frequently, cf. Treatise 
216, 220ff, 254, 259, 493. Iser points out that Hume did not mean this in any derogative way. As 
Belonging and Narrative60
physical mobility generates lists of questions that add up to entire paragraphs. 
Wondering whether or not to revisit the site of Waldegrave’s murder, Edgar asks 
himself:
What could I expect to f ind? Had it [the site] not been a hundred times examined? Had I not extended 
my search to the neighboring groves and precipices? Had I not pored upon the brooks, and pryed into 
the pits and hollows, that were adjacent to the scene of blood? (8)
The text is full of these cascading lists of questions, and this creates an air of con-
stant speculation and uncertainty. If in the narrator’s emotional economy one 
sentiment leads to and enforces another, his intellectual economy thrives on one 
question leading to another question—never to an answer. In one of these passages, 
Edgar steps aside to reflect upon the nature of his quest, realizing that he is not 
interested in revenge or any other direct action but in knowing itself.
For what purpose shall I prosecute this search? What benefit am I to reap from this discovery? […] Cu-
riosity, like virtue, is its own reward. Knowledge is of value for its own sake, and pleasure is annexed 
to the acquisition, without regard to anything beyond (15-16).
I read these lists of questions as an echo of Hume’s skeptical epistemology, which 
was widely known in intellectual circles in the U.S. at the time. With no certainty 
about the external world, the narrator is in constant need to make hypotheses 
about this world.21 And this also means that curiosity is not at all an end in itself, 
as Edgar seems to think. It is a vital strategy for bridging the gap between his inner 
and his outer world by means of constant speculation—which, in turn, becomes 
Edgar’s only hope to restore his impaired sense of belonging. For while the intellec-
tual quest for meaning is mainly retrospective, its larger objective lies in the future: 
an incomprehensible premise of cognition, “f ictions of the mind” became an essential concept 
in what Hume critiqued as misguided epistemological postulates (The Fictive 175). For concise 
discussions of Hume’s model of the human mind and his notion of the imagination, see Engell; 
Iser, The Fictive.
21 See, for instance, Armin-Paul Frank, who reads Edgar Huntly ’s open-ended, reality-testing mode 
of narration as a prototypical feature of the Romance. Frank locates the emergence of the genre 
in Hume’s speculative epistemology and argues that it can be directly related to patterns of 
sense-making that are paradigmatic to the American experience: “Die aus Europa in die Neue 
Welt gekommenen mehr oder weniger intelligenten Wesen mussten erkennen, dass sich viele 
der mitgebrachten Erfahrungssätze (verites) hart mit amerikanischen Fakten stießen. Auf die 
alten Automatisierungen konnte man sich nicht verlassen. Neue Deutungsmuster mussten erst 
aufgebaut werden. Einstweilen war der Kolonist von Fall zu Fall auf eigene interpretierenden An-
strengungen angewiesen” (63). From here it is only a small step to the means and ends oriented 
epistemology of pragmatism that is often regarded as the only genuinely American philosophy.
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Edgar seeks to recover his senses of place and self so that his life can continue. Yet 
the desire of self-extension driving this intellectual quest is destined to transgress 
continuously what has already become familiar. And it is precisely in this vein 
that Edgar cultivates a habit of venturing ever deeper into the western parts of 
the province. In fact, his excursions connect the epistemological and geographical 
uncertainties of his habitual state of being-in-the-world—and likewise, the intel-
lectual and physical dynamics of narrative mobilization—in consequential ways. 
Earlier trips into the wilderness undertaken with Sarsefield “chiefly consisted in 
moralizing narratives and synthetical reasoning” and had “familiarized [him] 
with [the province’s] outlines and the more accessible parts” (92). But after his 
mentor had left, Edgar kept exploring for the sole reason of expanding the realm 
of the familiar:
Every new excursion indeed added somewhat to my knowledge. New tracks were pursued, new pros-
pects detected, new summits were gained. My rambles were productive of incessant novelty, though 
they always terminated in the prospect of limits that could not be overleaped. (93)
The last sentence is especially telling with regard to his motivation: More than pro-
viding any certainty of knowledge about the region, Edgar’s excursions incessantly 
assure him of—familiarize him with—the limits of his known world. Novalis’s say-
ing that “[a]ll philosophy is really homesickness, an urge to be at home anywhere” 
(Novalis 179; my translation) addresses precisely this double bind of post-Enlight-
enment modes of belonging. Edgar’s quest to recover his sense of place and self can 
be read as an early American version of this quintessentially modern feeling of 
homelessness—not just in the transcendental sense of falling out of the security of 
religion but also in the pragmatic, geographical sense of being exposed to western 
wilderness beyond the frontier.
Edgar’s account of his awaking in the cave maps the two senses of existential 
uncertainty onto one another. The utter unfamiliarity of his surroundings twist-
ed his guts, but the despair that he felt in this situation is all the more dramatic 
in the absence of a God with whom to reason. Edgar’s atheism is indeed closely 
associated with his sleepwalking habit. In the first reported incident, he hides the 
letters that Waldegrave had written to him during a short phase in which he was 
an atheist. Yet while Waldegrave soon reconverted, Edgar never did. In the sec-
ond, much more disturbing incident, in which Edgar finds himself in the cave, his 
atheism prevents him from making sense of his incomprehensible “captivity” and 
the life-threatening dangers caused by it in terms of a transitory stage in a longer 
journey home.
I had none but capricious and unseen fate to condemn. The author of my distress and the means he 
had taken to decoy my hither, were incomprehensible. Surely my senses were fettered or deprived 
by some spell. I was still asleep, and this was merely a tormenting vision, or madness had seized 
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me, and the darkness that environed me and the hunger that aff licted me, existed only in my own 
imagination. (164)22
Edgar’s response to this threat is to kill with one strike and then eat the ferocious 
panther that suddenly emerges from the darkness of the cave—a deed that redi-
rects his self-devouring urge “to bite the flesh of [his] arm” (164) to an object in 
his environment. It has often been noted that this moment marks a fundamental 
transformation in the novel’s protagonist: his rebirth as a savage-killing American 
performed, in Turner-like fashion, by the wild setting of the western frontier.23 
I agree with this interpretation. However, just as striking as this transformation 
of character is the shift in talking about his fate. In his efforts to make sense of 
what has happened, the tyrant who mysteriously took him captive becomes an 
incomprehensible author of distress—a position that Edgar, in assuming narrative 
agency to mediate this experience, seizes for himself just as instinctively as he slays 
and eats the panther.
Calling the novel Edgar’s “memoirs” bears testimony to this second rebirth: 
that as an author who to narrates himself back into having a place in the world. In 
fact, what the author of this memoir yearns for more than anything else is to be 
sustained by his capacity of telling stories. The German term unterhalten (enter-
tain) has three meanings that converge in this longing: to be pleasantly diverted, 
comfortably supported, and engaged in a valuable exchange. In Brown’s novel, the 
desire to retreat into a self-absorbed and self-sustaining state of Unterhaltung—the 
narrator’s longing to dwell in his story—turns out to be stronger than any longing 
for a place in the world. The final lines of his long and self-serving letter to Mary 
read like a concession in this regard: “I am surprised at the length to which my sto-
ry has run. I thought that a few days would suffice to complete it, but one page has 
insensibly been added to another till I have consumed weeks and filled volumes. 
22 Many critics have pointed out the resemblances between this novel and the colonial accounts 
of Indian captivity that were still popular at Brown’s time. See for example Slotkin, Hamelman, 
Rowe, and Smith-Rosenberg, “Captured Subjects.” Luciano takes the argument even further 
when suggesting that “Edgar Huntly is itself a captivity narrative, though of a dif ferent sort: 
Although Edgar is at no point in the novel imprisoned by Indians, he is captivated by the carnal 
body, as much as he hopes the reader will be by his narrative” (11). For reasons that will become 
clear as I further unfold my own reading of the text, I would modify this argument by stressing 
that Edgar is captivated by his “sorely wounded” (13) mind as much as by his carnal desires.
23 To quote one of the iconic passages of Turner’s seminal essay: “The frontier is the line of most 
rapid and effective Americanization. The wilderness masters the colonist. It f inds him a European 
in dress, industries, tools, modes of travel, and thought. It takes him from the railroad car and 
puts him in the birch canoe. It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him in the hunting 
shirt and the moccasin” (2). For discussions of Edgar’s transformation/rebirth upon awaking in 
the cave see, for instance, Luciano 13-15, and Garner 444-46.
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Here I will draw to a close” (282), he announces in an abortive gesture before end-
ing with the promise to visit her—a hollow destination by now.
tHe Power of Narr ative aNd tHe Limits of tHe Narr atabLe
Read along these lines, Edgar Huntly is a story about the efforts and perils of nar-
rative recovery. It is a story about a young man who sets out to narrate himself 
back into having a place in the world, exploits his listeners, and ends up inhabiting 
the world of his story rather than the world beyond it. In the process of telling 
this story, he integrates, in minute detail and sympathetic elaboration, narratives 
of others into his own with the effect of expanding the boundaries of his textu-
al and imaginary habitat. And while these other narratives enlarge and pluralize 
the body of the written text, producing idiosyncrasies that can be read as early 
experimentations with modernist techniques (such as multiple focalization and 
heteroglossia), they are also crucial for the evolution of the story and the dwelling 
places prospected by it. In fact, throughout the novel, narrative is portrayed as 
an immensely powerful agent in regulating social relations and the highly mobile 
space evolving from them. Time and again, it directly and vastly affects states of 
belonging: by moving characters to unforeseeable places, by transforming them in 
the act of listening, and by thrusting them out of seemingly stable social relations. 
More often than not, these effects are disruptive, working against the prospect to 
belong somewhere and to someone. And hence, the prospect of dwelling is moved 
from actual to imaginary places.
Clithero is the most extreme figure in this regard, and that he serves as Edgar’s 
doppelgänger heightens his symbolic significance: Both are sleepwalkers, both are 
box-makers of extraordinary skill, both hide and nearly destroy their dearest trea-
sure while sleepwalking. In fact, both break into their theft-proof boxes to steal 
from themselves, in both cases the hidden treasure is a written record of a beloved 
person, and as Edgar takes on more and more of the other’s behavior, one cannot 
help but wonder if he may eventually become an equally dangerous psychopath.24 
But back to Clithero: After his crime has exiled him from the comfortable home 
24 Many scholars have written on this relation, for example Luciano; Schultz; Garner; Bellis. Con-
trary to Luciano and Schulz, who stress the conflation of Edgar’s and Clithero’s identities, Garner 
argues that Edgar’s doubling of Clithero brings out their dif ferences. In either case, Edgar’s im-
pulse to identify with/become the “alien other” adheres to a logic of incorporating the “danger-
ous other” out of desire to neutralize it and with the outcome of self-transformation. The scene 
in which the wounded Edgar faints on top of one of the Indians he killed and thus, by implication, 
exchanges blood with him has regularly been interpreted as a token of this transformation. Bellis 
reads Edgar’s increasing resemblance to Clithero psychoanalytically as a pathological/trauma-
tized behavior of compulsive repetition.
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provided by Mrs. Lorimer on her estate in Ireland, his sense of belonging hinges 
on his possession of her written memoir. He takes it with him—steals it—not only 
for its value as a talisman but also because, once abroad, this manuscript bears the 
only proof that he has ever had a place where he has belonged. The document—as 
a material object, as a mediated presence of its author, and for the narrative record 
that it contains—oscillates between being a (mobile) agent of (provisional) em-
placement and the painful reminder of a home forever lost. Its owner’s obsession 
with this object highlights a fundamental contradiction in the relation between 
property and belonging. The most treasured piece of this poor fellow’s few pos-
sessions (and thus the object kept for emotional stability) is an object to which he 
belongs as much as it belongs to him: He is literally possessed by it. Moreover, and 
crucially, his final outbreak of madness is caused by a narrative interference with 
a barely bearable state of belonging as non-belonging. He settled on the verge of a 
frontier community, and for a moment he is not wallowing in his tragedy (he was 
forced to leave his home for having accidently killed Mrs. Lorimer’s evil brother 
and willfully killed her to “save” her from her grief), when Edgar hunts him down 
and retells this story to him, reminding him how exclusively his livelihood is an-
chored in it. Clithero’s fragile state of belonging hinges on his belief that he is the 
bearer of a metaphysical burden, and it depends on the tale that he has crafted 
around this belief: He is the one with the extraordinary fate of having killed the 
one whom he loved most, and will have to endure this fate until God relieves him. 
Meanwhile, he lives in an abandoned hut whose location is removed enough to de-
prive him of all close social bonds, and close enough to other people to constantly 
remind him of his lonesome destiny. His interlocking senses of place and self are 
defined in the ways in which he does not belong anywhere, to anyone, or anything 
except to his story. Telling this story in the tragic mode grants him a sense of agen-
cy—of affirmation, of choice—that is essential for his survival. What he does not 
know until Edgar retells his story, however, is that the second act of killing was 
unsuccessful; that Mrs. Lorimer lives and is well, and that she has recently moved 
to America. But rather than bringing relief to the tortured stranger, the revised 
story horrifies him by interfering with the tragic mode of emplotment and the 
agency gained form it. For the life of him, he cannot give the old story away! If Mrs. 
Lorimer is alive, this can only mean, then, that he is “reserved for the performance 
of a new crime. [His] evil destiny will have it so” (289). And while Edgar is not 
possessed by self-fulfilling prophecies, his inclination to dwell in narrative self-as-
sertion is severely questioned by Clithero’s manic precedence.
But Edgar Huntly is as much a novel about the limits of the narratable as it is a 
novel about the power of narrative. And it is a story about the ways in which these 
limits regulate the possibilities of belonging that its narrative operations map out. 
Installing a sleepwalking narrator with a tortured psyche is a consequential choice 
in this matter. “The incapacity of sleep denotes a mind sorely wounded” (13),  Edgar 
remarks after finding out that the main suspect in the murder of his friend is a 
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sleepwalker who displays great anguish when being in this state. He waits almost 
until the end of his epic letter to Mary to address finally his own sleepwalking, but 
implicitly he also speaks about himself when saying this. The formulation used 
here resonates with Erasmus Darwin’s then contemporary notion of sleepwalking 
as a mental disease: a state in which “general sensation” is disconnected from a 
person’s bodily actions that can, in turn, engage freely in an “exertion to relieve 
pain” (202). And it resonates with sensational psychology’s core idea that percep-
tions can forever form—and possibly harm and distort—a person’s mind.25 With 
psychoanalytical models of the unconscious still more than a century away, sleep-
walking—conceived as a mode of action both purpose-driven and separated from 
rational conduct—offered itself as a potent vessel for exploring the limits of the 
narratable.
There are at least two incidents from which we can assume that Edgar’s mind 
has indeed been “sorely wounded:” His closest friend has only recently died of 
violent murder in Edgar’s arms, and as a child he found half of his family killed 
by Indians upon returning home with his two younger sisters. These events have 
been used as touchstones for reading the novel as a tale of traumatization, giv-
ing occasion to trace the narrative mechanisms of a compulsive desire to repeat 
striving against an unconscious need to forget and repress, or to decipher the 
25 Darwin’s ideas about sleepwalking were widely circulating as part of his influential study 
 Zoonomia, to which Brown was exposed at the Friendly Club, the literary club of which he was a 
member. Darwin himself was heavily influenced by Lockean notions of sensational psychology, 
particularly their challenging of Cartesian notions of enlightened rationality by proposing that 
the human mind does not process innate ideas but begins its life as a tabula rasa on which sensory 
perceptions leave immediate and lasting imprints. Thus conceived, the psyche emerges from an 
initial incident of wounding; “from its f irst experience after birth, [it] becomes marked, scored, 
impressed, and indented” (Engell 18). The shift in thinking about the human mind in terms of a 
safely enclosed, self-contained entity imagined by Descartes to a genuinely vulnerable target of 
random impressions corresponds with an uncertain, irritated sense of belonging. It is important 
to add, however, that Locke pairs this vulnerability with a strong instinct of survival: Not only 
can the mind “repeat” the simple ideas derived from sense perception, but it has the capacity “to 
rearrange, to alter, and to fuse the separate elements it receives in ‘an almost infinite variety’” 
(18). Among the most immediate effects of this rethinking was a declining belief in the virtues of 
authoritarian childrearing and its replacement by the pedagogical ideal of fostering an “affective 
individualism” (Fliegelman 12-29). Locke writes: “If the mind was not formed at birth and from 
this moment on safely installed with rationality, the little, and almost insensible Impressions 
on our tender Infancies have very important and lasting Consequences” (Axtell,  Educational 
Writings 12). It might be added that Descartes’s self-contained model of human rationality can 
be read as a prior reaction to an irritated sense of belonging, sheltering human rationality in 
a quasi-hermetic capsule to keep the world in order after the coercive epistemologies of the 
 pre-Enlightenment era had lost their power.
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trauma-typical inscriptions of a guilt-tortured psyche from which this imaginary 
effort of storytelling springs (see Bellis, and Cassuto). Traumatic experience and 
unconscious repression constitute very real limits of the narratable, and readings 
sensitive to psychic operations stirred by them do important work in delineating 
the resulting silences as well as the strategies of narrative deferral and delayed 
re-semantization. But their belated, non-contemporary assumptions about the hu-
man psyche are of limited use for the project of making tangible concerns about 
belonging that brush against the limits of the narratable from within the enunci-
ative structure of the text. Then-current ideas about sleepwalking are a promising 
venue in this regard, for sleepwalking both produces and intensifies those gaps 
and uncertainties in the narrative that the narrator’s emplotment efforts seek to 
smoothen out.26 In fact, sleepwalking serves to stage a perceptual disjunction be-
tween the narrator’s inner and outer worlds, as exemplified in Edgar’s walk home 
in a state of reverie: Moving through a familiar environment with his perceptions 
completely absorbed by his mental activities, he suddenly finds himself in front of 
his uncle’s house. Sleepwalking amplifies this split state of consciousness by cast-
ing the inner world into the (semi)darkness of sleep. As a narrative device, it pulls 
the psychic world inside out, mapping it onto the external world, which becomes 
a virtual stage for experiences entrapped in a person’s “wounded mind” with no 
other outlet than this physical, absent-minded, and ultimately “mad” kind of “ex-
ertion.” In other words, the narrative is so obsessively entangled with physical 
and affective mobilization because the narrator’s efforts to remember are not only 
split along the usual lines of object/subject, past/present, experiencing/narrating 
self. They are further punctured within that split by movements and feelings from 
which—despite physically embodying them—he is irredeemably separated.
The actions performed in this split state of consciousness have real effects on 
the external world precisely because they are fully embodied. The novel’s excessive 
concern with embodiment has often been noted.27 From a perspective of belonging, 
this concern gains yet another dimension: The novel dramatizes the fact that the 
body, in naturally emplacing each individual, serves as the degree zero of dwelling. 
Moreover, in Edgar Huntly, this natural nucleus of dwelling is severely troubled 
since the narrator’s body is marked by a painfully widened and ostensibly “patho-
logic” gap between inner and outer world, which the novel explores through the 
26 The reader’s gradual process of piecing together the scope and details of Edgar’s sleepwalking 
is carefully laid out by the plot: Initially evoked by the novel’s title, the theme is f irst associated 
with Clithero and shifted (back) to Edgar in a guilt-laden dream of Waldegrave and his discovery 
of the mysteriously missing letters in its immediate aftermath, dramatized in Edgar’s all the 
more mysterious awaking in the pitch-dark cave and largely resolved in Sarsefield’s counter-nar-
rative of Edgar’s adventures in the wilderness. The possibility that Edgar may have killed his 
friend while sleepwalking looms until the very end of Edgar’s letter to Mary.
27 See, for instance Luciano, Burgett, and Dillon.
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idiosyncrasies of sleepwalking. In the process of gaining awareness of this habit 
that his writing seeks to put into words, Edgar’s body functions both as the prima-
ry site and mobile vessel of his “pain-exerting” activities and as the mute witness 
of all those actions performed in disjunction from the supposedly “sane” facets of 
his consciousness.28 As a self-disclosing force of mobilization, Edgar’s “wounded 
mind” and the involuntary yet willful actions “exert[ed]” by it propel, dislocate, 
and puncture the narrative desire to belong. The errant, deviant movements in the 
external world generated this way thrust the narrator’s life into a continuous state 
of crisis, demanding to revisit the grounds traversed with a split consciousness be-
fore. But retrospective narration under the spell of sleepwalking demands repeti-
tion of an unusual kind. While technically setting out to cover the same, disturbed 
grounds again with the desire of making them meaningful, familiar, and ideally 
inhabitable, it actually covers some of these grounds for the first time, for they 
were initially traversed in the shadowy world of the sleepwalker’s dreams.
Only one passage gives us insight into the narrator’s dreaming psyche, and 
thus provides us with clues on how to read his sleepwalking actions. When telling 
Mary about what later becomes discernible as his first sleepwalking incident, he 
mentions “the image of Waldegrave […] flitting before [him]” in a state of “in-
quietude and anger,” reminding him of having neglected “[s]ome service or duty” 
(130). Upon awaking, he remembers not only his pending promise to destroy a 
certain correspondence between the two but also his promise to Mary of a copy of 
this correspondence as a souvenir of her deceased brother, well aware of her being 
the last person on earth whom his friend would have wanted to read the letters. 
When looking for the letters in their theft-proof hiding place, however, he finds 
them missing; and learns from his uncle that someone walked around in the attic 
that night. The plotline drops out of sight as Weymouth visits the Huntly farm and 
triggers Edgar’s much more spectacular sleepwalking incident—to be picked up 
a good hundred pages later when Sarsefield tells Edgar about having seen him on 
his way into the wilderness, barely dressed, no shoes on his feet, not responding 
to being called by his name. Sarsefield also tells Edgar about finding the missing 
letters in the attic of the uncle’s house, proving the earlier sleepwalking incident. 
28 By far the most dramatic episode in this regard is Edgar’s awakening in the cave after sleepwalk-
ing into the wilderness. His alleged consciousness of “nothing but existence” (159) is a state 
in which his sense of embodiment is detached from any other sense of place. Yet even in this 
crude state, his body, not his consciousness, allows him to reconnect with the external world: by 
stretching out his sore limbs, feeling that he is lying on his back, noticing the rugged texture of 
the ground underneath him, and the striking freshness of the air in his lungs. This tactile mode 
of reconnection gradually expands, f irst into assessing the immediate space around him (walking 
along the wall of the cave, yelling out at the top of his lungs to estimate its size), then by provid-
ing food and drink and protecting himself against threats from the wilderness, and then by trying 
to get home.
Belonging and Narrative68
Edgar’s dream hence not only reminded him of his duty to destroy the letters but 
it also must have stirred his guilty conscience. His following action acted out the 
resulting pain, relieving him of his duty to copy the letters for Mary; in fact, hiding 
them at a place where their gradual destruction would have eventually fulfilled his 
promise to his deceased friend. Yet how he felt when performing these actions—
was he swift or reluctant, was he grieving while engaged in them?—or why he 
chose this particular hiding place is “beyond recovery” as no one was consciously 
present when these plotted grounds were traversed for the first time.
The first sleepwalking incident also reveals, piece by piece, that no viable 
dwelling place can be built from this narrator’s hermeneutical or imaginative work 
alone. His longing for other stories responds to the structural limitations of the 
narrative agency granted him within this storyworld. Indeed, his storytelling grav-
itates toward other narratives to fill the gaps in his impaired consciousness, and to 
compensate for the instabilities immanent to his hermeneutic efforts. Sarsefield’s 
account of witnessing Edgar’s sleepwalking is the most interesting case in this re-
gard. For a short and happy moment, the longing for an interlocutor gives way to 
a conjoint act of storytelling: As Edgar and Sarsefield tell and listen to each other’s 
stories when stumbling across one another amidst great confusion, their stories 
become complete, where both would have remained erring without the comple-
menting account of the other. This triumph is soon questioned, however: Sarsefield 
was certain to have seen Edgar drown after his fall into the river, just as he is sure 
that Clithero drowned after jumping off the ship that was taking him to detention. 
In the first case, his flawed narrative is corrected by Edgar’s account; whether or 
not he is also wrong in the second case is uncertain. Maybe Clithero did die after 
going overbroad, but the previous misinterpretation lingers, destabilizing—in not 
surely terminating Clithero’s erring state—the prospects of future dwelling.
The narrative project of creating viable dwelling grounds is severely con-
strained by this narrative’s eclipsed mode of recovery. It can only succeed when 
reconciling the narrating consciousness with the hazardous fact that it has been 
oblivious to its external world, absorbed with interior pains and obsessions from 
its past, not the present. And if sleepwalking is imagined here as being connected 
to unacknowledged feelings of guilt, the sleepwalking witnessed by Edgar before 
becoming a sleepwalker himself underscores this connection. When first seeing 
the sleepwalking Clithero, he is deeply moved by the other’s grief and despair. The 
story that Clithero tells Edgar to prove that he did not kill his friend leaves no doubt 
that he, too, sleepwalks out of guilt. The obsessive burial of a stolen manuscript be-
longing to the person whom he believes to have murdered is his “pain-exerting” ac-
tion. He, too, breaks into his own secret hiding place, hides and nearly destroys his 
most valued treasure elsewhere. In both cases, sleepwalking generates actions that 
are potentially harmful to the one performing them, thus turning the perpetrator 
into a possible victim. This leveling of distinctions between victim and perpetrator 
is indeed of great importance for what Brooks would call the “narrative design and 
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intent” of this tale and its implied prospects of dwelling in the world. In crafting 
a story in which sleepwalking springs from an ailing, inarticulable sense of guilt 
that is potentially hazardous for its bearer, it does not exploit the topic of guilt to 
teach a moral lesson. On the contrary, guilt serves to suspend moral judgment. 
Trapped between a haunted past and a rejected future, dwelling in this narratively 
created state of suspension is the desired way of belonging that drives the telling 
of this tale. And it is to this end that sleepwalking is not exploited as a stabilizing 
metaphor but as a metonymic trajectory, “the figure of contiguity and combina-
tion, the figure of syntagmatic relations” (Brooks, “Masterplot” 281). Its conjoint 
forces of driving, deferring, and punctuating the narrative align Edgar’s yearning 
to dwell in his narrative with the yearning to dwell in a state of suspended guilt.
The suspension of guilt is most powerfully pursued through sleepwalking, but 
it is practically omnipresent as the motif and motivation of storytelling in this 
novel. When Edgar decides to reconnect with his fiancée, he knows that he has 
kept her waiting, possibly for an irresponsibly long time, and perhaps he has made 
up his mind about terminating their engagement when he starts writing his letter. 
Prone to feel guilty about these matters, creating a favorable frame for her inevita-
ble judgment is of utmost concern. Similar dispositions are at work in Edgar’s final 
letter to Sarsefield, which closes with the words: “I shall not escape your censure, 
but I shall likewise, gain your compassion. I have erred, not through sinister or 
malignant intentions, but from the impulse of misguided, indeed, but powerful 
benevolence” (290). The breakup passage is another example: Edgar urges Mary 
to return the money, confronts her with the resulting consequence while doing 
everything to make the end of their engagement seem inevitable, including por-
traying himself as a victim. And although this passage achieves a remarkable con-
clusive density (thus creating the strongest sense of an ending in the middle of the 
book), the final sentence counters the moment of closure that has just been reached 
with a resurging longing for suspension: “These considerations, however, will be 
weighted when we meet” (157), he announces before steering straight into that part 
of his adventure that will turn him into the greatest victim of his sleepwalking—
the moment of his awakening in the cave.29
29 In the same passage, guilt suspension also plays out on a very dif ferent register of speech—
omission—in Edgar’s silence to rumors about Mary’s pregnancy. Is this true? Is it Edgar’s child? 
Is his silence based on a mutual agreement or is he imposing it? Does he want to abandon his 
responsibility? As if responding to this massive silence, the opening paragraph of the following 
chapter features the word “pregnant” that has been so thoroughly avoided when recounting 
Weymouth’s story in what can be read as a metonymic slippage of the term. “The following in-
cidents are of a kind to which the most ardent invention has ever conceived a parallel. […] The 
scene [awaking in the cave] was pregnant with astonishment and horror” (158; my emphasis). 
This proximate metonymic use of the term can be read as a hint towards an act of deferred, prob-
ably unwillful acknowledgement.
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The desire for a suspension of guilt brackets and undergirds the entire nar-
rative and again, this desire leads straight to Edgar’s manic doppelgänger. Upon 
learning that Clithero has impulsively killed Mrs. Lorimer’s evil brother and that, 
out of maddening regret, nearly killed her, Edgar defends him as having “acted in 
obedience to an impulse which he could not control, nor resist. Shall we impute 
guilt where there is no evil design?” (91) This judgment is indeed crucial, for it 
turns the other from being the bearer of Edgar’s unbound sympathy into being the 
personification of suspended guilt—and hence into a powerful figure of imaginary 
kinship. As a result of identifying with this imaginary placeholder of guilt suspen-
sion, Edgar outgrows the desire to save the other that drives the first half of the plot, 
and begins to reenact or double the other’s behavior. This new desire constitutes 
the narrative thrust in the second half of the novel. The narrator’s transformation 
into a sleepwalker is its most evocative sign of this shift of gears, and his passionate 
defense of Clithero turns him into a major suspect in the case of his best friend’s 
murder.30 This suspicion is officially proven wrong at the end of his letter to Mary. 
The deceased, it turns out, was the random victim of a revenge-seeking Indian 
determined to kill “the first human being whom he should meet” (281), with Edgar 
crediting himself for being the likely killer of that Indian.
Even so, our narrator is not quite rehabilitated from the suspicions of hav-
ing played an active role in his friend’s violent death. Does the desire to destroy 
Waldegrave’s letters acted out in his first instance of sleepwalking not hint at an 
even deeper desire to destroy the one who wrote them? Could this desire have 
something to do with the latter’s return to faith while Edgar stayed an atheist, a 
topic passionately discussed in these letters? Had Edgar secretly wished for his 
friend’s death because he knew about Weymouth’s money, started a relation with 
Mary out of sheer calculation about the inheritance, and now feels so guilty that 
he sleepwalks into the wilderness? And what about his odd friendship with the 
old  Delaware woman known to the region’s settlers as Old Deb/Queen Mab (both, 
obviously, non-indigenous names given to her by her colonizers), who turns out 
to be the mastermind behind the outburst of revenge violence that killed both 
 Waldegrave and Edgar’s uncle? Does this relation not strongly suggest a secret 
complicity of the narrator with death and destruction? Once again, sleepwalking 
offers itself as the most productive figure of contiguity and combination to plot ev-
idence for this looming suspicion. In this case, it connects with the second name of 
the old Delaware woman, Queen Mab, a famous fairy character in English folklore, 
in highly suggestive ways. The name stems from a Celtic legend in which its bearer 
30 Having the sleepwalker turn out as the murderer was presumably the idea of an earlier work, 
“Somnambulism,” which Brown never f inished. Edgar Huntly toys with this suspicion, for example 
in the f inal chapter, shortly before the murderer is revealed, when Edgar ponders over his and 
Clithero’s sleepwalking, and concludes: “How little cognizance men have over the actions and 
motives of each other!” (278).
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is a warrior queen. Frequently evoked by poets such as Herrick, Spencer, and Shelly, 
the best-known version of the character goes back to Shakespeare’s Romeo and 
Juliet, where it brings the dreams to sleepers and presides over childbirth.31 Edgar 
is closely connected to the native woman known by this name: Inspired by her 
“pretentions to royalty” (209) and the strangeness of her appearance, it was he who 
gave it to her.
In Edgar’s meandering tale, this act of name-giving creates the occasion to tell 
her story. And in telling this story, Edgar’s tale absorbs an uncanny reminder of 
the expulsion and dispossession imposed upon the native population that reads 
like a token of an emerging sense of discomfort (possibly even guilt) on the side of 
the settler colonialists from whose position Edgar speaks. Queen Mab’s tribe, he 
reports, once lived on the grounds now occupied by his uncle’s farm. When repeat-
ed harassments drove her people away, she refused to go along with them, burnt 
the wigwams, and moved to a hut deep in the woods where she “conceived that by 
remaining behind her countrymen she succeeded in government, and retained 
the possession of all this region” (208). In the narrative pursuit of belonging that 
becomes tangible here, “[t]he English were aliens and sojourners, who occupied 
the land only by her connivance and permission, and who she allows to remain on 
no other terms but those of supplying her wants” (208-9). When retelling Queen 
Mab’s story, Edgar spends an entire paragraph describing the constant conver-
sation with her three wild dogs, granting her (as the only woman and the only 
indigenous character of the novel) a voice of her own. And yet, she does not speak 
directly. Refusing the language of the colonizer, her long isolation has rendered her 
unintelligible even in her native language. Only Edgar has studied a little of her 
jargon, and, as a result, she is favorably inclined to him. For Myra Jehlen, her in-
cessant, unintelligible speech addressing wild beasts, her control over these beasts, 
and their strange loyalty to her “parody the rituals of domestication,” making her 
“a creature of romance and of Romanticism, conceivably a heroine, if a perverse 
one” (165). Edgar directly participates in creating this heroine: by associating her 
with the power of fomenting weird dreams that turns her—at least in Edgar’s fan-
cy—into a possible midwife in the dream material of his own (and by extension 
also his community’s) worst nightmares, some of which he might have already 
acted out while sleepwalking. But “midway through the paragraph in which this 
possibility suggests itself, Brown pulls back” (165), having his protagonist concede 
that he has gone too far in seeing “some rude analogy between this personage and 
her whom the poets of old-time have delighted to celebrate: thou wilt perhaps dis-
cover nothing but incongruities between them, but, be that is it may, Old Deb and 
31 In Romeo and Juliet, the character is evoked in Mercutio’s speech, Act I, scene 4. A comprehensive 
genealogy of this reference is given in Barnard and Shapiro’s annotated edition of Brown’s novel 
(138-39).
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Queen Mab soon came indiscriminate to general use” (Edgar Huntly 209, quoted 
in Jehlen 165).
Edgar’s lack of insistence in the rightness of this name strips its bearer of the 
magic powers she has barely seized. Does this mean (as Jehlen argues) that the nov-
el’s only potentially transgressive character falters, that history wins over romance? 
That it was doomed to falter since its subversive potential was too weak to be fully 
realized by the narrative? Not necessarily. I prefer another reading (forwarded by 
Paul Witherington) in which romance and history are two distinct voices, both 
speaking from the novel in poetically sound ways (166-69). Oscillating between 
these two voices, the narrative is less an expression of the narrator’s personal guilt 
(and not a product of a tension between conscious and unconscious levels of his 
storytelling). Rather, it makes tangible a tension between romantic aspiration and 
historic qualification that the text articulates in idiosyncratic yet exemplary ways. 
But whether one sides with Jehlen or Witherington, the double-voicedness of the 
narrative that both address exposes yet another limit of the narratable, and with 
it, another trajectory of suspending guilt. The romantic imagination emerging at 
this time is not yet fully hatched, which is why it cannot assume the role of a trans-
formative force in its own right. But historical guilt cannot be aptly expressed as 
long as narrative agency and narrating consciousness remain disconnected. In the 
absence of an artistic vision (and the respective narrative techniques) that would 
suture the gap between a troubling experience and its redemptive mediation, guilt 
is exploited for the purpose of dwelling in a state of extended suspension, in which 
past injustice deadlocks with future anxiety.
The novel leaves no doubt that this state corrodes the foundations of the com-
munity imagined here. It tells the story of an attempted homecoming that is struc-
turally and morally perverted: Instead of offering closure, it embarks on a process 
of narrative recovery whose outcome is selfish, provisional and uncertain. I read 
this courting of the contingent as a poetic response to a shared sense of social 
unrest and uncertainty that becomes bottomless in conjunction with the falter-
ing faith in the adequacy of both reason and religion to soothe existential doubt. 
In tune with the emerging romantic spirit, the yearning for a place in the world 
turns to the imagination, the body, and the senses. Yet in distrusting their healing 
powers, this mode of emplacement dwells in a haunted and self-serving state of 
suspension.
3 The Art of Attachment
 Sarah Orne Jewett ’s The Country of the Pointed Firs
Sarah Orne Jewett’s regionalist masterpiece The Country of the Pointed Firs (1896) 
begins with an instance of return: A summer visitor comes back to the fictional 
town of Dunnet Landing on the rugged coast of Maine for a writing retreat after 
having fallen in love with the place several summers prior on a yachting cruise. A 
vacationer’s return is temporary by nature, and as closely as this one gets acquaint-
ed with the place and its shrewd old inhabitants during the months of her stay, she 
does not become a true member of Dunnet’s community. The position of the well-
versed outsider is a staple of regionalism’s investment in matters of belonging, and 
it is crucial for this book in particular. The mix of proximity and distance on which 
it thrives allows for an ethnographic view of a place whose remoteness offers more 
than a spatial sanctuary for the troubled modern soul. It grants access—return—
to a different time, an imaginary past in which life is imbued with a powerful sense 
of stability and rootedness.
It has often been noted that the backwardness of costal Maine has a nostalgic 
appeal for Jewett’s privileged visitor. And if the will to capitalize on the respective 
yearnings of an elitist audience counts as a hallmark of regionalist fiction, I do 
not want to contest this view here.1 The charm of Dunnet Landing is indeed in-
separably tied to a peaceful rural life for which the conflicted realities of a soci-
ety grappling with the rise of urban industrialism serves as a tacit backdrop.2 But 
Pointed Firs exploits the figure of the intimate outsider not only, and to my mind 
1 Raymond Williams was instrumental in establishing this view. Two influential positions in the 
context of American letters are those of Brodhead and Kaplan.
2 For a long time, the nostalgic renderings of regionalist places were explained in terms of im-
poverishment: When New England’s population and economic growth went elsewhere, political 
and cultural status vanished, and the region itself seemed to have been feminized: Regionalist 
writers, themselves predominantly female, were telling their stories to compensate for an actual 
state of lack or loss. See, for example, Westbrook; Douglas; Cox. With its focus on attachment, 
this chapter seeks to contest notions of the interplay of, narrative and nostalgia as a spiteful 
conundrum. This view, which is widely shared in our f ield, f inds poignant expression in Stewart’s 
On Longing. For Stewart, nostalgia is not only a thoroughly narrative phenomenon, transforming 
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not even primarily, to stage longings for a lost home. Rather, its nameless visitor 
is the narrating agent in an exercise in attachment that, in making porous the 
boundaries of her self through the love of place, is more than merely regressive. A 
treatment of place-as-friend provides the affective foundations for this feat, and 
the tale consummates it through the art of the sketch.
Jewett liked to think of Pointed Firs as a collection of “sketches,” only rarely 
referring to it as a novel.3 But her endorsement of the sketch does not mean that 
she was writing in its conventions (the literary genre was strictly confined to a his-
torically-minded study of character at the time).4 She used the description-based 
narrative mode that it affords to cross boundaries between sketch, story and novel 
in ways that were “pushing the envelope of conventional fiction,” perhaps even 
probing a kind of “experimental fiction” avant la lettre (Goheen 30-34; here: 32). 
What makes Jewett’s sketches so intriguing from the perspective of this study is 
their tenuous mode of engagement with the physical world; their tactile transla-
tion of sensory data into artistic form. The sketch’s reputation of being a minor art 
form hinges on this basic makeup, and it is thus no surprise that associations with 
it were persistently used to diminish rather than valorize Jewett’s work.5 In what 
follows, I want to reverse this line of judgment and recalibrate Pointed Firs’s ac-
complishment in terms of the tenuous exercise in attachment conducted through 
the “minor” art of the sketch. My point of departure is simple: A sketch is always 
a sketch of some concrete thing in the world, and never a sketch of a mental object 
or image. Whether sketching is a precursory stage of a larger work or an artistic 
the past into an imaginary shelter—which I agree with—but also a “social disease” (23)—
which I f ind an unproductive generalization that this chapter seeks to complicate.
3 In a letter to her publisher Jewett even suggests advertising Pointed Firs as a sketch rather than 
a novel. Letter to Mr. Garrison on 22 April, partially dated, most likely written in 1880 (quoted in 
Goheen 32).
4 In the world of American letters, the sketch gained a high profile through Hawthorne’s biograph-
ical treatment, to which Jewett was clearly not restricting herself.
5 A f irst reference to the sketch occurs in a letter by Horace Scudder after publishing one of Jewett’s 
early stories. He writes: “Your story disappoints me, now that I read it in print. There seem to be 
good characters for a story and good scenery but no incident, no story. In other words that here is 
a sketch and not a picture” (Scudder to Jewett, 2 July 1870; quoted in Goheen 41). Henry James’s 
ambiguous endorsement of Jewett’s writing as “a beautiful little quantum of achievement” 
(“Fields” 30) resonates with these same issues. And while Pointed Firs was favorably reviewed, its 
most dissatisf ied reviewer (writing for Bookman) ties his disappointment with the book directly 
to its endorsement of the sketch: “[…] the little volume comes to its quiet ending, leaving the 
impression that, suggestive and delightful as such books are, they cannot, save in rare instances, 
leave any deep impression. […] These delicate sketches of life hold the same place in literature 
as do their counterpart in painting, but no artist can rest an enduring popularity on such trif les 
light as air” (Anonymous; quoted in Howard, “Traffic” 2).
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expression in its own right, it is always an act of familiarization (for the photo-
realist painter Robert Bechtel even an act of “taking possession”). But familiar-
ization is never complete, and hence the artist is inclined to move on to the next 
striking view, person, object, detail or scene before her work has reached a state of 
consummation.
Stressing the artistic thrust of this inherently unfinished practice is important, 
however, for art is always double-coded; it does something while also staging and 
reflecting its own doing. Approached this way, the tactile mode of engagement 
with an immediate “place world” that is key to Jewett’s endorsement of the sketch 
makes tangible a longing to not only be familiar with this world but attached to 
it.6 Reading Pointed Firs with an interest in its art of attachment is inspired by 
Rita Felski, who, invoking the Latourian notion that “[t]ies […] are not limits to 
action but a fundamental condition for action,” and that emancipation “does not 
mean ‘freed from bonds’, but well-attached” (Latour, Reassembling 218), argues 
that “attachment is an ontological fact, an inescapable condition of existence” 
(“Latour” 738; 740).7 Belonging, conceived here as an existential need for a place 
in the world, depends on and works through attachment; in fact, one could say 
that attachment is its basic emotional currency. But how are attachments formed 
and maintained, what does narrative have to do with it, and how does Pointed Firs 
exploit this relation?
In a most basic sense, attachment is an affective relation with the physical 
world: to places, people, and things about which and for whom we care because 
they are familiar to us. We have seen, felt, smelled, heard, or touched them many 
times, and storing these vast amounts of sensory data in our memory, let alone 
making sense of and creating connections between its countless bits and pieces 
across space and time, requires narrative mediation. But recording and storing im-
pressions and memories is neither voluntary nor controllable. On the contrary, the 
fact that we have very little control over what we record and remember and what 
we omit, misplace or forget enhances our wish to safekeep and narrativize what 
we hold dear. It is indeed one of the puzzling paradoxes of using narrative for the 
purpose of safekeeping that, in demanding selection and combination, narrative 
creates its own modes of actualizing that to which it wants to attach itself. And if 
one of the endeavors of this study is to solicit an understanding of narrative as the 
mediating structure to which we turn to feel and direct our yearning for a place in 
the world, this chapter zeroes in on one of its most hands-on, and yet most capa-
cious features: the capacity to create, regulate and maintain those attachments to 
the physical world that it takes to build a place and dwell in it.
6 The term is drawn from Edward Casey.
7 As I was writing this chapter Felski had just started working on her book with this topic, which 
bears the working title Hooked: Art and Attachment.
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Regionalist fiction is paradigmatically invested in this operation. It tells sto-
ries about remote and backward places because it cares for them, and it is this 
topophilic disposition that defines its place in the context of late nineteenth-cen-
tury American literature. Turning away from the urban or international scene that 
was realism’s preferred environment (as a training ground for sensible judgment), 
regionalism explored the fringes of a rapidly changing society and recorded the 
quaint and exotic life-forms flourishing there. In terms of form, it favored short-
ness over length, description or dramatic exposition over dramatic development 
and consummation, all of which is highly conducive to Jewett’s narrative art of 
attachment. As one of its foremost practitioners, Jewett, whose work has been fa-
vorably received throughout her own lifetime and beyond, has been substantial in 
defining our understanding of the genre. Pointed Firs, after Deephaven (1877) and 
A Country Doctor (1884), her third and most accomplished book, is of particular 
interest for conjoining matters of place and form in ways that exemplify narrative’s 
intimate involvement with the physical world. Historically, this was a remarkable 
move. The need to belong that drives Jewett’s tale finds relief in a radically in-
tersubjective, reception-based model of narrative exchange that revolves around 
matters of familiarization and attachment at a time when its polar opposites, de-
familiarization and detachment, were on the rise. These new aesthetic parameters 
stood in the service of an art that wanted to see the world with fresh eyes in order 
to overcome modern self-alienation. But these eyes were strikingly disembodied; 
in fact, the alleged freshness and rigor of their gaze depended on a systematic dis-
sociation from its bearer’s affective and visceral corporeality. Cognitive insight 
thus became a matter of cool introspection, which often went hand in hand with 
a twofold retreat: into the depth of one’s mind and into the sheltered rooms of the 
private sphere. Henry James’s Isabel Archer fully embodies this artistic agenda. 
In the pivotal moment, she sees Gilbert Osmond and Madame Merle’s betrayal 
in front of her, framed by the doorway like a picture on the wall, yet it is only 
upon withdrawing to her room and spending the night reflecting on what she has 
seen that she is able to understand it and redirect her life accordingly.8 Narrative 
8 See James, The Portrait of a Lady, chapters XL and XLII. The instance of incomplete recognition, to 
be completed in Isabel’s nocturnal reflection, is described as follows: “Just beyond the threshold 
to the drawing room she stopped short, the reason for her doing so being that she had received 
an impression. The impression had, in strictness, nothing unprecedented; but she felt it as some-
thing new, and the soundlessness of her step gave her time to take in the scene before she inter-
rupted it. Madame Merle was in her bonnet, and Gilbert Osmond was talking to her; for a minute 
they were unaware she had come in. Isabel had often seen that before, certainly; but what she 
had not seen, or at least not noticed, was that their colloquy had for a moment converted itself 
into a sort of familiar silence, from which she instantly perceived that her entrance would star-
tle them. […] There was nothing to shock in this; they were old friends in fact. But the thing 
made an image, lasting only a moment, lie a sudden flicker of light. Their relative positions their 
The Ar t of At tachment 77
agency, when derived from this basic pattern, aims for the power of irritation, for 
self-transformation as the result of feeling unfamiliar and detached. Modernist art 
amplifies these dynamics while also casting doubt on the possibilities both of gain-
ing true insight into an individual’s inner core and of achieving reintegration into 
the social world. Yet despite their diverging aesthetic responses, both modernism 
and realism share the basic assumption that an improved state of belonging (if it 
can be attained at all) is the result of detachment.
Against the backdrop of this allegedly sketchy scenario, the present chapter 
wants to bring into view how Jewett’s artistic practice both complements and chal-
lenges the dominant path of narrative art at her time. Doing so involves pondering 
over what kind of activity attachment is, and what forms of (narrative) agency it af-
fords. Moreover, in assigning attachment rather than its opposite the role of a pre-
requisite of belonging, Pointed Firs gives occasion to reevaluate some of our most 
solid assumptions about narrative (and) agency. For when attachment becomes an 
explicit end of narration, acts of listening, retelling, mending, and caring—all of 
which are commonly received as passive, derivative, female—assume a proactive 
role. In telling a story that foregrounds these presumably minor components of 
narrative exchange, Pointed Firs exposes their gendered valences while rejecting 
supposedly “male” ends of narrative agency (such as transformation or self-reali-
zation) as superior means to dwell in the world.9 It would be shortsighted to think 
of this agenda can as merely regressive, not least because a narrative agency that is 
geared toward attachment must forge ties to the physical world—to objects, places, 
people. It is this tactile, non-self-centered dimension of Pointed Firs’s narrative art 
in which I am interested here as a practical means of dwelling in the world.
Coinciding, furthermore, with the rise of realism and the professionalization 
of the literary field that dovetailed this development, Jewett’s book raises far-reach-
ing questions about the interstices of narrative art and the literary market—and 
hence, about belonging as a cultural commodity. In fact, Pointed Firs was conceived 
for, and to a viable extent even by this market, and the “object life” of  Pointed Firs 
unleashed by this market in a series of material incarnations—a magazine and a 
absorbed mutual gaze, struck her as something detected” (457-58). The very similar instance, 
reflected in strikingly similar terms—“The glimpse made a picture; it lasted only a moment, but 
that moment was experience” (35)—can be found in the programmatic essay “The Art of Fiction,” 
in which James develops his visual theory of recognition and literature’s guiding role in it.
9 It is no coincidence that most of regionalism’s best-known authors are women—in addition 
to Jewett, one may think of Kate Chopin, Mary Wilkins Freeman, Mary Austin, and later Willa 
 Cather—who turned the genre into the fertile ground for a female tradition and a hotbed of 
feminist ideas. Regionalism hence carved out a distinct place for women writers and for female 
concerns, and this in turn generated a rich body of scholarship. See, for instance, Bell, “Gender 
and American Realism;” Ammons, “Going in Circles;” Zagarell, “Narrative of Community;” Foote, 
Regionalist Fictions; Fetterley and Pryse, Writing Out of Place.
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book publication as well as several posthumous editions, the most famous of them 
by Willa Cather—challenges the fixed and closural form of the book and the novel. 
New chapters were added and existing chapters rearranged in each of these pub-
lications, and many of these changes were unauthorized. And if this “object life” 
cannot be divorced from the printed matter in which it resides it makes palpable 
the process in which the book, as a cultural object and consumer good, emerges as 
a viable site of topophilic investment that this chapter seeks to explore.
toPoPHiLic disPositioNs
Pointed Firs tells a story of growing attachment to a place that stands out not be-
cause it is the most beautiful stretch of land on the coast of Maine but because it 
is already familiar. Narration set in with this personal bias—“[p]erhaps it was the 
simple fact of acquaintance with that neighborhood which made it so attaching”—
and from the get-go the relation to this place is rendered in terms of friendship, the 
freest, most malleable form of interpersonal affection.
When one really knows a village like this and its surroundings, it is like becoming acquainted with a 
single person. The process of falling in love at f irst sight is as f inal as it is swift in such a case, but the 
growth of true friendship may be a lifelong affair. (377)
Taking my cue from these opening lines, my guiding question in this section is: 
How and to what ends does the narrative stage and exploit the topophilic dispo-
sition on which it thrives? More specifically, I want to explore the interplay of af-
fect(ion) and narrative mobilized for the purpose of dwelling in the world through 
Pointed Firs’s treatment of place as a friend. With this focus I am less concerned 
with deciphering what this place means and more with finding out what it does, 
especially what kind of (narrative) agency it yields.10
10 The meaning of regionalist places is an issue for heated debate, and it revolves around the basic 
opposition of it being ideologically coopted or resistant. Brodhead and Kaplan stress the reduc-
tive regress of tourist retreat and its conservative implications; Foote, Fetterley and Pryse insist 
on it being heterogeneous and dif ferent. Pointed Firs is an especially contested case in point. 
Some of the critics who praised the book for fathoming a quasi-utopian place of a female sol-
idarity and care in the 1980s found it nativist and imperialist a decade later. See, for instance, 
Ammons and Zaragell. Yet no matter how original and diverse these accounts are, they all zero 
in on a particular ideological mechanism (nation, class, empire, race, ethnicity, sex, gender) to 
trace its implications for social formation and subject positioning within the f ictional world of 
the text. The readings thus produced are mostly plausible, consistent, and even insightful when 
disagreeing with them, but there is a certain predictability about the ways in which they mirror 
The Ar t of At tachment 79
It is striking how readily the erotic force of an instant crush is dismissed for 
a presumably truer kind of affection. The primary measure of difference invoked 
here (through the organic metaphor of “growth” and its “lifelong” prospect) is 
temporal. The prospect for enduring friendship charges the remote coastal town 
not only with human virtues (trust, reliability) but also with existential vulner-
abilities (growing old and frail). The place-as-friend allegory thus works toward 
invoking a relation of mutual, self-relativizing devotion and care. So if it has been 
argued that the subject of Pointed Firs “is less Dunnet Landing, its citizens, or 
even its regional interest as such, and more friendly comportment and its spiri-
tual meaning” (Shannon 241), I almost agree. Jewett’s narrative art of attachment 
programmatically draws these subjects together, materially reinforcing them in its 
treatment of place as friend.
Jewett’s high regard of friendship was subtended by Swedenborgian doctrine, 
from which she adopted the notion that a special form of love for one’s neighbor 
leads to salvation. Ideas of the Swedish mystic circulated widely in American liter-
ary circles at the time, so much so that it has been called his “age.”11 Their impact 
on Jewett was momentous for helping her overcome a spiritual crisis early on in 
her adult life, which involved her conflicted feelings for a close female friend.12 
Quite possibly, the mode of affective engagement endorsed in Pointed Firs echoes 
its author’s personal struggles, which she came to resolve in intimate same-sex 
friendships, particularly with her long-term companion Annie Fields. Jewett and 
Fields lived in a marriage-like relationship for many years after Annie’s husband, 
the shifting ideological grounds of the f ield—thus making palpable that scholarly narratives, 
too, are engaged in matters of belonging and place-making.
11  For example by F .O. Matthiessen in his preface to The American Renaissance (viii). According to 
religion historian Sydney Ahlstrom, “Swedenborg’s influence was seen everywhere [in America 
at this time]; in Transcendentalism and at Brook Farm, in spiritualism and the free labor move-
ment, in the craze for communitarian experiment, in faith healing, in mesmerism, and half a 
dozen medical cults; among great intellectuals [for example William James, about whom I will 
have more to say], crude charlatans, and innumerable frontier quacks” (quoted in Hart 518).
12 Jewett was introduced to Swedenborgian ideas in the 1870s by Theophilus Parsons Jr., a Harvard 
law professor and one of their main disseminators in the U.S. The two met when Parsons vaca-
tioned in Maine. Donovan thinks that Jewett’s feelings for her close friend Kate Birckard in the 
early 1870s were a crucial factor in the crisis that Jewett underwent at this time, and which led 
her to embrace Swedenborgianism. Be that as it may, the character Kate Lancester in her f irst 
novel Deephaven is not only named after Jewett’s close friend, she also makes the most out-
spoken Swedenborgian comments in the book. See Donovan, “Jewett and Swedenborg” 732-34. 
Tempting as it may be to think of Jewett as a lesbian writer, it is important to bear in mind she 
never overtly addressed sexuality in its post-sexological sense. In Howard’s apt words, Jewett 
“has a place among writers who portray intimacies and devotions that do not follow heterosexual 
scripts” (“Traffic” 8).
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the influential publisher James Fields, had passed away. Such relationships be-
tween two women were so common in New England at the time that scholars have 
invented a name for them, “Boston marriages,” and often, as in the case of Jewett 
and Fields, they consolidated in response to one of them becoming a widow.13 Yet 
whereas Swedenborg saw heterosexual marriage as the ultimate expression of di-
vine love in human terms, Jewett replaces the neighbor with the friend, and along 
with this move she sacralizes the affective domain of friendship (Shannon 236-37). 
Moreover, and crucially, this sacalization gives friendship a placial quality. Just as 
a place unfolds from a network of relations and not from a bilateral conjunction, 
friendship is a mode of affective attachment that is decidedly less exclusive, less 
normative, less private than marriage while not necessarily being shorter lived. 
And it is in precisely this vein that Pointed Firs features friendship as a place-mak-
ing agent: Its topophilic disposition both grounds and mobilizes the sacred dimen-
sion of friendship in and through the love of place. So if, in “[y]oking together the 
realms of spiritual and material life, friendship forms the soul’s ‘country’” that, in 
turn, “translates, transports and transfigures the self” (Shannon 228), it is through 
the allegorical treatment of place as friend that Pointed Firs’s concerns with dwell-
ing in the world are brought to converge in an overarching concern with attach-
ment to a spiritually enhanced place world.
Clearly, the strongest friendship bond in the book is that between the name-
less narrator and her landlady, the wondrous, widowed Mrs. Todd. And while the 
rapidly growing affection between the two women is enforced by the fact that they 
live under the same roof, their shared site is not merely domestic. Mrs. Todd is 
the local herbalist who runs her business from home, and it does not take long 
until her tenant helps out in dealing with the frequently calling customers. From 
this house the place-making power of friendship branches all the way out to the 
remote channel island where Mrs. Todd’s mother and brother live. In fact, the 
island gains its fabulous appeal through friendship as place (a local constellation 
of people who are affectively disposed to the narrator and display their affection 
at particular sites) and form (shared observations, memories, meals, songs).14 The 
13 See Faderman 90; Donovan, “Love Poems” 101. Faderman defines a “Boston marriage” as a mo-
nogamous relation based on female values, in which one woman’s life was spent primarily with 
another woman, each giving to the other the bulk of affection and energy (109). The relation 
between Jewett and Fields lasted for almost three decades, during which they lived together for 
part of the year, travelled together, corresponded daily, shared interests in books and people, and 
gave each other a sense of belonging. See Roman and Fryer for an emphatic endorsement of their 
relationship. Love thinks that this line of work too readily dismisses the loneliness and isolation 
that homosexual women must have experienced at the time, and that reverberates so strongly and 
coherently from Jewett’s writing that, for her, it emblemizes a “spinster aesthetic” (310-13).
14 “The Bowden Reunion” chapter, in which the visitor gets as close as she will to belonging to 
Dunnet Landing, and which has recently been predominantly read in terms of a nativist and 
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place-making power of friendship is also directed inward, where it complicates the 
intimacy within Mrs. Todd’s “quaint little house with as much comfort and uncon-
sciousness as if it were a larger body, or a double shell” (421). These are curious met-
aphors for a dwelling place, animating it both in human and in non-human terms 
as a magical equilibrium between separation and unity. And if this nearly perfect 
state is threatened by the arrival of another visitor, this long-term acquaintance of 
Mrs. Todd’s becomes a “sincere friend” (421) of the narrator within hours of being 
exposed to her company. It is through recurring instances of this kind that friend-
ship gains a placial quality throughout the narrative: by exploiting the topophilic 
disposition at its core for the purpose of fostering multilateral acquaintance, and 
by giving shape to the setting through the caring bonds among female friends (the 
anxiously awaited houseguest is, of course, yet another elderly woman).
Moreover, and crucially, finding herself in a local web of female affection is 
essential to the growing state of attachment that motivates the narrator’s act of 
telling. These bonds are especially strong since Dunnet’s women are neither bound 
up in heteronormative commitments nor confined to the domestic sphere. These 
women make up the thrust of Pointed Firs’s narrative-generating love of place, 
while the men (old and frail as most of them are) are consigned to the margins of 
a gendered topography that invokes an alternative “female world of love and ritu-
al” (Smith-Rosenberg, “Female World”).15 The fictionality of Pointed Firs’s setting 
might be a tribute to this tacit utopianism, and when wondering what bestows the 
place with its utopian air, the matrifocal community immediately comes to mind. 
Like in Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s Herland, written a few decades later and possi-
bly inspired by Jewett’s novel, this utopia is spatial rather than temporal; no magi-
cal time travel is involved in getting there since traveling (back) in time is rendered 
as a function of traveling across space.16 In stark difference to Herland, however, 
elitist exclusionism performed by a local clan, can also be read along these lines. Against claims 
that the reunion is both a “celebratory mythologization of a rural martifocal community” and a 
“protofascist” endorsement of “racial purity and white cultural dominance” (Ammons, “Material 
Culture” 91-92, 96), or of the Bowden family as “one of the many fraternal [sic] organizations—
among them the Knights of Columbus and the KKK—that f lourished during this period” (Gilman 
113), Shannon makes a compelling case for reading it as “a ritual of aff iliation, specif ically the 
relationships it suggests between friendship and family,” not least since the Bowden clan com-
prises “almost everyone within a sphere of contact” (Shannon 250-51).
15 Most of the men in Pointed Firs have died long ago, and those who are still around are aptly 
represented by the shrewd Captain Littlepage whose name alone carries a humorous gesture of 
diminishment. For an inventory of the marginalized male characters in Pointed Firs see Bell 67-71.
16 I owe this insight to Katharina Metz, who writes about Gilman’s utopian novel in her dissertation 
The Language of Altruism. Female and feminist utopian f iction was a f lourishing genre at the time. 
For an overview see Lewes, Gynotopia. Pointed Firs is not among her list of over 50 volumes pub-
lished between 1836 and 1900. Levy, in her study on feminist utopian visions of the home place, 
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which solves the problem of social reproduction on its all-female world-island 
through virgin birth, there are no children in the self-contained “land of the point-
ed firs,” not even on the horizon. All of the women whom we encounter are past 
childbearing (with the exception of maybe the narrator, who seems to be in her 
forties but does not come across as an aspiring mother).
Pointed Firs’s dismissal of procreation is crucial for at least two reasons: It re-
jects the heteronormative alliance of motherhood and domesticity that was the 
overpowering ideal of femininity at the time. Even more pertinently, however, it 
forecloses the future for its community. The enchanted place unfolding from Dun-
net’s network of loving and caring relations is dying, and this creates a powerful 
paradox. For what do we make of a utopia of old and dying people even if they are 
as radiant as Mrs. Todd’s eighty-something-year-old mother, “a delightful little 
person herself with bright eyes and an affectionate air of expectation like a child 
on a holiday” (406), who might be the secret queen of Dunnet Landing but by 
sheer biological fact is facing the end “of her summers and their happy toils” (408), 
with children who are themselves old and childless remnants of an earlier age? 
What ends, we may ask, are served by conjoining elegiac mood and utopian air in 
and through the love of place as friend? In grappling with this paradox, a crucial 
distinction is in order: Regardless of the actual place that inspired the narrative 
(had it already ceased to exist when writing about it, or had it never existed as re-
membered here in the first place?), the beloved place in the world of the text is not 
dead; it is dying. The difference is crucial because anticipating death has its own 
temporality—a heterochronic hyperpresence that absorbs the past in the absence 
of a knowable future. This extraordinary, “artificial” time creates its own topo-
graphic realities in the world of Pointed Firs—“waiting place[s] between this world 
an’ the next” (397), one of them being the mythical “country ‘way up north beyond 
the ice” (395) populated by zombie-like, “fog-shaped men” (396), another the small 
inaccessible channel island (“a bad place to get to, unless the wind an’ tide were just 
right”) that served Joanna Bowden for her lifelong hermitage after being “crossed 
in love” (429).17 These two sad places find a viable counter-site in Green Island, 
with its youthful old people, shared meals and song, an abundant growth of rare 
herbs and affective bonds. It is a place of hospitality and enchantment rather than 
exile and despair.
Even so, with the queen of Green Island being over eighty years old (which was 
ancient at the time), Green Island is a waiting place nevertheless. Bestowed with 
mythic perfection in the narrator’s emphatic account—“one could not help wish-
ing to be a citizen of such a complete and tiny continent and home of fisherfolk” 
(407)—the remote island resembles a heaven on earth. The reason for this is that 
uses Herland to set the stage for discussing the works of Jewett (with a special focus on Pointed 
Firs), Willa Cather, Ellen Glasgow, Katherine Anne Porter, Eudora Welty, and Gloria Naylor.
17  The term “heterochronic” is, of course, drawn from Foucault.
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it materializes friendship as “a consecrated way of life” (Shannon 241). Rife with 
Swedenborgian ideas about an afterlife in which “old friends renewed their love 
and brought it to greater intensity” (Donovan 732), it is a place that can dismiss the 
future because it embodies an extraterrestrial state. Dunnet Landing’s difference 
from its heterotopian otherworldliness is marked by the narrator calling it “large 
and noisy and oppressive” (420) upon returning there. But the contrast dissolves at 
night, when “the village was so still that I could hear the shy whippoorwills sing-
ing as I lay awake in my downstairs bedroom, and the scent of Mrs. Todd’s herb 
garden under the window blew in again and again with every gentle rising of the 
sea breeze” (420). That Dunnet Landing resumes this hyperpresence of caressing 
sounds and smells as the nameless visitor anticipates the “small death” of sleep 
exposes the degree to which it, too, is a mythical waiting place—possibly of the 
Green Island variety.
tHe sketcH aNd tHe joUrNey
Except for the first short chapter, Pointed Firs is the first-person narrative of our 
nameless summer vacationer, and hence the place that we encounter is quintessen-
tially her place—filled with her longings, mediated through her senses, put forth 
in her language and imagery, rendered by her selective taste and compositional 
skill. Jewett opted for this most subjective of all narrative voices, and yet she gave it 
neither a name nor much of a life story. In fact, the nameless narrator tells a story 
that dwells in close contact with the physical world while leaving introspective re-
flections of temporal matters largely aside. With Edward Casey, I want to think of 
the point of view endowed here as placial: Rather than prompting an immersion in 
the unfolding of time, which is always closely tied to consciousness and the mind, 
it engages “an alliance between an outlook into place and our existence as bodily 
beings. Adopting such a viewpoint […] precipitates us […] into bodily comport-
ment: how we move, where we stand” (452). Jewett’s nameless visitor fully inhabits 
this point of view. Nowhere in her narrative does she delve inward to contemplate 
the course of her life; introspection—the narrative scheme in which troubled states 
of belonging are so often reflected and potentially resolved—does not play a role 
in this book. Instead, narration revolves around the “experience of living through 
[her] corporeal intentionality as it engages with the places of [her] near sphere—
and as they in turn nestle within the containing horizon of [her] immediate place 
world” (Casey 452). In doing so, the act of telling performed in Pointed Firs is 
always within touching distance (in Tuchfühlung) of its subject matter.
 The sketch is the perfect form for this kind of narrative, for no other artistic 
practice is so genuinely directed toward the immediate place world of the person 
engaged in it. Where one stands, and how one moves vis-à-vis one’s subject matter 
affects the outcome immediately. And while the translation of sensory data into 
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artistic form is never unmediated (simply because there is no such thing as unme-
diated experience), sketching stands out in its relatively direct engagement with 
the physical world. And this brings me back to my earlier claim that the most basic 
impulse behind the art of the sketch is familiarization. It is both literal—for the 
promise of unobstructed encounter—and serial—because acquaintance is never 
complete. A new angle on the same object, a slight change of light, a rivaling site 
of interest in the vicinity will start the familiarization process anew. How seam-
lessly compatible this potentially open-ended type of artistic production is for the 
purpose of catering to an audience craving for a tangible, familiar world as a com-
modity will concern us later on. For now, I want to focus on the affordances of the 
sketch as a narrative mode. Stemming from the repertoire of the visual arts, the 
sketch brings to mind techniques such as pencil drawing or water coloring, both of 
which capture the nook of the world in front of the artist in a few precise gestures. 
Some playful lines on paper are enough to evoke the object or scene at hand (along 
with the body of the artist).18 In the world of letters much of the discrete physical-
ity of the sketch is lost; what remains—and is masterfully put to use in Pointed 
Firs—is the translation of select physical details into evocative signs. Selection can 
be as random as putting two juvenile chickens into the domestic setting of Mrs. 
Todd’s upbringing on Green Island, arguably the sacred core of the entire fictional 
place world. Approaching the “small white house” from the landing, the narrator 
registers “the bright eyes and brainless little heads of two half-grown chickens who 
were snugged down among the mallows as if they had been chased away from the 
door more than once, and expected to be again” (408). The image evoked here is 
uncannily precise and suggestive. Placing the chickens at Mrs. Blackett’s doorstep, 
tucked in with the mallows (just like the house itself is tucked “iceberg”-like into 
the landscape “as if [it was] two-thirds below the surface” [408]) gives the domestic 
scene an air of wholesomeness. Dumb and ordinary as they are, the juvenile birds 
have a place in this perfect little world.
Jewett’s sketches thrive on being descriptive for sure, but this is not to say 
they are transparent or neutral. Finding chickens—not one but two—important 
enough to put in the “Green Island” sketch, combining them with further details 
(the tender mallows, the doorstep to Mrs. Blackett’s house), describing them affec-
tionately (the birds are “snugged” to the ground by the door), all of these choices 
attune our perception of the place world made visible here with the caressing gaze 
of the narrator. And if description is always geared toward making something visi-
ble, how this is done modulates our perception of and relation to its subject matter. 
But Jewett does not engage vision as the disembodied master sense of truthful 
18 For Byerly, the sketch in visual art is “a rapidly drawn picture that sacrif ices aesthetic f inish for a 
sense of spontaneity.” This idea, when appropriated into literature, displays a certain disdain for 
techne and removes the layer of artif ice so distrusted by displaying the kind of honesty gleaned 
from spontaneity.
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perception which classical realism (especially of the Henry Jamesian kind men-
tioned above) values as a primary tool of self-assertion.19 Her sketches take us 
close, so close that the visual sense is pushed back on behalf of the less assertive 
senses—especially sound and smell, which make us feel at their mercy rather than 
in control. Without a shutting mechanism, their default modus operandi is pure 
exposure: They break down distance and bring the world up close, and Jewett’s 
narrator exploits them to this very end. Mrs. Todd’s “queer little garden,” for in-
stance, is described through the “fragrant presence” of the herbs flourishing there. 
The “bushy bit of green” gains discernible contours when the breeze comes in from 
the sea, “laden with not only sweetbrier and sweet-mary, but balm and sage and 
borage and mint, wormwood and southernwood,” and after a short while the nar-
rator knows “in exactly which corner of the garden [Mrs. Todd] might be” (378) 
based on the smells set free by the stroke of her skirts and the weight of her feet. 
Likewise, the soundscape around Shellheap Island—“gay voices and laughter from 
a pleasure-boat” (444)—deepens the narrator’s understanding of Joanna Bowden’s 
hermitage. More examples could easily be found, and in all of them the placial 
point of view endorsed in Pointed Firs is crucial for their synesthetic renderings of 
proximity. In fact, it is through this technique that familiarization is fathomed in 
terms of attachment—as a fully embodied, multi-sensual form of close contact in 
which reception and description are seamlessly intertwined.
A brief comparison of Jewett’s style with that of another regionalist writer, 
Kate Chopin, is instructive here: Chopin’s writing is equally sensuous for sure, yet 
whereas her impressionistic style resorts to a semantic field of bodily and emotive—
erotic—stimulus with the aim of engendering an aching desire for change, Jewett’s 
descriptive mode stresses the sensuous materiality of the physical world with the 
aim of engendering attachment. And while Chopin mobilizes Edna, her heroine in 
The Awakening, to the degree that she realizes that social norms and expectations 
make it impossible to build a viable dwelling place, turning temporal relief (death) 
into the ultimate resort of self-realization, Jewett lets her nameless narrator record 
her near sphere in ways that make building and dwelling seem feasible. But are 
there not pitfalls to such a descriptive mode, and if yes, how do they play out in 
Pointed Firs? For Susan Stewart, “all description is a matter of mapping the un-
known unto the known” (26); doing so involves a hierarchization of information, 
and hierarchization means imposing significance and value.20 The chicken detail, 
19 For matters of vision and visuality in Henry James see especially Brosch, Schneck, and Seltzer; for 
a counter-agenda of regionalist writers such as Jewett and Freeman see Bader, “Dissolving Vision.”
20 Again, Stewart’s stance on the matter is highly representative of our field. This is how she further 
elaborates her point: “Descriptions must rely upon an economy of signif icance which is present 
in all of culture’s representational forms, an economy which is shaped by generic conventions 
and not by aspects of the material world itself. While our awe of nature may be born in the face 
of her infinite and perfect detail, our awe of culture relies upon a hierarchical organization of 
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for instance, values ordinariness, creatureliness, togetherness, organic belonging 
to a domestic cosmos, and the list could easily be continued. But the sketch makes 
this detail suggestive rather than definitive; the reality that it helps construe is ten-
tative rather than solid. And while detail is certainly used realistically in  Pointed 
Firs, it does not so much mime reality as authenticate it. Jewett’s use of detail nei-
ther adheres to the logic of abundance employed in realism’s signature style of 
verisimilitude nor does it seek to create a mental image that is believable because 
it is accurate. Rather, the “reality effect” of the sketch aims for credibility by using 
just a few spontaneously selected details that are prone to capturing our interest 
but require further affective and hermeneutic investment.21
This kind of realism—Jewett herself referred to it as “imaginative realism” 
(Cary, Jewett Letters 122)—is typical of the art of the sketch as a whole. Its mode 
of description is thin rather than thick, its valorizations are tentative rather than 
thorough; hence the air of the fleeting and the provisional that always surrounds 
the sketch. As an ephemeral art it asks not only for a high degree of participation 
but also for our care. Moreover, and crucially, in exposing a generic dependency 
on the physical world, the sketch also displays—and in Pointed Firs empathical-
ly—the yearning for material intimacy that drives it. And this is where Jewett’s 
description diverts from Stewart’s assessment in ways that trouble Stewart’s ana-
lytical grid. In embracing the new, object-based epistemology that came to fruition 
in the 1890s and in which “physical things attach people to place” (Brown 197), 
significance becomes determined by generic conventions and by aspects of the ma-
terial world.22 The details that make up the storyworld of Pointed Firs—rocks, trees, 
information, an organization which is shared by social members and which dif fers cross-cultural-
ly and historically. Not our choice of subject, but our choice of aspect and the hierarchical organi-
zation of detail, will be emergent in and will reciprocally effect the prevailing social construction 
of reality. As genres approach ‘realism,’ their organization of information must clearly resemble 
the organization of information in everyday life. Realistic genres do not mirror everyday life; they 
mirror its hierarchization of information. They are mimetic of values, not of the material world. 
Literature cannot mime the world; it must mime the social” (26). Of course, I agree that descrip-
tion (like any representation) is social and thus laden with value. But the mimetic understanding 
of realistic genres suggested here fails to do justice to the dialogical dimension inherent to it. 
They do not so much mirror or mime social reality as proactively participate in their construction, 
which also means that they negotiate rather than simply perpetuate values. In fact, the selective 
use of detail serves precisely this end.
21 The term is drawn from Barthes, “L’Effet de Réel.” See also S/Z. For a lucid discussion of realism’s 
inherently dialogical form that counters received notions of realism as a straightforward mimetic 
extension of ideology see Ickstadt, “Concepts of Society.”
22 Recent scholarship has given a heightened attention to object and material culture in Pointed Firs. 
See especially Bill Brown’s chapter on Jewett in his landmark study on the interstices of material 
culture and literature, A Sense of Things, which was published separately as “Regional Artifacts” 
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houses, herbs, tools, pieces of furniture, animals, items of food and drink—are 
molded straight from the environment about which Jewett writes, and how she 
writes about them oscillates between fiction and ethnography.
Such writing calls for a special use of details, one that exceeds the aim of pro-
ducing a resemblance of reality in the reader’s imagination, that uses details not 
as mere signs or referents but as facts, or rather: as data. In close correspondence 
to the sketch as a literal record of sensory imprints, Jewett’s details function as 
material inscriptions of reality into the storyworld.23 Charged with a discrete phys-
icality and inscribed with a history of long-term exposure (to seasons and weather, 
work routines and daily chores), they saturate bodily life and gain corporeality 
in and through Jewett’s characters. Or, as Willa Cather puts it in her preface to 
Pointed Firs: “Miss Jewett wrote people that grew out of the soil” (“Preface” 8). And 
while Pointed Firs is, at the end of the day, clearly a work of fiction with invented 
places and characters and a made-up course of events, the factual gravity of its nat-
uralistic use of detail-as-data is crucial to its persuasiveness as a literary text. Mrs. 
Todd’s brother William, for instance, is described as “an elderly man, bent in the 
shoulders as fisherman often are” (411), and Captain Littlepage has “the same ‘cant 
to leeward’ as the wind-bent trees on the height above.” With his “thin, bending 
figure,” his “narrow, long-tailed coat” and walking stick he looks, to the narrator, 
“like an aged grasshopper of some strange human variety” (384-85). It is through 
descriptions like these that Jewett evokes an acute intimacy between the place and 
its people, a sense of human bodies being molded into shape by the routines and 
conditions that physically define the place world to which they belong. Couched in 
her narrator’s casual rendering, the old sea captain’s peculiar shape is the “natural” 
course of things in a world in which nature and culture are continuous, interlock-
ing forces.
Perhaps William Dean Howells’s grasshopper varieties have prompted this 
image of Littlepage: “the ideal grasshopper, the heroic grasshopper, the impas-
sioned grasshopper, the self-devoted, adventureful, good old romantic card-board 
grasshopper,” all of which “must die out before the simple, honest, and natural 
grasshopper can have a fair field” (Fiction and Criticism 13). Featured in one of 
Howells’s influential Harper’s editorials that he used to flesh out and promote the 
new literature that he found apt for his age, these grasshoppers make up the sa-
tirical thrust of an attack against the “culturally constructed type”—and against 
a narrative art in the service of cultivating the ideal rather than being “simple, 
natural, and honest […] like a real grasshopper” (12-13).24 Jewett’s grasshopper is 
in Critical Inquiry. Ammons, in “Material Culture,” reads Jewett’s object world as manifesting the 
author’s ideas about nativism and imperialism.
23 This understanding of detail in naturalism draws from Howard, Naturalism 147.
24 Howells wrote his monthly statements “From the Editor’s Study,” which were later published as 
Criticism and Fiction between 1886 and 1892. Patchworked as they are, his editorials are the most 
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also humorous (in an endearing rather than a disseminating kind of way), but it 
is certainly not “real” in Howells’s sense of referring to no more than the living 
creature itself. Indeed, Jewett’s realism does something quite different than what 
her former mentor had in mind.25 Naturalistically inclined as her details are, they 
invoke a material history of the metonymic trace. Describing the old sea captain as 
an aged grasshopper not only makes present physical force as it equally affects man 
and animal, flora and fauna, live and dead matter. It invokes a narrative trajectory 
in which the shape of a human figure embodies a state of rootedness. Doing so also 
hints at the alternative lives that did not or could not materialize for this human 
figure in the given circumstance. But rather than further dwelling on this unre-
alized matter, Jewett lets her narrator proceed instantaneously, with the effect of 
turning a detail that so clearly stands for more than the literal meaning lingering 
on the descriptive surface into a viable echo chamber.
“Don’t write a ‘story’ but just tell the thing” was a piece of advice that Jewett 
liked to give to younger writers (Cary, Jewett Letters 120; emphasis in the original). 
And if storytelling thrives on the dramatic art of emplotment—of which Jewett 
thoughtherself as incapable—thing-telling thrives on the tactile, descriptive art of 
the sketch.26 So yes, Jewett’s advice clearly harks back to the object-orientation of 
her narrative art. But the idea of transmitting the physical world as faithfully as 
possible is not materialistic per se. It is charged with a symbolism that is steeped 
in Swedenborgian doctrine.27 Besides being taken with the Swedenborgian notion 
of “use” (which Jewett was able to translate into a professional and artistic sense 
of purpose), it was the idea of the spiritual permeating the material world that 
profoundly impressed her. And because she thought of her writing as striving to 
express this relation, she found herself at odds with “Mr. Howells [who] thinks […] 
that it is no use to write romance anymore”—marveling instead “how much of it 
there is left in every-day life after all” (Letters of Jewett, ed. Fields 59). But while the 
residual symbolism stemming from this belief was didactic and overt in her earlier 
work (especially in her first book Deephaven), it becomes a tacit feature of everyday 
comprehensive account of Howells’s understanding of realism, and publication with Harper’s saw 
to their wide circulation. The grasshopper passage is part of the December editorial of 1887.
25 Howells was an avid supporter of Jewett’s early work. He published some of her f irst stories 
during his time as the editor of The Atlantic Monthly and was pivotal in encouraging the produc-
tion of her f irst novel, Deephaven, published by Osgood and Co. (later Houghton Miff lin) in 1877.
26 In an often quoted letter to Scudder, Jewett writes: “[…] I don’t believe I could write a long story 
[…] In the f irst place I have no dramatic talent. The story would have no plot. I should have to f ill 
this out with descriptions of characters and meditations. It seems to me I can furnish a theatre, 
and show you the actors and the scenery, and the audience, but there is never any play!” (Jewett 
Letters 29)
27 In my account of Swedenborg’s influence on Jewett’s artistic practice I am substantially drawing 
on Donovan, “Jewett and Swedenborg.”
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life and its object world in Pointed Firs, where naturalistic details are allegories 
for something unstated. Jewett had distanced herself from the direct, didactic al-
legory promoted by Swedenborg, and yet she remained invested in his idea that 
language is founded upon correspondence. In fact, her notion of “telling things” 
places things in a context of unstated correspondence (both in the relational and 
the communicative sense) in which they become part of a larger whole precisely 
because they are told.
Pointed Firs exploits this dynamic as its form-giving principle: Cosmic uni-
ty becomes tangible in metonymic traces, and what these traces reveal under the 
careful scrutiny of the narrator’s caressing gaze are lives devoted to daily routines 
and chores (and an act of living resembling the act of writing a narrative script). 
The narrator’s visit to Mrs. Blackett’s bedroom is a case in point. The intimate space 
that she enters here revolves around a mundane everyday object, Mrs. Blackett’s 
rocking chair. The adjectives used to describe it (old, quilted) as well as the activi-
ties conducted when sitting in it (resting, reading) value the object through a ma-
terial intimacy with the human body. The object becomes legible, and what we read 
is a story of human attachment through touch. And as the narrator grasps that the 
old chair is part of an assemblage of other things she beings to elicit the following 
narrative: The “worn bible on the lightstand,” the “heavy, silver-bowed glasses,” the 
“thimble […] on the narrow wood-ledge,” the “thick striped-cotton shirt that she 
was making for her son” and that now lay “folded carefully on the table”—every lit-
tle detail in this passage is part of an everyday routine that ties the old lady, through 
the modest possessions gathered here, to an object world of used and useful things. 
But it is the needlework the captures her attention most acutely. The imaginative 
act inspired by it turns a tedious chore into a labor of love and the object world 
gathered by it into a virtual shrine of belonging. “Those dear old fingers and their 
loving stitches, that heart which made most of everything that needed love! Here 
was the real home, the heart of the old house on Green Island!” (420)28
The shirt that the old mother is sowing for her elderly son brings to mind all 
the shirts she has ever made for him (and for other members of her family) when 
sitting in this very spot. In the legible, object-based presence of repetitive routines 
and domestic rituals description veers into narrative, and what we are told is a 
mythical tale about the true meaning of this nuclear place. And if no belonging 
(and no narrative) is possible without repetition and ritual, in Jewett’s descriptive 
28 The narrator’s visit to Mrs. Blackett ’s bedroom is one of several instances in which Jewett uses of 
needlework as a metaphor for female bonding and intergenerational collectivity, as well as for 
psychic and somatic integration. And if the old quilted rocking chair in which the work is routine-
ly performed is the “heart” of the home, the “little brown bedroom” is both a literal room and an 
allegory of a peaceful psychic state. Tropes of quilting, sewing, weaving, or knitting, even though 
they are rallying points of feminist scholarship, have to my knowledge not been explored with 
regard to Jewett’s work. For general scholarly work on the topic see Hedges; Torsney and Elsley.
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style repetition and ritual are agents of topophilic stability and enchantment. The 
move from tactile description to emphatic meditation that is a defining feat of this 
style is conducted via a heightened intensity (the two final sentences of the rocking 
chair passage have exclamation marks). Shifts like these occur throughout the text, 
and often the move beyond the domain of the literal is indexed by imagistic or fic-
tional markers (“like,” “as if”). In moments like these, the metonymic trace on the 
surface of an object is prone to eliciting not only narrative but also attachment. The 
operative principle of Jewett’s descriptive mode becomes tangible here: The yearn-
ing for attachment that drives narration from sketch to sketch is told intermittently, 
in the recurring shifts from tactile description to emphatic meditation.
Thematically, the episodic instances of familiarization strung together this 
way may best be described as a series of reduced and yet highly evocative expo-
sitions of different states of belonging. There is the wondrous Mrs. Todd, a long-
time widow to a seafaring husband, who leads her admirably self-determined life 
as the village’s eminent herbalist. There is Captain Littlepage whose deep-seated 
fear of death entraps him in the story of the mysterious “waiting place” between 
this world and the next way up in the Arctic Sea. There is Mrs. Blackett’s perfect 
homestead on Green Island, which magically keeps her young. There is her son 
William’s shrewd withdrawal from other people, ended in a later Dunnet Landing 
story with his marriage to a shepherdess. There is the long-anticipated visit of a 
friend equipped with the skills to make a whole way of life out of visiting (and one 
should, of course, bear in mind that “visiting” was a social institution at the time 
that meant taking someone into one’s home for weeks and months on end). There 
is Joanna Bowden’s self-imposed exile after disappointed love. There is the yearly 
reunion of the Bowden family, a social event of unmatched grandeur in which the 
narrator gets to participate. And there is the poor fisherman Elijah Tilley and his 
inconsolable grief about his long-deceased wife. The states of belonging invoked 
here alternate between isolation and embeddedness, lack and abundance. It has 
been argued that this pattern creates a unified whole in the end (Berthoff, “Pointed 
Firs;” Waggoner); in terms of belonging, this New Critical sense of unity might 
translate into a state of aesthetic transcendence that resides in an artfully crafted 
story and has the power to redeem alienation.
The stronger and more obvious force holding the sketches together, however, 
is the travel motif that is so typical of longer narrative forms. And while trav-
el depends on narrative to grapple with the unfamiliar that it always encounters, 
“[t]he different stages of travel—departure, voyage, encounters on the road, and 
return—provide any story with a temporal structure that raises certain expecta-
tions for things to happen” (Mikkonen 2007, 286). Thinking of narrative in terms 
of travel is indeed so pervasive that “we have come to understand personal life 
and mental development as a voyage” (286). The travel motif in Pointed Firs ex-
ploits this tacit conundrum. The trip to the remote coastal town ignites a process 
of spiritual transformation that is broadened and deepened in the manifold travel 
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activities conducted over the course of the summer; the tale that we read is an 
account of both journeys.29 For a scarcely plotted story like Pointed Firs the trav-
el motif provides a temporal baseline that follows the logic of the itinerary: The 
narrative moves from place to place, and it is at these places—which are always 
particular, and always interrelational—that events happen, one after another. In 
the narrator’s account of her summer, the consecutive relation between places and 
events is at times more explicit than at others. It is accentuated, for instance, when, 
right after Captain Littlepage’s dreadful story about the mysterious “waiting place” 
in the Arctic Sea, the magical illumination of Green Island by the evening sun in-
spires the voyage to this place that is the theme of the following sketches. But when 
Mrs. Fosdick comes for a visit after the narrator’s return from Green Island it is not 
clear at all; in fact, we do not even get a sense of how much time passes between the 
separate events in this latter case. In this episodic structure, acts of familiarization 
and attachment are amplified, while a more forceful plot would have diminished 
their emotive force.
Moreover, and no less importantly, the implied chronology in the order of the 
sketches that needs to be in place to grasp that the narrator’s spiritual journey 
diverts from the travel narrative’s usual scheme: It does not move from departure 
to return but proceeds the other way around. The result is a narrative in which 
the sense of belonging yearned for by the narrating agent and found in Dunnet 
 Landing is not a safe haven to be reached at the end of her journey. It is a  thoroughly 
transient, cyclical state, in which belonging is gained, lost—and possibly regained 
again, here or elsewhere.
recePtive ageNc y
The plot of Pointed Firs is quickly recounted: A nameless visitor from the city, prob-
ably Boston, spends her summer in Dunnet Landing as the lodger of Mrs. Todd’s 
after having fallen in love with the place at an earlier occasion, grows attached to 
it during her stay, and leaves again. What happens in the episodic narrative filling 
this simple timeline is strikingly eventless and devoid of drama. And while the 
narrator seems to suffer from a spiritual crisis when arriving to Dunnet Landing, 
her troubles are merely hinted at; at no point do they take on a questing or desiring 
kind of urgency that could become a driving force in this first-person narrative. To 
29 Pennell reads Pointed Firs, somewhat along these lines, as a “transformation of a literary form 
long familiar to New Englanders, the spiritual biography. […] In Jewett’s f iction, sorority, the 
bonding together of women in an acknowledged sisterhood, becomes a manifestation of spiri-
tual union and fulf illment, and it allows Jewett to shift the means of establishing the identity of 
women away from the relationships with men and patriarchal institutions and center it instead 
in ties to other women and to a female heritage and tradition” (193-94).
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reiterate an earlier point, the narrator assumes her role decidedly not (and entirely 
unlike the letter-writing narrator of Edgar Huntly) by dwelling on herself. In fact, 
it is because she abstains from herself that she comfortably dwells in her surround-
ings. And if the placial point of view and the sketch, with their tactile directedness 
toward an immediate place world are a perfect match in terms of giving form to 
this narrative, what kind of narrative agency is at work in Pointed Firs? Immedi-
ately striking in this regard is the attention that is given to the narrator reading her 
surroundings and listening to the people whom she gets to know over the course of 
her summer. In one of the numerous examples that could illustrate this point she 
strolls along the shore where she meets one of the shrewder fishermen of Dunnet 
Landing. He “was carrying a small haddock in one hand, and presently shifted it to 
the other hand lest it might touch my skirt” (474), from which she concludes that 
her company is accepted, and the short walk that they take together leads to a visit 
to the fisherman’s modest home later that day.
It is by virtue of the persistent and careful directedness toward the world in 
which the narrator finds herself that narration is guided, first and foremost, by a 
willingness to take this world in. In this basic makeup, it is neither active nor pas-
sive but both. The affective engagement with the world on which it thrives depends 
upon a sensory openness that is at once an active endeavor (an opening up) and 
a passive state (a being open); the German term einlassen perfectly captures this 
mix. In the resulting narrative act, emphatic contemplation of what is observed 
marks the highest degree of narratorial self-assertion. These moments are pow-
erful because they are short and suggestive. Afterwards, the narrative gravitates 
toward attaching itself to the physical world once again. The first thing to be noted 
about the agency put to work in this kind of narrative, then, is the tactile degree 
to which it endorses reception and receptiveness. In the recurring shifts from tac-
tile description to emphatic meditation discussed above, the narrative operation 
performed by the text weaves moments of acute, multi-sensual perception and re-
ceptive exchange into sketches, and sketches into a communal texture that reads 
like—evokes, creates—a viable dwelling place.
The resulting narrative is meandering rather than linear. The narrator tells us 
about returning to Dunnet Landing and settling in at Mrs. Todd’s; renting the 
Schoolhouse for the solitary work of the writer, yet soon abandoning it again to 
be more immersed in the everyday life of Dunnet’s community; taking trips to 
some islands and walks along the shore; cherishing the twosome intimacy with-
in Mrs. Todd’s house until “some wandering hermit crab of a visitor marked the 
little spare room for her own” (421); participating in the Bowden family reunion 
and leaving shortly thereafter. The gallivanting movements performed by the nar-
rative exploit the temporal impulse of emplotment for the purpose of building a 
place without getting stuck in it. At the center of the weblike structure thus created 
stand Mrs. Blackett’s house on Green Island and the close-by grove where Mrs. 
Todd’s favorite herb, pennyroyal, grows in lavish abundance; it is here that real 
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friendship between her and her lodger, our narrator, starts to emerge. The farthest 
and bleakest outpost in this imaginary geography is the mystical “waiting place” in 
the  Arctic Sea, construed as a thoroughly male fantasy and told by one old sea cap-
tain to another in a life-threatening deadlock. Mrs. Todd calls it one of  Littlepage’s 
“great narratives” and thinks it might be the product of the excessive reading that 
he did during “his seafarin’ days” (400). The old sea captain’s name mocks his 
bookishness (he recites Milton and brags about his knowledge of Shakespeare on 
an earlier occasion), and hence it is no surprise that the antidote to this harmful, 
“male” circulation of narratives is located in the structures of oral storytelling that, 
in the world of Pointed Firs, are predominantly maintained by women.
The combination of a gyratory and emphatic style and a plot that prioritizes 
communal care over individual advancement has been praised as prototypically 
female.30 The world of Pointed Firs is devoid of conflict and the progressive devel-
opment ignited from trying to solve it. One can read the disposition toward harmo-
ny and sense of stasis that it invokes as specters of nostalgic retreat; I prefer reading 
them as a willful rejection of the future-bound implications of narrative that serve 
the purpose of dwelling in the present. Mrs. Todd’s favorite herb symbolizes this 
latter implication. It bears strong associations to childbirth, but with procreation 
not being an issue in the world of Pointed Firs, it does not work toward procuring 
tomorrow’s community; rather, it deepens the bonds among its childless, aging 
women in the present.31 And if neither the place nor its shrewd old people change 
over the course of the narrative other than in terms of increasing attachment, this 
is precisely the point. As a paradigm for the productive conjunction of narrative 
and belonging Pointed Firs is of interest, then, for staging an affectionate process 
of place-making by means of engaging in an unusual kind of storytelling. Instead 
of being driven by an individual quest or bundled desire (and thus generative of 
a narrative agency geared toward the pursuit of that quest or desire), the story is 
almost entirely devoid of self-determination. In fact, in the world of Pointed Firs 
individual action, be it narrative or other, tends to meander while (narrative) agen-
cy dissolves into intersubjective exchange and communal interdependency—a 
 utopia, possibly female, that not only dismisses the romantic ideal of liberating 
the individual from social constraints but also steps back from the realist formula 
of “self-assertion through painful experience plus conversation,” which remains 
stubbornly centered on the self—fixed on transforming individuals at the expense 
of fostering communal ties in comparison.
30 See, for instance, Ammons, “Going in Circles;” Zagarell, “Narrative of Community;” Folsom; Pennell.
31 As Ammons points out, pennyroyal is a strong and potentially dangerous herb, and as such, a 
perfect symbol of Mrs. Todd, Jewett’s “midwife of the spirit.” The herb’s stimulus of menstrual 
f low and uterine contractions is used in childbirth, where it helps to expel the placenta and is 
thus involved in the healthy delivery of new life. But it is, for the same effects, also associated 
with miscarriage and abortion, and thus the end of new life. Ammons, “Jewett’s Witches” 175.
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Telling and reading or listening procedures are intertwined so closely in  Pointed 
Firs that reception and receptiveness become a major theme, motif and driving 
force of the narrative. And this also means that narrative agency becomes receptive 
agency to a substantive degree. The merger is endorsed early on in the story, when 
the narrator wakes up to hearing Mrs. Todd outside her window. “By the unusual 
loudness of her remarks to a passer-by, and the notes of a familiar hymn which she 
sang as she worked among the herbs […] I knew that she wished I would wake up 
and come and speak with her;” indeed, the commotion outside of her window feels 
“as if directed purposely to the sleepy ears of my consciousness” (402). Just a few 
moments later the two women converse through the blinds of the narrator’s room 
(which is, in this passage, decidedly not rendered as an interior space of enclosure 
but as a space that is permeable even in its delicate early-morning privacy).
“I expect you are going up to your schoolhouse to pass all this pleasant day; yes, I expect you’re going 
to be dreadful busy,” she said despairingly.
“Perhaps not,” I said. “Why, what’s going to be the matter with you Mrs. Todd.” For I supposed that 
she was tempted by the f ine weather to take one of her favorite expeditions along the shore pastures 
to gather herbs and simples, and would like to have me keep the house. (402)
Note how the last sentence is unvoiced. And yet, Mrs. Todd’s eager reply can only 
mean that she has heard it.
“No, I don’t want to go nowhere by land,” she answered gayly,—“no not by land; but I don’t know’s 
we shall have a better day of the summer to go out to Green Island and see mother. I waked up early 
thinkin’ of her. And the wind’s light northeast,—‘twill take is right straight out, an’ this time o’ year 
it ’s liable to change round southwest an’ fetch us home pretty, ‘long late in the afternoon. Yes, it ’s 
going to be a good day.” (402)
The two women, it seems, have settled into a permeable state of consciousness 
in which an extrasensory communication is a casual routine. Mrs. Todd and her 
mother are able to communicate long distance in this same fashion, and again, the 
semi-consciousness of arousing from sleep is rendered conducive to it. Moreover, 
the reading and listening skills put to work here and elsewhere display an acute in-
timacy with the environment. Increasing smoke from Mrs. Todd’s mother’s hearth 
is a gesture of welcome—“Look at the chimney, now: she has gone right in and 
brightened up the fire” (405)—, her backward potatoes speak of a lack of rain, and 
the weedy potato patch gives away William’s preoccupation with catching herring. 
This also means that the narrator does not monopolize the receptiveness on which 
the narrative thrives; on the contrary, it is a shared sensibility. That, after the narra-
tor and Mrs. Blackett had known each other for just a few hours, they “understood 
each other without speaking” (420) testifies to her increasing participation in this 
conducive state. But it is Mrs. Todd who is most keenly attuned to it. She brings 
The Ar t of At tachment 95
the onion that her mother needs for their stew, catches a perfectly-sized haddock 
for their shared meal, adds a special blend of herbs to her usual spruce beer brew 
to calm the narrator’s nerves on the day of Mrs. Begg’s funeral, and once she even 
talks to a tree. Having found it “drooping and discouraged” on an earlier occasion, 
she hails with “that quick reassuring nod of her head which was usually made to 
answer for a bow” (454) when seeing it next.
So yes, extrasensory communication includes non-human life-forms and in-
animate matter (on the way home from Green Island the wind picks up as if being 
called upon). And when the narrator—toward the end of her stay and thus at the 
height of being part of Dunnet Landing’s panpsychic consciousness—visits a local 
fisherman who is trapped in grief for his long-deceased wife, her receptiveness 
even reaches the dead. As she reads the old man’s house (a shrine of his mourning, 
unchanged since his wife passed away) and listens to his litanic lament the dead 
person becomes present at her former dwelling site—“I began to see her myself in 
her home” (478). In a later, posthumously published Dunnet Landing story, “The 
Foreigner,” the theme of bringing back the dead is amplified (the deceased person 
is evoked so powerfully in the story told by Mrs. Todd to the narrator that she 
returns as a ghost that both women can see) and more explicitly tied to the occult 
(the ghost is the mother of a woman of Caribbean descent from whom Mrs. Todd 
learned many of her special powers). Yet, the most puzzling thing about these ex-
trasensory powers is how utterly ordinary they are in the world of Pointed Firs. 
They are nothing that deserves further notice, and the utter casualness with which 
they occur throughout the tale has the effect of amplifying their capacity to per-
forate the boundaries between self and other, here and there, now and then in 
emphatic acts of attachment to a concrete, beloved, and densely storied place world. 
Hence a psychic disposition toward permeability subtends the general openness 
toward the world on which the topophilic disposition of the narrative thrives. 
Contrary to Brown’s erring letter writer, whose narrative act sutured a gasping 
rift between forcefully disjointed worlds, the receptive agency at work in Pointed 
Firs makes inner and outer worlds seamlessly continuous. And if Edgar Huntly’s 
psyche was fathomed (with Darwin, Locke and Hume) as wounded by a violent 
exterior with which it could reconnect only in the absent-minded state of sleep-
walking, the spiritistic ideas undergirding the psychic imaginary of Pointed Firs 
invoke a mystic state of interconnectedness, not only with the material world but 
also with the afterlife.
Such mystic ideas were taken quite seriously at the time; they were a feasible 
part of making sense of a world caught in transition from metaphysical to secular, 
scientific ways of construing one’s place in it, and as such, they have a persistent 
place in Jewett’s work.32 A fellow thinker in this regard was William James, whom 
32 An impressive historical record of Spiritualism in mid-Nineteenth century America is Emma 
Harding’s Modern American Spiritualism: A Twenty Year Record of the Communication Between the 
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Jewett read and admired, possibly because of their striking like-mindedness (he, 
too, was strongly influenced by Swedenborgian ideas, being exposed to them at 
home and through some of his most important interlocutors).33 Throughout his 
career, James was keenly interested in questioning the confines of an individual’s 
psyche, an interest that led him to reconsider the significance of religious, spiritu-
al, and mystic experience in his late work, especially in his monumental  Varieties 
of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature.34 At the core of religious ex-
perience, according to James, lies an acceptance of something “more,” which is 
beyond the individual’s grasp. To further define this “more,” which connects the 
material with a spiritual world, James put forth his central hypothesis about the 
subliminal constitution of consciousness: “whatever it may be on its farther side, 
the ‘more’ with which in religious experience we feel ourselves connected is on its 
Earth and the World of Spirits, f irst published in 1870. Harding, herself a famous medium, gave 
lectures that were instrumental in circulating the ideas of Spiritualism at the time. For more 
recent accounts, with a special focus on the interrelations of Spitirualism and woman’s rights 
in Nineteenth century America, see Nelson, Spiritualism and Society; Ann Baude, Radical Spirits. 
 Ammons traces Jewett’s lasting concern with the occult and its manifestation in a series of fe-
male characters with mystical powers in “Jewett’s Witches.”
33 James’s Varieties of Religious Experience came out six years after the publication of Pointed Firs; 
Jewett writes enthusiastically about it in a letter to Annie Fields (Jewett Letters, ed. Fields 90). 
The letter is dated 1892 in Fields, but as Ammons rightly points out, this must be a mistake, for 
Varieties was not published until a decade later (“Jewett’s Witches” n33). James’s interest in the 
occult dates back to at least 1882, when he was introduced to the work of the Society of Psychical 
Research while visiting his brother Henry in London; his father died that same year, making him 
feel “as [he] never began to do before, the tremendousness of the idea of immortality” (James 
in a letter to his wife; quoted in Blum 78). James’s father, Henry Sr., was also responsible for his 
exposure to Swedenborgian ideas; in fact, he was to one of their most influential dissemina-
tors in America, bringing such intellectuals as his close friend (and William’s Godfather) Ralph 
Waldo Emerson and Charles Sanders Peirce into their orbit. For a concise discussion of James’s 
high-powered social milieu see E. Taylor, “Spiritual Roots.”
34 A foremost f igure in establishing psychology as a scholarly discipline, James was also involved in 
empirical research of spiritistic and occult phenomena; in fact, he set up an American branch of 
the London-based Society for Psychical Research that was at the forefront of conducting this re-
search, and served as its president for a term. Only recently, Deborah Blum has delivered a book-
length study, Ghost Hunters, about James’s obsession with f inding scientif ic proof for life after 
death. The group of researchers under scrutiny in this fascinating account includes Alfred  Russel 
Wallace, Henry Sidgwick, Fredric Myers, William Crookes, and Edmund Gurney. That James’s 
fellow “ghost hunters” were among the most renowned scholars of their time underscores the 
degree to which spiritism was indeed a serious scientif ic concern.
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hither side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life” (556-57).35 With 
its endorsement of receptive agency and permeable boundaries between inner and 
outer worlds, here and there, now and then, Pointed Firs reaches out to this “more.” 
Against the suspicion that this agenda marks its author as shrewd, esoteric, and 
backward, association with James makes tangible that Jewett, too, was a bridge fig-
ure between the intellectual culture of the mid-nineteenth century and the mod-
ernist movements to come.
But her path lay not in exploring the literary tenets of “stream of conscious-
ness” interweaving discrete instances of experience into a continuous sense of flow, 
as was done by James’s brother Henry and so many modernist writers thereafter 
(William was, of course, the one who had developed the idea in the “Stream of 
Thoughts” chapter of his monumental Principles of Psychology). Counteracting 
concerns with mapping internal procedures, Jewett turned toward the physical 
place world to dwell on what would become a foremost implication of James’s doc-
trine of “pure experience”: that “our fields of experience have no more definite 
boundaries than our fields of view. Both are fringed forever by a ‘more’ that con-
tinuously supersedes them as life proceeds” (“Pure Experience” 35). Her haptic 
mode of description, her tacit symbolism of unstated facts, and the receptive agen-
cy drawn from their midst are the outcome of this experimental agenda.
coNsecUtive eNdiNgs, editoriaL care, aNd 
tHe book as dweLLiNg site
Pointed Firs endorses the receptive agency on which it thrives tacitly. The narra-
tor’s initial obligation to get on with a joyless writing job wears thin as she finds 
herself spending more and more time fostering her sprawling attachments. What 
we are reading may very well be what she wrote during or after her summer in-
stead of the commissioned work that she seems to abandon early on. Even so, the 
narrator’s deepening bonds do not mean that she is becoming a full member of 
 Dunnet’s community; they mean—demand—that she, being a writer who has to 
leave again at the end of her summer, must tell about it. This need to tell mobilizes 
both her narrative and her attachments. But ironically, it also sets her apart from 
35 Concerns with the “fringe of consciousness” run through James’s work. Developed originally in 
The Principles of Psychology, subliminal consciousness assumes a key role in Varieties, where it 
becomes the medium that makes religious experience possible and in which religious experience 
in all its varieties takes place. Acting as an embodied relay between the material and the spiritual 
world, it concretizes individual notions of the absolute. As the cornerstone of James’s “science of 
religion,” the subliminal (or transmarginal) consciousness also mediates between the domains 
of religion and science whose antagonistic relation James seeks to resolve with his late work. See 
Albers, Spiritismus.
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the predominantly oral mode of narrative exchange and communal belonging 
that reverberates through her tale (just as none of Dunnet’s storytellers will ever 
become a professional writer). Her need thus sparks an act of telling that conse-
crates their stories in and through the written text. The difference is crucial, for it 
marks narration as acting upon a need to tell that is both circular and self-serving. 
Through the solitary act of writing and the literary products that are its results, 
narrative proceedings seize the place of the community, with the result of both 
compensating for and distancing it. At the risk of stating the obvious, this pattern 
(memorably described in Walter Benjamin’s “The Storyteller” four decades later) 
repeats itself on the side of consumption: Jewett’s readers are engaged with printed 
matter, not with a place and its people. Her tale may have inspired travel and vaca-
tioning, but the formative experience was that of a literary text.
Conceived at the historical juncture when narrative consummation of belong-
ing coincides with the consolidation of print capitalism, the act of telling that be-
comes manifest in Pointed Firs partakes in erecting this constellation. In doing 
so, it replicates and reinforces a logic that turns cultural artifacts into commodi-
fied (and socially stratified) sites of topophilic investment.36 Approached this way, 
Pointed Firs’s object-life in a series of material incarnations emerges as a busy tra-
jectory with immediate impact on its narrative form. Like many literary works at 
the time, Pointed Firs was first published serially in a magazine, the prestigious 
Atlantic Monthly, which featured it in four installments over the course of the year 
of 1896.37 That these installments were spread out to appear in the January, March, 
July, and September issues signals a reorientation in the business of publishing 
magazine fiction: away from the monthly installments of the serialized novel, 
which had been its staple for decades, and toward the short story and short serial 
that was Jewett’s preferred métier. Atlantic editor Horace Scudder, who also hap-
pened to be editor-in-chief at Houghton Mifflin, the renowned publishing house 
where Jewett’s collection of sketches was scheduled for book publication later that 
year, had not only solicited the tale that was to become Pointed Firs. He had en-
couraged Jewett to submit a short serial rather than a singular piece, which led her 
36 That the consolidation of the literary f ield at the time contained well-defined “regions” of dis-
tinction and taste is another manifestation of the shifting, highly mobilized parameters of em-
placement at the time. The genre of regionalist f iction was clearly not regarded to be “high” 
literature, but relative proximity to this consecrated sphere (through the same publishing venues 
and promoters) made it suitable for the needs of an audience inclined to believe that a comfort-
able dwelling place was a matter of making the right investments. Perhaps it is rooted in this 
constellation that investment could become such common form of attachment in our own time. 
My understanding of the consolidation of the f ield of American letters is indebted to Florian 
Sedlmeier, Field Imagination.
37 My account of Pointed Firs ’s intricate publication history closely follows Sedgwick and Goheen.
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to expand her initial idea for a story about old sea captains into a more general tale 
about a place and its people.
The internal units that so clearly stand out even from Pointed Firs’s loosely 
plotted narrative bear the mark of the serial: The four “Green Island” chapters 
appeared in the March issue, the four “Poor Joanna” chapters in the July issue, 
and the four “Bowden Reunion” chapters in the September issue. In fact, the gen-
tle, almost leisurely alternation between states of communal embeddedness and 
lack thereof that subtends the narrator’s journey gains its tact from a publication 
mode in which the story will eventually be continued, with a need to go on that is 
casual rather than throbbing. Following the story in its various installments over 
the course of the year made the reader subscribe to a sense of belonging with an 
amiable ebb and flow—and subscribe not just in the metaphorical sense: The first 
installment appeared in the January issue that was instrumental to committing 
the magazine’s readers for the year. Thematically less unified and formally more 
piecemealed than latter installments (it uses four short sketches to introduce the 
setting and the main characters, and another three to tell Captain Littlepage’s sto-
ry), the first installment ends not with an interim conclusion but pilot-like: with 
making plans to visit the remote channel island “struck” by “a gleam of golden 
sunshine” where Mrs. Todd’s mother lives. “The sunburst upon that outermost is-
land made it seem like a sudden revelation of the world beyond which some believe 
to be so near” (400). Subscribing to the magazine for the year meant subscribing 
to dwelling in this world.
In the fall, with the book publication drawing close and Scudder feeling “that 
his readers would not greatly miss a narrative conclusion to the serial” (Sedgwick 
84), the end of the Bowden feast came to serve—incidentally—as the end of the 
narrative’s first incarnation. That Pointed Firs assumed a second material form was 
a pleasant surprise to its author. “How little I thought of the ‘Pointed Firs’ […] 
turning into a book of parts when I began,” Jewett wrote to her sister Mary in 
August (quoted in Sedgwick 84). The book that came out in October was indeed to 
a substantial degree the making of a keen and persuasive editor acting under the 
pressures of the literary market on two intersecting fronts (book and magazine 
publishing). Jewett only slightly revised the existing sketches for the book pub-
lication, but she added two more chapters at the end. Considerably shorter than 
they would have been as the serial’s final installment, these new chapters alter the 
narrative decisively. The first of them, “Along the Shore,” about Elijah Tilley’s end-
less mourning, elevates the receptive agency endorsed by the tale to an unprec-
edented level of permeability. Even acuter, however, is the impact of the book’s 
final chapter, “A Backward View,” which postpones and revises the former ending. 
Whereas the magazine publication had left things with the Bowden reunion—sug-
gesting, through the performative power of the ending, the narrator’s initiation 
into  Dunnet’s community—the new ending turns this happy moment into a tran-
sient, cyclical state. With the narrator’s departure spelled out rather than merely 
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pending, belonging can only be consummated in textual form—ideally as the uni-
fied literary object, a souvenir of the reader’s journey to be kept on her shelf, which 
Pointed Firs had become in its second incarnation as a book.
 Later, posthumous publications, the most famous of them an edition by Willa 
Cather, added even more chapters, again with the effect of producing substantial 
change but this time without consent from the author. The version of Pointed Firs 
that has been consecrated through Cather’s reputation as a writer extends the tale 
both into the past and the future, bringing the narrator back to Dunnet Landing 
to celebrate William’s wedding, and introducing the wondrous shepherdess who 
will become his bride in a chapter set prior to the narrator’s blissful summer. None 
of the posthumous publications made palpable to its readers that it was diverting 
from the authorized text (Jewett’s endorsement of Pointed Firs as a collection of 
sketches may have invited this peculiar editorial practice). Since 1924, additions 
have included a third chapter about a visit to an alleged twin of Queen Victoria, 
residing in the Dunnet area. All of these changes were made prior to Cather’s edi-
tion, and yet it is puzzling that she, who must have been fully aware of their weight, 
stuck with the unauthorized twenty-four-chapter version. She must have even felt 
the need to “improve” it by rearranging the new chapters. Placing “The Queen’s 
Twin” in between “A Dunnet Shepherdess” and “William’s Wedding” is the most 
elegant solution in terms of narrative flow (the future wife is introduced, and the 
interim between this event and the marriage is bridged by another chapter, which 
is also set at the end of the summer). For Goheen, Cather’s rearrangement epito-
mizes, for precisely this reason, not only an illegitimate seizure of authorship but 
also the “unmaking” of a story that was “perfect” in striving against the dictates of 
plot that her editorial work enforces retroactively (37-40).38
In terms of respecting the integrity of Jewett’s work, Cather’s actions are a defi-
nite violation, a seizure of authorship on behalf of an editor who was, furthermore, 
a disciple and a close friend. But what happens when these actions become part of 
our understanding of Jewett’s art of attachments? It is well documented in their 
38 If there is a structural logic at work here, it may best be described as a gradual movement from 
adding on further Dunnet stories to merging them with the authorized body of the text. The f irst 
edition, coming out with Houghton Miff lin in 1910, the year right after Jewett’s death, featured 
two additions at the end of the authorized text. “A Dunnet Shepherdess” had appeared in the 
Atlantic in December 1899, “William’s Wedding” (though most likely still unfinished when Jew-
ett died) was published there July 1910. “The Queen’s Twin,” f irst published in the Atlantic in 
February 1899, made its f irst appearance in the 1919 edition, where it was, just like the earlier 
additions, placed at the end. The 1924 edition changed this order insofar as it reinstalled “The 
Backward View” chapter, which concludes the authorized text at the end. Goheen also points out 
that the added sketches/stories/chapters, all of which are divided into numerous subsections, 
bear a greater resemblance to the collection of sketches as a whole than to its individual chapters, 
which are consistently made up of one single section.
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lettered correspondence that Cather’s editorial work was steeped in a relationship 
fervid with friendly affection, professional mentoring, artistic kinship, and per-
sonal grief (when Jewett died unexpectedly in 1909, the two women had been ac-
quainted for sixteen short yet intense months).39 Can the multiple, partially violent 
39 The relationship between Jewett and Cather is a much-studied subject, both in terms of literary 
influence and in terms of the question of open or closed lesbianism. For the latter, see espe-
cially Homestead and Love. Scholars concerned with their literary relationship take issue with 
the massive influence that Jewett allegedly had on Cather, who was much younger and the less 
established writer at the time of their friendship. See Cary, “The Scuptor and the Spinister” for an 
early effort to relativize the impact of Jewett’s mentorship. For an extremely nuanced reading of 
Cather’s changing relationship to her deceased mentor and friend, see Carlin.
Willa Cather wearing a necklace from Sarah Orne Jewett. 
Studio portrait by Aimé Dupont, c1912. 
Kaufman, Anne L. and Richard H. Millington (Eds.). Willa Cather and the 
Nineteenth Century. Lincoln and London: U of Nebraska P, 2015. Frontispiece.
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and transgressive outcomes of Cather’s editorial work—commemoration, canon-
ization, re-authorization, and self-assertion among them—be detached from the 
printed matter in which they reside? And does the possessive exegesis of editorial 
care not also expose a desire for the narrator’s return to the place, for the friend 
to which she had grown so attached? A desire that may cut across these various 
outcomes while amounting, first and foremost, to producing yet another book?40 
Perhaps Cather even toys with slipping into the role of Pointed Firs’s narrator in 
this charade. In a well-known studio photograph taken in 1910, the year after 
 Jewett’s premature death, she wears a jade necklace given to her by Jewett as a 
token of their friendship (see previous page)—just as the narrator receives a coral 
pin from Mrs. Todd when it is time to say farewell.41
In the space opened up by the trail of objects and writings left behind by the 
Jewett-Cather relationship (the necklace, the photograph displaying it, the letters 
written back and forth, the edited volumes thereof, Cather’s essay “Miss Jewett,” 
and its revised version prefacing her edition of Jewett’s work), the Cather edition 
emerges as a remarkably durable site. When it first came out in 1925 (Cather had 
just been awarded the Pulitzer Prize), many libraries acquired this book for its 
prestigious editor, and to this day it is this version of the text that is most easily 
available for purchase. With the Cather edition as a firmly established presence, 
critical awareness of the limits of Jewett’s authorized text—a text whose form en-
gendered by multiple, “serial” agencies including narrative genres, literary objects, 
editors, readers, writers—begs special importance.42 Reconstructing these limits, 
which had been buried in and through the proliferating posthumous editions, has 
been an important critical task, and like most of those engaged in this task, I, too, 
prefer the authorized text to its later editions. Yet to assess the full scope of Jewett’s 
art of attachment, a rigid “border patrol” of the original text is just as unsuited as 
being oblivious of the violation of borders—not least because fostering affective 
bonds always entails the possibility of possessive transgression. And has not the 
40 These questions bring to mind Winters’s lucid discussion of possession as a pervasive issue in 
Cather’s work. All her novels are concerned with it, with each of them presenting a dif ferent 
take on the questions what can be possessed, and who possesses it. Explorations range from 
the posessives carried in the titles of My Antonia, One of Ours, and My Mortal Enemy that ask who 
owns a person’s story, to the question who owns a place and its memory in O Pioneers and Death 
Comes to the Archbishop, to the possession of houses, of one’s family’s happiness, of the artifacts 
of bygone civilizations in The Professor’s House (38-40).
41 Mrs. Todd’s gift is clearly double-coded: The coral pin used to belong to Joanna Bowden; passing 
it on to the narrator is both a token of their lasting friendship and a tacit acknowledgement of 
the narrator’s loneliness—and by extension possibly also an emblem of the loneliness of lesbian 
women at the time.
42 The term “serial agencies” is drawn from Kelleter’s actor-network-theory inspired study with the 
same title.
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most vital incarnation of Pointed Firs been conceived from the consecutive labor of 
two affectionately connected “mothers”? With a bit of good will, one can read the 
Cather edition as an empowering gesture of collective female authorship, whose vi-
olation of the historically fixed body of the work transports regionalism transhis-
torically into literary modernism. In short-circuiting authorial desire and editorial 
care, it invigorated Jewett’s tale, prolonging the literary life of its enchanted place 
world while producing yet another, inherently progressive and remarkably durable 
site of topophilic investment.

4 Dwelling in What is Found
 Henry Roth’s Call It Sleep
In our modern world migration recurrently raises concerns with belonging on a 
massive scale. Who stays and who leaves, where to go, and how those who leave 
their home in search for a better future are received, all of these things depend 
on narrative, be it in word-of-mouth accounts, storied images, or elaborate tales. 
The vast archive of literature speaking from these experiences gives voice and 
form to concerns with belonging across geographic, linguistic, and cultural fault 
lines, with the effect of both exposing and soothing displacement in its attempts 
to fathom new modes of dwelling. Henry Roth’s Call It Sleep does so in an unusu-
al combination of ethnographic documentation and modernist experimentation. 
An immigration novel that resists easy categorization, it has a history of falling 
through the cracks of academic reception that reenacts its thematic concern with 
lacking a proper place. Set at the peak time of “new” immigration (1.28 million 
people arrived at Ellis Island in the novel’s opening year 1907 alone) and pub-
lished in 1934, the low point of the Great Depression, Roth’s novel takes concerns 
with belonging to the urban ghetto of the early twentieth century, recording with 
striking eloquence and sensitivity the modes of dwelling that emerged from this 
prototypically modern environment.1
Inspired by Mike Gold’s groundbreaking “slum novel” Jews Without Money 
(1929), Call It Sleep was part of what Alfred Kazin called “age of the plebs—of writers 
from the working class, the lower class, the immigrant class, the non-literate class, 
1 The family at the center of the novel is part of the “new” immigration of increasingly poor, 
unskilled, non-WASP people from Southern and Eastern Europe in the late nineteenth centu-
ry that was met with nativist hostility and led to the ratif ication of the National Origins (or 
 Johnson-Reed) Act of 1924, a milestone in the “repression of America’s ethnic past” (Singh et al. 
5). Yet while Roth’s novel speaks from this particular moment in the history of immigration, mass 
migration is a persistent reality in the modern world: From the 1830s to World War II over 40 
million people left their homes to f ind a new and better place to live (Bodnar xv)—a staggering 
number that, nevertheless, pales in comparison to the 60 million people on the move today. The 
global spread of “narrativized” migration experience via digital communication technology is a 
powerful mobilizing factor.
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from Western farms and mills—those whose struggle was to survive”  (Starting 
Out 12). What these writers wanted, Kazin (who was one of them) goes on to argue, 
“was to prove the literary value of our experience, to recognize the possibility of art 
in our lives, to feel that we had moved the streets, the stockyards, the hiring halls 
into literature” (15).2 The demographic upheaval of the literary field occurring at 
this time had lasting impact on the shape and form of concerns with belonging 
in narrative art: first and foremost by expanding the range of lived experience 
to include the (promisingly “authentic”) struggles and concerns of less privileged 
writers. Entering the field in the aftermath of modernism, however, these writers 
had to position themselves with regard to its daunting heritage, which for Kazin as 
for Roth was a matter of demonstrating “that our radical strength could carry on 
the experimental impulse of modern literature” (Starting Out 15).3
Call It Sleep endorses this agenda like no other novel of its time. Reading 
 Ulysses, Roth said, had “opened my eyes to the fact that the material for literature 
was all around me. [...] That life was a junkyard […] and that you just pick up the 
pieces of junk. That language and art was the way you transmuted it” (Roth in 
Lyons 53). His novel embraces the Joycean celebration of the ordinary stuff that 
makes up modern urban life in a remarkable experiment of dwelling in what is felt 
and found. In doing so, it disappointed those who had expected a “truly proletar-
ian novel.” For them, it was an untimely infatuation with childish introspection 
flawed by an unfortunate lack of social realism and political will. The first review, 
published anonymously in the communist magazine New Masses in February 1935, 
brims with resentment: Call it Sleep degenerates into “impression on a rampage,” 
is too long, contains “vile spelling of dialects,” and bores its readers with “the sex 
phobias of this six-year-old Proust. […] It is a pity that so many writers drawn 
from the proletariat can make no better use of their working class experience than 
as material for introspective and febrile novels” (quoted in Wirth-Nesher, “Intro-
duction” 12). Still, many of the established critics liked the novel, and even com-
mercially it was a modest success.4 Then its publisher went out of business, and the 
2 Kazin’s autobiographical Starting Out in the Thirties is still a most valuable read for anyone inter-
ested in the troubled decade.
3 Noted as early as in the f irst reviews, the Joycean influence on Call It Sleep has been of persistent 
scholarly interest. The best account of it is McHale’s “Roth in Nighttown.” Besides Joyce, Roth’s 
modernism was influenced by Eliot and O’Neill. He was introduced to all of them by Eda Lou 
Walton Roth, with whom Roth (twenty-four at the time and twelve years younger than her) was 
living when writing the novel. Walton opened the literary world to him: She was a professor at 
NYU, a practicing poet, and an established promoter of modernism with a circle of friends who 
were formative of the contemporary cultural moment (among them Hart Crane, Margaret Mead, 
Ruth Benedict, and Constance Rourke). Call It Sleep is dedicated to her.
4 John Chamberlain of The New York Times wrote: “Mr. Roth has done for the East Side what James T. 
Farrell is doing for the Chicago Irish. […] The final chapters have been compared to the Nighttown 
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book plunged into oblivion, staying out of print for nearly twenty-five years with a 
few treasured copies passed around in select circles of rare-book lovers. Its revival 
has by now become legendary: Endorsed simultaneously in Walter Rideout’s wide-
ly noticed The Radical Novel (1956) and by both Alfred Kazin and Leslie Fiedler in 
The American Scholar special issue “The Most Neglected Books of the Past 25 Years” 
of the same year, Call It Sleep was reissued, sold a million copies, and became the 
first paperback ever to be reviewed on the front page of The New York Times Book 
Review, where Irving Howe celebrated it as “one of the few genuinely distinguished 
novels written by a 20th-century American” (“Life” 60-61). (It took some serious 
effort to track its author down when this happened: Roth was working on a turkey 
farm in Maine, had dropped all ties to the literary world, and was suffering from a 
writer’s block that lasted for almost sixty years.)
The novel’s notorious resurgence went hand in hand with a critical shift in 
perception. Still valued as a powerful evocation of turn-of-the-century slum life 
in either the tradition of experimental modernism (Joyce, Eliot, Frazer) or of 
 American naturalism (Dreiser, Farrell), now its alleged Jewishness was enthusias-
tically praised.5 But as much as the novel’s belated recognition benefitted from the 
burgeoning interest in ethnic literature at the time, its place in the annals of U.S. 
 literature remained uncertain. When choices had to be made on which texts to 
episodes of Joyce’s Ulysses; the comparison is apt.” Kenneth Burke defended it in a letter to the 
New Masses by comparing it to Frazer’s Golden Bough and locating its “great virtue” in “the flu-
ent and civilized way in which he found, on our city streets, the new equivalents to the ancient 
jungle.” Alfred Hayes wrote that there “has appeared in America no novel to rival the veracity of 
this childhood. It is as honest as Dreiser’s Dawn, but far more sensitive. […] It is as brilliant as 
Joyce’s Portrait of an Artist, but with a wider scope, a richer emotion, a deeper realism.” Edwin 
Seaver of the New York Sun accused the New Masses’ anonymous reviewer of suffering from the 
“infantile disorder of leftism” and calling Roth “a brilliant disciple of James Joyce,” and Fred Marsh 
for the New York Herald Tribune found it “the most compelling and moving, the most accurate and 
profound study of an American slum childhood that has yet appeared in this day. Henry Roth has 
achieved the detachment of universality of the artist.” All quotes are drawn from Wirth-Nesher’s 
“Introduction,” which gives a comprehensive overview of the novel’s turbulent history of reception.
5 Howe wrote that although the novel “is structured according to the narrative strategies of mod-
ernism […] [it] draws its substance, the whole unfolding of socioethnic detail, from the Jewish 
immigrant experience” (World of our Fathers 588); for Kazin it was “the most profound novel of 
Jewish life […] by an American” (“Introduction” ix); and Fiedler praised it as a “specifically Jewish 
book, the best single book by a Jew about Jewishness written by an American certainly through 
the thirties perhaps ever” (The Jew 38). It is no coincidence that the three critics most instrumen-
tal to its revival were children of immigrants, moved by it as a powerful transcript of the kind of 
“ethnic passage”—“out of immigrant confines into the larger world of letters“ (Ferraro, Ethnic 
Passages 8)—which they had undergone, and could now critically and professionally aff irm in 
their sophisticated praise for Roth’s novel.
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include in the new canon, the “ethnic realism” of Cahan, Gold or Yezierka would 
routinely trump over the “ethnic modernism” that is the artistic trademark of 
Roth’s novel. By the mid-90s Call It Sleep was once again among the “most for-
gotten book of the past 25 years” (Ferraro, Ethnic Passages 90). For the study at 
hand, Roth’s novel is intriguing precisely for the unusual combination of modern-
ist experimentation with language and perception with an unabashed saturation 
in Jewish folk life that interfered with its canonization. Are the formal tensions 
responsible for foreclosing a proper place for this striking novel not by definition 
laden with contradicting assumptions about dwelling in the world? If the need to 
belong yields a narrative drive that both spurs and draws from narrative art, how 
does Roth’s novel give voice and form to this need by drawing from two notorious-
ly conflicted traditions?
Both its high modernism and its ethnic realism respond to basic troubles with 
belonging—alienation and displacement—but with substantial stylistic differenc-
es, and with vast implications for the practice of narrative art and its investment in 
matters of dwelling in the world. The high modernism of Joyce and Eliot enlisted 
by Roth calls for an art that, in the alleged service of a humanist ethics, aims at 
dissembling mimetic conventions and social entanglements to arrive at a more 
viable state of being. To riff on Viktor Shklovsky’s famous definition, the purpose 
of this kind of art is to convey a perception of things that make us really see rath-
er than merely recognize them (18). The “ethnocultural authenticity” aspired by 
ethnic realism also calls for an art that is true to life, but here it asks to cultivate 
marginal experience—and hence a hands-on truth about being in the world, re-
siding in the concrete particularities of unprivileged life at the margin—as a bul-
wark against the corrosive forces of modern life, and as an imaginary repository 
for mainstream needs to belong. Ethnic and modernist realism are indeed closely 
related in this regard, separated mainly by the partisan perspective of the critics. 
The measure of difference is the value ascribed to the literary, a value openly nego-
tiated in Roth’s novel at a time when the pressure on literature to be politically en-
gaged was omnipresent. Call it Sleep engages the conflict about literary value as its 
form-giving principle. In doing so, it troubles modernist yearnings for “aesthetic 
transcendence” as a universal remedy with practical needs for a familiar, predict-
able life-world while confronting yearnings for “ethnocultural authenticity” with 
a deromanticized depiction of life at the margin.
cHiLdHood as immigr atioN
The novel’s congenial move in this regard is its choice of mediating the converg-
ing displacements of modernization and immigration almost entirely through the 
consciousness of a child: a young boy named David Schearl, who is almost six 
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years old when the main narrative sets in and eight when it ends.6 This focaliza-
tion allows Roth to interweave the commonly told immigration story of losing 
and regaining a familiar world with the tacit depiction of a world emerging from 
displacement as an experience of inherited, secondary, rather than immediate, loss 
of one’s home. Having arrived in the New World as an infant too young to remem-
ber the place of his birth, a stetl in Polish Galicia (then part of Austria-Hungary), 
David cannot make sense of their transplanted lives on the basis of his own experi-
ence of displacement. And yet he grows up firmly knowing that he has come from a 
“world somewhere, somewhere else” (23), a mysterious, dreamlike place powerfully 
present all around him—in the children’s songs that he hears in the street, in the 
magical glow of the stories told by the elders at home, in the linguistic boundaries 
drawn around their domestic space by the Yiddish spoken there, in his mother’s 
beloved picture of a corn field, and his father’s enigmatic cow horns on a plate.7
David’s quest to belong is confronted with the challenges of the protomodern 
environment in which he grows up and with the ghost of the displaced world of 
his family’s past. The narrative process of mapping the world emerging from this 
fault line is driven by the boy’s maturing desire for an own place in the world. Fo-
calization through his consciousness wires the narrative to an innocent and deeply 
immature need to belong.8 That this narrative is existentially inclined heightens 
6 Though clearly a work of f iction, David’s story is closely modeled after its author’s own immigra-
tion experience. Roth’s family f irst lived in Brownsville, moved to the Lower East Side when Roth 
was seven, and moved again to Harlem when Roth was nine (and with that, past the protagonist ’s 
age at the novel’s end). Roth also used the basic coordinates of his family’s arrival in the novel’s 
Prologue: he and his mother came through Ellis Island in 1907, and were picked up by his father 
who had left their home in Polish Galicia a few years earlier. Just like David, Roth was seventeen 
months old when he arrived.
7 Triggered by a song about a boy named Walter Wildflower (in the vernacular of the street 
 “Waltuh Wiuhflowuh”) that some girls sing along with their game, David imagines knowing this 
boy back in Austria with “warm, nostalgic mournfulness,” and as he shuts his eyes, “[f ]ragments 
of forgotten rivers f loated under the lids, dusty roads, fathomless curve of trees, a branch in a 
window under f lawless light. A world somewhere, somewhere else.” Roth, Call It Sleep (New York: 
Picador, 1991), 23. All references to the novel are from this edition and will from now on be cited 
parenthetically in the text. For Sollors, this passage is a paradigmatic articulation of “the second 
(or the f irst American) generation’s dif f iculty with nostalgia” for a place only known through 
second hand accounts (“A World” 142).
8 Due to the dominant focalization through a child protagonist and the at times quixotic quest to 
make sense of the world, the novel can be compared to Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry 
Finn, but its dependence on significant others as a main site of struggle also makes it akin to 
Henry James’s What Maisie Knew. In terms of narrative modes, Call It Sleep takes a middle position 
between the two: more distanced than Huck Finn’s f irst-person narration and more immediate 
and introspective than Maisie ’s auctorial narration.
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the sense of urgency on which it thrives: In the world of the novel, children are not 
safely contained in the loving care of those who raise them but thrust into a world 
in which they are forced to start out as strangers. The trope of childhood as arche-
typal immigration is introduced early on.9 The Prologue, set at Ellis Island five 
years prior to the main narrative and written last, presents us with a family that 
is unhappy and divided. A rift runs through its members that seems to go deeper 
than the tensions caused by the chaos of arrival, splitting it—in strikingly Oedipal 
fashion, about which I will have more to say—into the lonely figure of an angry 
father, and the symbiotic unity of a well-meaning mother and frightened child. 
Resonating with Freud’s saying that “[e]very new arrival on this planet is faced by 
the task of the Oedipus complex; anyone who fails […] falls a victim of Neurosis” 
(“Three Essays” 226n, quoted in Altenbernd 682), the task of immigration fath-
omed in here is twofold, with a definite stress on the domestic side of the matter.
After the conflicted family triangle is established, narration plunges into the 
consciousness of the child and into the throbbing world of New York’s tenement 
quarters where he grows up. Focalization through the boy turns his longing for a 
place in the world into the dominant narrative drive; in fact, it is his desire for a 
drink of water (one cannot survive for too long without it) that sparks narration. 
As he closely eyes “the bright brass faucets that gleamed so far away, each”—teas-
ingly, it seems—“with a bead of water at its nose,” we learn that he “again became 
aware that this world had been created without a thought of him.” Cast against the 
disinterested reality of the towering sink, whose “iron hip rested on legs almost as 
tall as his own body,” feeling out of place is presented as the boy’s uncomfortable, 
yet most familiar state of being. There is an aching corporeality to this state: “by no 
stretch of arm, no leap, could he ever reach the distant tap” (17; emphasis mine). In 
9 Approaching the novel this way draws from Wisse, who writes: “Every child hopes to arrive in a 
friendly new land, a golden land that will treat him with dignity and warmth. Happy families 
may be alike at least in this respect, that the fortunate pairing of the parents is retroactively 
confirmed by their desired, beloved children. Children of happy families are made to feel that 
their arrival benefits the existing settlement. But children born into less than perfect unions 
can never do anything to alter the condition that produced them. Because they loom for their 
parents as reminders of rejection and lovelessness, they must look out for harm from the very 
person who should be protecting them. […] Child and immigrant both are required to learn a 
new language and adapt to new surroundings. The burden on each is to adapt to a world already 
complete without him. Children may appear to be the most adaptable of immigrants because 
they are anyway engaged in the process of adjusting to their surroundings, and are already ex-
ercising the required skills of observation, emulation, intellection. In addition, the child has the 
greatest incentive to learn because he is the most disparate immigrant, lacking the advantages 
of maturity and mastery in other areas that sometimes help to compensate for physical or social 
disadvantage. Immigration is humiliating to adults because they are forced back into the posi-
tion of children, and required to relearn what took so much effort the f irst time” (61-62).
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the move from perception to intellection performed here, David’s displacement is 
channeled into a strikingly poetic mode (or even hermeneutics) of world-making: 
The faucet gains a nose, the sink has hips and legs, and so on. A “child’s magical 
thinking” ( Allen 446) mobilizes the search for a place in the world in this novel.10 
But the transformative power of creative enchantment is not without hazard. As 
David’s desire shifts from wanting a drink to taking imaginative measure of the 
world around him, the latter assumes a life of its own. “Where did the water come 
from that lurked so secretly in the curve of the brass? Where did it go, gurgling in 
the drain? What a strange world must be hidden behind the walls of a house!” With 
every question the boy’s imagination expands—until the game becomes so exhila-
rating that he has to actively divorce himself from it. “But he needed a drink” (17).
Wired to the ravishing receptivity of an emerging consciousness, dwelling in 
narrative may take on a self-absorbing, potentially totalizing drive in this novel. 
Brown’s letter-writing sleepwalker fell prey to a similar danger. But where Edgar 
Huntly gave the force of the imagination a pathological spin (sleepwalking was 
conceived as a form of madness at the time, and in the world of the novel it was in-
terlinked with the imagination in ways that corroded all viable prospects of dwell-
ing), Call It Sleep ties it to the inquisitive mind of an innocent child. As in Edgar 
Huntly and The Country of the Pointed Firs, a specific narrative space creates a 
specific need to tell. Yet if spatial imagination and narrative design will once again 
serve as the two main trajectories for my reading in this chapter, focalizing the sto-
ry through the consciousness of a child conjoins them more thoroughly than in the 
other stories: As David gets older, the external world expands and social relations 
multiply. Corresponding with this dynamic, processual rendering of the external 
world is the child’s inner growth, which climaxes in a narrativistic attempt of self- 
and place-making. Born from an extremely vulnerable and erring need to belong, 
the narrative drive of this novel is at once universalized by the fact that everyone 
was a child once, and amplified with the particular challenges of this immigrant 
child’s young life.
10 About the transformative work of the imagination employed by the text Freedman writes: “The 
imagination does not literally create, it transforms, and what it transforms are the very materials 
which Roth has transfigured in Call It Sleep—the fears, the anguish, the ugliness of life—here 
a young boy’s life on the Lower East Side” (“Redemptive Imagination” 114). Allen, who has cred-
ited the novel with being “the most powerful evocation of the terrors of childhood ever written” 
(444), stresses that David’s world is not a world of “simple fantasy or make-believe but one he 
creates with the desperate, compulsive imagination of the poet” (446).
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sPace as feLt, storied, aNd scriPted
The opening image of a small white steamer approaching Ellis Island unmistakably 
situates the novel in the world of immigrant fiction. On the threshold to this world 
we find the following striking inscription: “(I pray thee ask no questions/ this is 
that Golden Land)” (9). The deictic “this” of the novel’s motto places us at the gates 
of a longed-for destination, the aspired end of a strenuous journey. But the “that” 
following suit displaces both the spatial marker and the affirmative investment, 
creating a suspicious perceptual dissonance between outer and inner world, reality 
and expectation. Hence we become attuned to a narrative operation that takes us 
onto unstable, problematic grounds. Bearing not even the slightest resemblance 
to the mythical idyll evoked in the motto, arrival comes in the shape of a hungry, 
people-eating machine. A harsh, naturalistic language underscores its life-condi-
tioning force: Endless numbers of immigrants, “natives from almost every land in 
the world,” are “delivered,” like goods, “from the stench and throb of the steerage 
to the stench and throb of New York tenements” (9).
The urban environment that serves as the story’s nourishing ground is thor-
oughly mobilized (how can the available space contain them all?) and intensified 
(what will become of this heterogeneous mix once they have been “delivered” to 
those tenements?) under the impact of this mechanical procedure. It is tempting to 
think of the naturalistic force inscribed into this setting as turning its inhabitants 
into “a force among forces” and ask “whether the idea of agency—of the self as 
independent actor—makes sense in a world where people come to consciousness 
by becoming aware of the myriad of forces impacting them” (Minter 228-29). But 
Call It Sleep is decidedly not a novel in which character is a mere effect of the en-
vironment; the alienating forces of modern life at work in it may be daunting, but 
they are not overpowering per se. Rather, the space produced from these forces 
calls for specific—imaginative and narrative—strategies of survival. In fact, the 
naturalistic air of the setting is not geared toward dramatizing the futility of these 
strategies; it serves as a force field to explore and refine them.11
11 That the main characters exposed to this setting are Jewish is crucial to this balancing act: “Jews 
are generally so conscious of the pressure of history that it was a notable achievement for Henry 
Roth […] to put character ahead of environment” (Kazin, “Introduction” xiii). As a prototypical 
urban dweller, the Jew is fathomed as the quintessential “modern Everyman.” In fact, twenti-
eth-century Jewish f iction was at the vanguard of creating “myths of urban alienation and terror,” 
turning the Jew into a virtual model of what “Western man in general [was] becoming” (Fiedler, 
Love and Death 493-94). Their immigration could become a metaphor for a collective transition 
from agrarian/rural to an industrial/urban society and the alienation that comes with/from it, 
because most Jews came from rural environments and were exposed and fundamentally shocked 
by the foreignness of city life as well as having been torn from belonging to a safe religious 
community and work structure.
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Perhaps the most striking thing about the space imagined by the novel is how 
packed it is. At the time, New York’s immigrant quarters may very well have been 
“the most densely populated place on earth” (Wirth-Nesher, “City” 95). This is how 
Irving Howe remembers them:
In 1890, within the small space bounded by the Bowery on the west, the river and its warehouses on 
the east, Houston on the north and Monroe on the south, there were some dozen Christian church-
es, a dozen synagogues (most Jewish congregations were storefronts or in tenements), about f ifty 
factories and shops (exclusive of garment establishments, most of which were west of the Bowery or 
hidden away in cellars and f lats), ten large public buildings, twenty public and parochial schools—
and one tiny park, on Grant and East Broadway. Gangs of German boys pressed down from the north, 
Irish from the south. A dominant impression of the Jewish quarter, shared by immigrants and visitors 
alike, was of f ierce congestion, a place in which the bodily pressures of other people, their motions 
and smells and noises seemed always assaulting one. Of spaces for privacy and solitude, there was 
none. (quoted in Wirth-Nesher, “City” 95)
And this is how haptic and noisy the place becomes in Roth’s rendering. The pas-
sage describes the corner of the Lower East Side to which the Schearls move from 
the less populated slum of Brownsville: 12
Here in 9th Street it wasn’t the sun that swamped one as one left the doorway, it was sound—an 
avalanche of sound. There were countless children, there were countless baby carriages, there were 
countless mothers. And to the screams, rebukes and bickering of these, a seemingly endless f ile of 
hucksters joined their bawling cries. On Avenue D horse-cars clattered and banged. Avenue D was 
thronged with beer wagons, garbage carts and coal trucks. There were many automobiles, some blunt 
and rangy, some with straw poops, honking. Beyond Avenue D, at the end of a stunted, ruined block 
that began with shacks and smithies and seltzer bottling works and ended in a junk heap, was the 
East River on which many boat horns sounded. On 10th Street, and 8th Street Crosstown car ground 
its way toward the switch. (143)
Orientation is an obvious challenge in such a high-strung environment. Quick 
judgments and decisions are crucial to getting around—which means, in turn, 
that appearance becomes a matter of utmost concern. Thanks to the “American” 
clothes that the father provided to the mother and the child, they blend in upon 
arriving at Ellis Island (a typical theme in immigrant fiction). But the child’s “odd, 
outlandish, blue straw hat” (10), a farewell gift from a friend back home, gives them 
away as foreigners. Albert Schearl loathes the attention that this hat attracts: “Can’t 
12 Taking his cue from Allen’s remark that Call It Sleep may be “the noisiest novel ever written”, 
 Adams dedicated an entire article to the urban soundscape of Roth’s novel, arguing that the many 
sounds f illing and often disrupting David’s familiar environment are the key to evoking the effect 
of immediacy that is such a strong and compelling feature of the novel.
Belonging and Narrative114
you see that those idiots are watching us already? They’re mocking us!” (15), he 
snaps before tearing it off the child’s head, terrifying the little boy, and driving his 
wife to silent tears.13 Already tainted by the cloud of unhappiness under which the 
reunion is cast, the desired effect of blending in is now damaged beyond repair.
Fueled by the feeling of constantly being watched and judged, Albert’s violent 
temper is a permanent threat to his environment. “They look at me crookedly, with 
mockery in their eyes! How much can a man endure?” (22). Losing job after job as a 
printer due to his unpredictable rage, he becomes a milkman, working alone when 
others are sleeping. (Ironically, the new line of work bears a remote resemblance to 
his former, rural job as a cowherd while the need to be close to the stables demands 
that the Schearls move to the hyperurban Lower East Side.) David’s father is an 
insanely proud man, degraded by the conditions of survival in the New World, and 
profoundly alienated from everyone including his family. Once he tries to articu-
late what ails him: “I think when you come out of a house and step on bare earth 
among the fields you’re the same man who you were when you were inside the 
house. But when you step out on pavements you’re someone else. You can feel your 
face change” (31-32, emphasis in the original). Brief as it is, his account impres-
sively captures the compound displacements of modernization and migration. The 
aching disjunction between place and self expressed here harks back to what Ernst 
Bloch (right around this time) called Ungleichzeitigkeit [non-contemporaneity]: 
“Not all people exist in the same Now. They do so only externally, through the fact 
that they can be seen today. But they are there by not yet living at the same time 
with the others. They rather carry an earlier element with them; this interferes” 
(quoted in Kaes 185). Bloch does not mention migration, but his concern about 
the dangers of this tension-ridden simultaneity of the urban and the rural find a 
powerful echo in Albert’s unpredictable rage.
There is a strikingly physical dimension to Albert’s sense of displacement—a 
change of the part of his body most exposed to the gaze of others, his face—which 
creates an irritation so profound that it destabilizes the spatial moorings of his 
entire family. The somatics of spatial production at work here persist throughout 
Call It Sleep; space emerges directly from the bodily experiences of its characters. 
David’s desire for a drink that he is too small to get gives this process a distinctly 
phenomenal quality early on. Wherever the boy goes, he takes in the environment 
with all of his senses; instant by instant, his world is molded from his percep-
tions. “How could you hear the sound of your own feet in the dark if a carpet 
muffled every step you took?” he wonders when traversing the dark hallway of 
their tenement building. “But if you couldn’t hear the sound of your own feet and 
couldn’t see anything either, how could you be sure that you were actually there 
13 The fact that he mockingly calls it a “crown” (14) has been read as pointing towards David’s sym-
bolic role as a potential savior, being brought to the New World in the arms of a Madonna-like 
mother f igure. For further elaboration of this theme, see Altenbernd.
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and not dreaming?” (20) Living in a world that is inherently troubled by displace-
ment spurs an especially urgent need for narrative mediation, and in the world of 
the novel this need is geared toward affirming social ties. Albert’s brief account 
addresses Luter, the only person in the New World whom he longs to befriend. The 
self-imposing “I think” gives voice to a desire to be heard and received by this man. 
Genya’s many stories, told to her son or to the few adults in her small world, serve a 
similar function: They either affirm another’s or her own place in this foreign, un-
stable environment. In all of these cases, narrative acts are instruments of assert-
ing and emplacing the speaker in the unfamiliar world from which the tale evolves.
But these narrative acts of self-assertion and emplacement are acutely charged 
with matters of language. Different languages reign in different spaces, and the 
boundaries between them tend to become effective (and at times unbridgeable) 
as linguistic boundaries.14 The domestic space of the Schearls unfolds from the 
Yiddish spoken there, transposed by Roth into “splendid, almost too splendid, 
King James English” (Kazin, “Introduction” xv). “Shudder when I speak to you,” 
 Albert furiously demands of his son. But as Kazin rightly points out, “The English 
does not convey the routine, insignificant weight of the word ‘shudder’ in Yiddish,” 
veiling the fact that “The people speaking Yiddish in this book are not cultivated, 
careful in choosing their words” but “hard-pressed, charged up, deeply emotional” 
(xv). They are also less religious than their language makes it seem. Roth sets this 
graceful, exalted language against the crude (and possibly exaggerated) vernacular 
used among the children when playing in the street—here with a dissembled alarm 
clock: “‘So what makes id?” he asked. In the street David spoke English. ‘Ken-
cha see? Id’s coz id’s a machine.’ ‘Oh!’ ‘It wakes op mine fodder in the mawning.’ 
‘It wakes up mine fodder too’” (21). How different he sounds when talking to his 
friends! Speaking English gives him access to a world more or less closed to his 
mother, while her secret spaces of the “old county” gain imaginative substance 
when David overhears a conversation between her and her sister, in which the two 
accidentally switch back and forth between the—for David unintelligible— Polish 
that guards these spaces and their habitual Yiddish. The Hebrew David learns at 
his cheder promises to open the gates to a mystical space of salvation, gradually 
turning the school itself (through this very prospect and despite the abusive au-
thority of the rabbi) into a viable shelter away from his troubled home.
In depicting space as a heterogeneous entity that is socially activated through 
different, often “storied,” forms of language use, Roth spells out the extent to which 
access and orientation depend on them. “I know that I myself live on one hundred 
and twenty-six Boddeth Stritt” (33), Genya once set out to describe her shrunken 
world, but before she can go on with her story, Albert impatiently corrects her: 
14 A substantial body of scholarship has been dedicated to the novel’s striking use of language and 
its signif icance for negotiating matters of belonging. See in particular Wirth-Nesher, “Between 
Mother Tongues;” Fiedler, “Many Myths; “ Diamant; Buelens; Baumgarten; Aarons.
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“Bahday Street!” Repeating the mispronounced name with gentle self-mockery, she 
seamlessly weaves the disruption into her melancholic tale:
“It is such a strange name—bath street in German. But here I am. I know there is a church on a certain 
street to my left, the vegetable market is to my right, behind me are the railroad tracks and the 
broken rocks, and before me, a few blocks away is a certain store window that has a kind of white-
wash on it—and faces in the white-wash, the children draw. Within this pale is my America, and if I 
ventured further I should be lost. In fact,” she laughed, “were they even to wash that window, I might 
never f ind my way home again.” (33)15
But Genya shows little desire to challenge either the close boundaries of this world, 
or its aching absence of meaning and attachment. And hence, it is not the mother 
but the son who cannot find his way home one day. In his emerging world, the 
questions of who he is, where and how he belongs have exponential gravity, culmi-
nating once, early on in the book, in a situation in which walking away from his 
home presents itself as the only viable option. Enthusiastic about his adventure at 
first, he soon finds himself “losted,” and in growing despair when realizing that 
the address he readily gives to the friendly strangers trying to help—“a hunnder ’n’ 
twenty six Boddeth Stritt” (101)—does not exist on their map. It refers to a place 
only a few blocks away but displaced to a no-man’s-land by the boy’s vernacu-
lar bending of his mother’s foreign pronunciation. To reiterate the nodal points 
of this discussion, then, Call It Sleep treats space as conjointly produced through 
perceptual and narrative investment. In doing so, it charts the incentive to make 
it/to make a home through a socially binding, communal use of language in ways 
that make tangible both its power to organize space, and its power to dissect, com-
partmentalize, and separate. And as David’s life is sustained by a patchwork of 
languages, stories, and social ties more diverse than that of his parents, his place 
among them becomes increasingly troubled.
The issue of David’s discomfort within his family touches upon another cru-
cial feature of spatial production at work here. Undergirding the perceptual and 
linguistic malleability of place(-in-the)-making is an organization of space that is 
strikingly psychological—or rather psychoanalytical. In fact, the family triangle 
of an angry, isolated father, a loving mother, and a fearful child that is nestled into 
the tenement setting as the smallest spatial unit from which the narrative evolves 
15 Genya’s disorientation is also infused with the phenomenon of Ungleichzeitigkeit. In the conver-
sation that leads to the sad account of “her America,” she mentions that “nothing ever came to 
[her] hamlet except the snow and the rain,” and that prior to her departure, the most modern 
experience of her life had been to listen to an even then outdated gramophone. She inhabits a 
“displaced corner of the Old World” (Samet 571), a description that aptly captures the peculiar 
distance between her and her environment. Her remoteness is further enhanced by her frequent 
indulgence in nostalgic stories about the “old country.”
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has a powerful Oedipal script.16 But Call It Sleep not merely gives its spatial order a 
Freudian spin; it exploits this feature (which is based on a mythical tale about the 
human condition) as the very means to push beyond the conventionality of the 
immigrant’s tale. In daring to suggest that David’s troubled sense of belonging has 
a source other (or at least more complicated) than the difficulties of living in the 
disorienting, transitory space between different languages and cultures, it dero-
manticizes the nurturing ideal of the Jewish family.17 With his father’s unpredict-
able temper as a constant source of terror and threat, David’s home is anything but 
a safe haven from the hostile world. The boy is haunted by recurring dreams of “his 
father’s footsteps booming on the stairs, of the glistening doorknob turning, and 
of himself clutching at knifes he couldn’t lift from the table” (22). In his emerging 
world, the fear of his father is a major structuring force, which thrives on a basic 
distinction: There are “black days” (the good days when his father is away at work 
and David has his mother and the family’s domestic space all to himself), and 
there are “red days” (the dreadful days when his father is at home). Naming them 
so is the secret code that David uses to gain control over a space threatened by his 
father’s open dislike of him. Yet intermingling with the ever-looming fear of being 
abused by his father are feelings of envy and adoration. When seeing him dress, 
David is awed by his muscular physique. “How long would it be […] before those 
knots appeared above his own elbow and those tough, taut braids at his forearm. 
He wished it were soon, wished it were today, this minute. Strong, how strong his 
father was, stronger than he’d ever be” (177).
In the light of such fancies, David’s habit of collecting the old calendar leafs be-
comes tangible as the desire to create a material record of time progressing toward 
him finally being “big enough” (18). “You peel off the year as one might a cabbage,” 
(19) his mother once teases him; that David’s father made the calendar at one of 
his many jobs as a printer turns the boy’s ritual into a symbolic routine of dismem-
bering his awful power—a process in which the mother, in providing him with 
the daily leafs, is an accomplice. David’s symbiosis with his mother (who is also 
rejected by the father and has no other object for her love but her son) is the bul-
wark raised against a menacing world. “Darkness was different without his moth-
er near. People were different too” (37). The thought of her listening until he has 
traversed the threatening hallway is of existential reassurance for him. But as the 
story progresses, the codependence of mother and son becomes suffocating, fur-
ther troubling David’s already tainted comfort in the family’s domestic space. The 
16 A substantial body of work is dedicated to the Freudian subplot of the novel. See for example 
Altenbernd; Ferraro, “Oedipus in Brownsville;” Fein; Samet; Freywald.
17 Yezierka’s The Breadwinners is an earlier portrayal of a problematic immigrant family, yet while 
both novels share the f igure of the threatening father, Call It Sleep goes much further in decon-
structing the ideal of the Jewish family, and adds psychological depth to the conflicts among its 
members.
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symbiosis between mother and son eventually cracks under the weight of the boy’s 
jealousy—his obsession with “erotic images of her naked flesh, which he compul-
sively fantasizes being stared at by strangers and ravished in his father’s planned 
absence by a boarder who pretends to be his friend” (Fiedler, “Many Myths” 25).
Roth downplayed the Freudian influence on his novel that so clearly becomes 
tangible here. “I don’t know much about Freud and never did. […] If I had known 
about things like Oedipus complexes I probably would have never written the 
book at all” (Howard 76), he stated in an interview, conceding soon thereafter: “Of 
course, I knew about Freud, but I only had a smattering of it. I only knew what ev-
eryone else knew of Freud, and that wasn’t a great deal” (Freedman,  “Conversation” 
155). Deliberately exploited or not, what he knew was forceful enough to earn Call 
It Sleep the reputation of being “the most Freudian of the American great novels” 
(Guttman 50). Roth’s intense engagement with Joyce, Eliot, and O’Neill are likely 
sources of an “osmotic” reception. Yet what interests me about the novel’s invest-
ment in Freud’s ideas are not so much possible sources or routes of transmission. 
Rather, I am intrigued by how readily these ideas were absorbed in contemporary 
efforts of giving voice and form to concerns with belonging. When Roth began 
writing his novel in the summer of 1930, psychoanalysis had undergone a short 
and steep history of success in America. Launched by the series of lectures Freud 
had given at Clark University in 1909 (the occasion of his only visit to the United 
States), psychoanalysis was rapidly institutionalized as a medical discipline, and 
widely received in writing (mostly through the published lectures themselves, 
and the translations of Freud’s other major works of the time: Introduction to 
 Psychoanalysis, Interpretation of Dreams, and Psychopathology of Everyday Life).18 
Call it Sleep can indeed be read as a showcase of the ways in which a popularized 
set of Freudian ideas began to form a more or less coherent repository of narra-
tive frames and storylines about modern individuals and their place in the world. 
Three components of the emerging psychoanalytical imagination are pertinent to 
18 Opening his monumental study on Freud’s reception in America, noting that 1909 was the last 
year an American President rode to his inauguration in a carriage, Hale aligns the arrival of psy-
choanalysis in the U.S. with modernization. There is wide agreement among Freud scholars that 
the shared sense of transition pervading U.S. society during the early decades of the twentieth 
century was a decisive factor in propelling the favorable reception of psychoanalysis, and the 
quick and thorough spread of its main ideas (in Europe, they were met with suspicion until re-
imported from the U.S.). While it must be assumed that these feelings of instability and change 
were unevenly distributed and subjectively experienced throughout the social f ield, experiences 
of immigration and of the disintegrating forces of modern life had a measurable impact in turn-
ing “analytic absorption in […] individual histories” (Roazen 273) and the “search for meaning 
in […] dreams, wishes, fears and confusions” (Turkle 31) into welcome venues for emotional sta-
bilization and intellectual reorientation. For further reading about Freud in America, see Illouz, 
Saving; Zaretsky; Hale; Borchers.
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rendering concerns with belonging in Roth’s novel: the key roles assigned to the 
nuclear family and to sexual desire, which are closely related through the  Oedipus 
complex; the turn to the sphere of the ordinary and the everyday, prototypical-
ly embodied in the “Freudian mistake” that is significant precisely because of its 
randomness; and the secular revision of former frames of self-narration, most sig-
nificantly the biblical salvation story with its clear-cut patterns of dealing with 
existential doubt (Illouz, Saving 45-68).
While the latter two aspects feature prominently in the novel’s narrative design 
to be discussed in the following section, the Oedipal nexus of nuclear family and 
sexual desire has a decisive impact on the novel’s spatial organization—with two 
important effects. First, it amplifies a use of symbolism in which related pairs of 
opposites (light and dark, good and evil, inside and outside, cellar and roof) gain 
meaning in close relation to space. The Oedipal script of the family thus inter-
links with a thoroughly spatialized symbolism, connecting darkness (the domi-
nant symbol of fear) to the space of the cellar and to the father, just as light (the 
symbol of salvation) is associated with the roof and the rail and with the desired 
escape from male authorities (the father, the rabbi). That the symbolic couplets 
thrive on an inside-outside opposition, which is firmly grounded in the novel’s 
imaginary geography, amplifies their signifying power (the problematic interior 
spaces of the Schearls’ home, the cellar, the cheder versus the promising open-
ness of the urban wasteland by the river and the rails).19 Such a highly charged 
environment is riddled with boundaries that are both geographic and symbolic, 
which makes movements across especially effective in spurring narrative action. 
Second and closely related, the psychological dimension brought into play by the 
Oedipal rendering of the family has the effect of mobilizing the space imagined by 
the novel from within the storytelling process. Contrary to Freud’s “geographical” 
model of the psyche, with its fixed realms of the ego, the superego, and the id, the 
Oedipal family follows a progressive and predictable script. Out of sheer psychic 
need, the relation between its members has to change, with the effect of altering 
19 This pattern can be further extended in the sense that the cellar resembles the unconscious and 
the roof resembles the super ego. On the symbolism of light vs. dark, good vs. evil, see Lyons, 
Henry Roth 40-42; Freedman “Mystic Initiation” 27. For the psychoanalytical enhancement of this 
symbolism, see Fein. For psychoanalytical cellar and roof symbolism, see Freywald 445-48. Fur-
thermore, all the headings for the individual books into which the novel is divided—“The Cellar,” 
“The Picture,” “The Cheder,” “The Rail”—have not only significant symbolic meanings but also 
these symbols are attached to and substantially gain their meanings in relation to the novel’s 
imaginary geography. See Lyons, “Symbolic Structure.” With regard to Books I, III, and IV, these 
references have already been mentioned. Book II, entitled “The Picture,” is associated with the 
cornfield in which David’s mother lived out her affair with the Christian organist of her village.
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the space they share among themselves and with others.20 Such an implicit mobi-
lization of space resonates with Freud’s conception of the family as a biographical 
event. In stark difference to the genealogical mechanism of emplacing an individ-
ual within a fixed and given social order that we saw at work as a socio-economical 
determinant in Edgar Huntly, construing the family as a biographical event goes 
hand in hand with a mode of symbolic production that molds and expresses one’s 
individuality in a unique and subjective way. Call it Sleep’s spatial imagination is 
indeed deeply invested in this kind of eventfulness. The Schearl kitchen as its epi-
center mirrors Freud’s insistence (in opposing Marx) that the domestic rather than 
the work sphere is most formative for a person’s life, with the family constituting 
the very entity from which individuals have to separate themselves to become a 
mature being.21 The eventfulness inscribed into the Schearl family through the 
 Oedipal script climaxes when David throws a dipper onto the streetcar’s electric 
rail in a desperate attempt of self-creation, and act of near self-electrocution. He 
seizes the tool—symbolizing the (sexual organ of the) father (the cowherd, the 
milkman, the one allowed to touch his mother’s breasts)—from a milk can in the 
street when escaping from home after the final showdown with his father, and 
takes it to the open space by the river on his erring flight. Yet all too soon, he finds 
himself back in the family kitchen, injured and in need of his parents’ care. It is 
not in the vision of an urban, democratic community taking shape in the public 
space out there by the river, but in the Schearls’ domestic space—in the flicker of 
the softening fatherly hatred upon David’s return—that a new form of belonging 
becomes tangible in this novel.
I will resume this train of thought in the following section. For now, we need 
to stay tuned with the space evolving from the family as a biographical event, more 
precisely, with the ways in which the Oedipal constellation between its members 
prescribes its mobilization. In providing a progressive script with predictable 
phases such as “arousal of sexual desire for the mother” or “increasing conflict 
with the father,” it encodes the space imagined by the novel with a specific seman-
tics of action (from powerlessness to self-assertion). The Oedipal subplot of the 
family hence plants narrative “seeds” that generate events and direct the course 
20 The rise of Freud’s ideas coincided with a transformation of the notion of the family. A decreasing 
birthrate led to conceiving it as a close, triangular relation between father, mother and child, 
while the increasing emphasis of the generational divide had the effect of juxtaposing the func-
tional unit of the parents against their child. Within this basic structure, the growing specializa-
tion of gender roles resulted in an intensif ication of emotional bonds between mother and child, 
structurally prefiguring a conflict between father and son that became the touchstone of the 
Oedipus complex. See Illouz Saving 69-72.
21 Ironically, this revaluation happened when the traditional foundations of the family began to 
falter, making it return as a “story” in which the self was placed rather than having an institution 
regulating it. See Illouz, Salvation 67.
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of the action while the narrative space of the novel unfolds. Yoking spatial orga-
nization and narrative action in this way directly affects the novel’s investment in 
matters of dwelling. It choreographs a search for meaning-as-form that takes us 
on a journey in which “return” is never an option (neither can David go back to an 
earlier, more innocent state of his evolving world nor can he return to a more com-
fortable place called home in the Old World). The journey on which the narrative 
takes us along with its maturing child protagonist is geared toward self-assertion 
and empowerment, and this turns travelling down the plotted path into a narrative 
ritual in more than one way. Plot—in its capacity of laying out the grounds to be 
traversed in order to make the boy’s world more suitable for dwelling in it—reigns 
over the prospect of mastering the rite of passage thus imposed on and through 
the boy, and the journey undertaken with this aim leads across the compound 
grounds of plotting as place-making and plotting as storytelling. Intertwining 
these two operations in the Oedipal script of the family (the smallest spatial unit 
from which the narrative is structurally destined to evolve) gives the journey a 
psychoanalytical spin. And with psychoanalysis being “a primarily narrative art” 
(Brooks, Reading xiv), redeeming the child’s lack of belonging is bound to take 
narrative form. The desire for this narrative—to craft and to tell it—is the primary 
form-giving drive in Roth’s novel.
Yet while Call It Sleep is deeply invested in the productive nexus of belonging 
and narrative, it was written at a time of rising suspicion against plot. Ulysses, for 
instance, the novel that had such a profound impact on Roth, has more than 500 
pages but hardly any plot. Its meandering narrative is not unconcerned with be-
longing; in fact, one of the most compelling features of Joyce’s novel is the degree to 
which its main protagonist Leopold Bloom is not an alienated modern individual 
but one that (despite the unfaithfulness of his wife that drives him from his home 
and makes him roam the streets of Dublin for an entire day) firmly and joyous-
ly belongs. For a displaced and fearful immigrant boy, however, aimless drifting 
through inner and outer worlds is not a source of comfort. His conjoint states of 
immaturity and displacement create a different need to tell—one that is plot-driv-
en in strikingly modernist, erratic ways.
foUNd stUff as Narr ative foUNdatioN
David has a habit that perfectly captures the novel’s erratic mode of emplotment. 
He gathers (in what can be read as a mise en abyme of the novel’s plotting opera-
tion) random objects from his environment and stores them in an old shoebox, to 
which he turns for comfort. There are two orders of things in his “treasure chest” 
(19): calendar leafs and “striking odds and ends he found in the street” (35). He 
treasures the calendar leafs for their capacity to map the contours of his emerging 
world by keeping a material record of time progressing toward outgrowing (the fear 
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of) his father. The “things […] old and worn” or “gems” (35), as his mother lovingly 
calls them, provide the imaginary stuff to fill this map. The link of a broken chain, 
the thread on a bolt of a castor wheel, the overstretched spring of a window shade 
are precious to him because they bear “obscurely aching” (36) marks of the places 
where they used to belong, and thus inspire him to assign them with new ones.
If one had one of these [springs] on one’s feet instead of shoes, one might bounce instead of walk. 
High as a roof; far away at once. Like Puss in Boots. But if the mouse changed into an ogre inside the 
puss—right before it died—I am a mouse—an ogre!—Then poor Puss would have swelled and 
swelled and— (36)
Following this basic pattern, stuff randomly picked up from David’s environ-
ment—objects like those mentioned above but also people, mental images, pieces 
of conversations, anecdotes—are employed to fill his emerging world with elabo-
rate, self-empowering stories. Using what is found as the organizing principle of 
emplotment—and thus as the narrative foundation of dwelling in the world—is 
closely aligned with the emerging psychoanalytical imagination, especially with 
Freud’s endorsement of the random and the everyday. As spheres of the ordinary 
and the uneventful they become primary sites of creating and destroying the self, 
turning the insignificant, the trivial, and the common aspects of life into prima-
ry resources of sense-production, identity formation, and belonging (Cavell, “The 
 Ordinary”). Call It Sleep embraces this logic both in being relatively uneventful 
(we follow a fearful Jewish boy through his daily routines and timid transgres-
sions), and in the sense that random or minor mistakes and events essentially drive 
the plot. After dropping a spoon into a bowl of soup his father erupts, curtailing a 
series of dramatic events: the boy earns a severe beating for kicking a friend in the 
nose, knocks one of his playmates to the ground (is he dead?), flees the scene of his 
“crime,” and gets lost. The rosary, a gift from a Christian friend, exposes him as a 
traitor, propelling the story toward its end.
This kind of stuff assumes an avalanching force over the course of the nar-
rative. And if David’s “gem” collection mimics the plotting operation of assem-
bling random, ordinary occurrences and things, one can think of it as found in 
at least two different ways. Echoing Roth’s conviction that art can be made “out 
of junk” (Lyons, “Interview” 53), it draws on an artistic procedure employed by 
Kurt Schwitters, Marcel Duchamp, Pablo Picasso (in his sculptures), and a bit lat-
er by Robert Rauschenberg, in which everyday objects (often pieces of junk) are 
creatively recontextualized, and hence turned into art. Roth’s novel embraces this 
procedure to the degree that it becomes an overall practice of form-giving, applied 
to the protagonist’s self- and place-making efforts, and to the narrative project of 
the novel as a whole. But one can also think of David’s stuff as found in the sense 
of “gifts from the world.” These gifts capture the boy’s imagination because their 
displacement makes them ache with a mysterious promise of belonging, fitting, 
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being useful somewhere again. What David “learns” from the sex games imposed 
on him by the neighbor’s physically challenged daughter, or from being cowed to 
throw a metal sword onto the streetcar’s electric rail by a gang of Christian boys on 
Passover Day, quivers with meaning in similar ways. Seemingly useless, disposable 
occurrences—the “junk” of his everyday life—become valuable through creative 
recontextualization. “Playing bad” with Annie, devastating as it may have been 
when it happened, provides him with the key to decode the sexual tension between 
Luter and his mother, just as producing “lightning” from the rail inspires his re-
demptive attempt at self-creation.
Moreover, and crucially, both incidents have a profound impact on the further 
course of the narrative. In the first case, David loses interest in the game he is 
playing with his friends when he sees Luter approach his house, suspecting him of 
wanting to “play bad” with his mother—which makes him embark on his adven-
ture of running away after knocking down his playmate (with Luter at his home he 
cannot go there). In the second case, he breaks into the cheder and is caught by the 
rabbi, who ridicules him for believing to have found “God’s light” (257) in the ur-
ban wasteland by the car-tracks, thus making him receptive to the Christian faith 
about which he learns from his new friend Leo. The latter event makes him stum-
ble across yet another gift from the world with vast implications for the further 
course of the story: his friend’s rosary. But this gift comes with a price. To receive 
it, David must help his friend “play bad” with his cousin. And when the rosary falls 
out of his pocket during the final showdown with his father (the most “Freudian” 
of his many mistakes, fueling his father’s suspicions that David is the illegitimate 
child of a goy), it pushes the conflict between father and son to a point of no return. 
Even the rosary’s previous owner, David’s friend Leo, can be viewed a found object 
with vast impact on the plotting operation. David makes his acquaintance when, 
feeling betrayed and lonely, he retreats to the roof of his house, where the older, 
gorgeous boy is flying a kite (a powerful symbol of freedom, recalling Benjamin 
Franklin and his famous kite-flying experiment). Leo is lean and blond, and be-
sides his kite, he owns a pair of skates that grant him a mobility that David envies. 
Leo goes where he pleases, eats what he likes, and in all of this, he is intriguingly 
“other” to David (Polish, Christian, American). That Leo just happens to be passing 
through the neighborhood when David finds him on the roof underscores the ran-
dom nature of an encounter that profoundly alters David’s desire to belong, with 
the effect of stimulating imagination and narration right away. Before even talking 
to the other, David fantasizes about a “bond of kinship growing up between them, 
[…] both inhabitants of the same realm” (300). He, who has never wanted to be 
anyone’s friend, spends one of the “most blissful” hours of his life in the company 
of the other boy. “The longer he heard him speak, the longer he watched him, the 
more he became convinced that Leo belonged to a rarer, bolder, carefree world” 
(305)—a world of which he yearned to be a part.
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There are numerous echoes in this yearning: his father’s wish to befriend the 
treacherous Mr. Luter; his mother’s premarital affair with the goy organist of her 
village; her husband’s doubt that David is his son. Acutely charged with this fam-
ily history, becoming Leo’s friend is the ultimate act of digression. Indeed, once 
the imaginary kinship with the other boy takes shape as the shaky outpost for a 
new way of belonging, challenging his feeble position within the family is only 
a matter of time.22 Exploiting what is found as the organizing principle of em-
plotment thrives on a promise of (narrative) agency and self-empowerment to be 
gained from creative recontexutalization. The novel’s plotting operation follows 
a pattern in which things happen to David with unsettling force, to which he re-
sponds by emplotting them. The frequent interior monologues explicate his relent-
less attempts to make random things fit with the effect of dramatizing his prospect 
of emplacement as hinging on a ceaseless narrativizing process. Once he returns 
home frightened and breathless, telling his mother that he “saw a man who was in 
a box” (63). After a lengthy interrogation about darkness, death and dying, she tells 
him about her grandmother’s death, ending with this highly poetic image:
She died the winter of that same year, before the snow fell. […] She looked so frail in death, in her 
shroud—how shall I tell you my son? Like early winter snow: And I thought to myself even then, let 
me look deeply in her face for surely she will melt before my eyes. (68)
Comfortably immersed in the story, David drifts into a dreamy state in which 
the grandmother’s melting face blurs with his mother’s features dissolving in the 
grainy light of dawn in ways that remind him of the swirling confetti he once saw 
at a wedding. Plunging deeper into his reverie, it occurs to him that the happy 
couple at the center of his randomly found mental image left in a carriage just like 
the one in the funeral. “It was solved now. He saw it clearly. Everything belonged 
to the same dark. Confetti and coffins” (70).
The boy’s frantic search for meaning quietens when, in creatively connecting his 
found mental images with the concluding image of his mother’s story, narrativizing 
the disturbing event of the funeral reaches a tacit moment of closure. And hence, the 
young protagonist learns not only to read (or decode) but also to write (or encode) 
his environment. The narrative-structuring process thus performed (and modeled 
quite consciously after Joyce) “occurs simultaneously in the character and in the 
reader; as motifs accumulate, we together with David gradually invest them with 
symbolic and emotional attributes” (Adams 45). The fusion of the reader’s experi-
ence with that of the maturing child is grounded in a narrative situation in which 
a (more sophisticated) “narrating self” orders the impressions of a (less developed) 
22 The implicit “Americanization” of this itinerary of belonging has led Cappell to read Call It Sleep 
as an anti-Jewish novel.
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“experiencing self.”23 The result is a kind of storytelling that stages the endless pro-
cess of negotiation between experience and narration across the cognitive gap in-
herent to all narrative activity. Similarly to Edgar Huntly (and quite differently form 
Pointed Firs, in which the “experiencing self” is voiceless in comparison), Call It 
Sleep aligns its form-giving drive with the internal negotiation between these two 
narrating agents. In fact, it enhances the form-giving process with an air of urgen-
cy by routinely assessing it from the disorderly, immature side of experience with 
the effect of structurally implementing an explicit demand for narrative mediation. 
And this means that the subsequent passage through the plotted middle ground 
is inherently challenged by a narrative operation that simultaneously propels and 
disperses the creation of order. In fact, in a narrative world founded in the perpetual 
operation of finding and recontextualizing the very stuff that feeds the story, the 
narrative drive of making the world known and familiar, which preconditions any 
possibility to belong, is simultaneously embraced and deterred.
In terms of narrative agency (conceived in this study as the capacity to make 
choices about the telling of one’s story and impose them on the world) encoding 
the external world with meaning thus becomes especially crucial. However, encod-
ing is not merely a complementary process to the semiotic activity of decoding, the 
latter being grounded in actuality in the sense of departing from something that 
exists in the protagonist’s external world. Rather, encoding is an activity through 
which David’s “imagination reorganizes reality into its own […] pattern of sym-
bol and meaning,” and in doing so, it exerts “its own pull on reality” (Diamant 
346-47). Encoding is indeed absolutely indispensable to the protagonist’s task of 
fathoming—narrating—a world with a place for him, for it can mold a given reality 
according to its practitioner’s particular needs. But encoding becomes precarious 
if the imaginary reorganization of the world performed by it loses touch with the 
actuality of the world; if the invented patterns and narratives are hermetic, em-
ployed to ward off reality rather than engage with it. David’s final response to the 
funeral epitomizes this drift toward hermetic closure. “Confetti” is associated with 
marriage, “coffins” with death, both are linked by the carriage, and the threatening 
darkness is effectively blocked out. In fact, his entire operation of encoding the 
world has this tendency. If one reads the novel as a “semiotic Bildungsroman” in 
which cognitive activity progresses toward a more refined state, the rite of passage 
takes shape as a movement “from flight via hermetic [storytelling] toward a more 
balanced […] poetic activity, which will enable the protagonist to establish a pos-
itive reciprocity with his environment” (Diamant 355). And this also means: to 
assert a place for himself the boy must become a different storyteller.
The funeral passage is illuminating for yet another reason: It makes tangible 
how the “odds and ends” of other stories, absorbed into the narrative operations 
23 Again, the terms are drawn from Stanzel 59-91. For a superb discussion of this cognitive opera-
tion in Call It Sleep, see Diamant 338-40.
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of a maturing consciousness, assume a key role in advancing the rite of passage 
engrained into the narrative design of this novel.24 Two of David’s most powerful 
findings in this regard are fragments of salvation stories: the story of Isaiah who 
sees God surrounded by the brightest light, and is cleansed of his sin when the 
angels touch his lips with a holy piece of coal, an aborted version of which he hears 
at his cheder; and Leo’s cryptic account of “Christ, our Savior” (304) who died 
on a cross and possesses a holy light “way bigger […] den Jew light” (322). Both 
stories capture David’s imagination with their redemptive plots, and they do so 
with particular force since they are mystical and incomplete. Yet even more im-
portantly, they connect themselves to David’s desire for an own story. In offering 
models of emplotment that enhance his sense and widen his scope of agency, they 
can be effectively recycled to sooth or redeem his aching lack of belonging. It is 
thus no coincidence that David’s final act of self-assertion builds on these reli-
gious narratives to envision—in an idiosyncratic mix of borrowing from Judaic 
and Christian faith—a viable place in the world. From the first story David adopts 
the idea that he, like Isaiah, can be cleansed of his sins if he finds the equivalent 
to God’s “angel-coal” (231), a storyline most welcome to a boy tormented by the 
treacherous dangers of sinning. In fact, it lends itself extremely well to creative re-
contextualization; with almost no effort, David exploits it to indulge in the fantasy 
that the terrifying light produced from the rail has the same cleansing power as 
God’s magic coal. Another random finding supports this crude story. Right before 
the older boys force him to throw a sword onto the rail, he sits on the docks where 
he sees in the sun’s bright reflections on the surface of the river “God’s holy light” 
burning the water. Connected through the Isaiah story, these two events turn the 
urban wasteland by the river into a space of possible healing and transcendence.
If the practical use of the Judaic salvation myth is to help the boy imagine him-
self cleansed of what he believes to be his sins, thus promising to create a degree 
(and ground) zero for a new way of belonging, his creative recycling of the Christian 
salvation myth is more diffuse. It is indeed as cryptic as the bits and pieces gathered 
from Leo’s account of it. This is hardly a problem, however, for the practical use 
of this story is inseparable from David’s fascination with its teller. His friendship 
assures him that he can fully and fearlessly inhabit the grounds purged from sin to 
become part of a new and freer world; it also cannot be separated from his desire 
to possess the rosary that is the token of this possible future.25 Yoked together by 
24 The narrative drive of the boy’s consciousness anticipates a major theme in Richard Powers’s The 
Echo Maker discussed in the following chapter. Inspired by recent neuro-scientif ic research on 
the human brain, consciousness is once referred to—and throughout the novel explored as—a 
“storytelling machine” whose entire end is “self-continuation.”
25 Using religious salvation stories for therapeutic purposes is another manifestation of the psy-
choanalytical imagination consolidating at this time. Drawing on Kirschner’s The Religious and 
Romantic Origins of Psychoanalysis, Illouz argues that the basic structure of salvation narratives 
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the boy’s longing to escape the terrible reign of his father, these findings fuel the 
plotting operation like gasoline poured on fire. With a total of a hundred and twen-
ty-two pages, the fateful day following the visit at his new friend’s home covers more 
than a quarter of the book. Up to this point, the narrative loosely strings together 
events that are stretched out over more than two years. But now it shifts to closely 
following its protagonist through a day in which one odd and random coincidence 
chases another with ever-rising levels of anxiety, thrill, and exhaustion.
Toying with his new friend’s faith brings him closer to becoming a member of 
that other, freer tribe, but to realize this fancy, his existing kinship bonds must first 
be resolved. His mother’s story of her affair with the organist of her home village 
provides the “odds and ends” that David needs for this purpose. Again, it is a high-
ly fragmented story, secretly overheard by the boy when his mother tells it to her 
sister Bertha, a character who, “like the sweat that pours from her body,” brings 
all the silenced trouble “to the surface” (Wisse 66), and whose function in the evo-
lution of the narrative is precisely that. In abiding by a now-familiar pattern, the 
story exchanged between the two sisters is odd and inconclusive to the eavesdrop-
ping child. Genya tells much of it in Polish, the old country’s tongue that David 
never learned, and only accidently slips into her habitual Yiddish, giving away just 
enough to piece together the main thrust of the story while leaving precious gaps 
for her son’s creative adaptation.
What had happened? She liked somebody. Who? Lud—Ludwig, she said. A goy. An organeest. Father 
didn’t like him, her father. And his, too, maybe. Didn’t want him to know! Gee! He knew more than his 
father. So she married a Jew. What did she say before? What did she say before? Benkart, yes, benkart 
in belly, her father said. What did it mean? He almost knew. (205)
And then he knows: His mother could have been pregnant from this other man—
which means that he could be this man’s son, not his father’s. Transposed (at least 
in his hungry imagination) from possibility to actuality, this fractured storyline 
becomes the trajectory of the disaster tale that he tells the rabbi during the long 
final day. Born from the horrifying consequences of getting caught, David’s pan-
ic-driven act of narrative self-assertion not only gives him a Christian father, it also 
denies his parents altogether. His mother is dead, he wails tearfully, the woman 
raising him is really his aunt. The basic plot of this tale bears striking similarity to 
Freud’s “family romance,” according to which part of gaining a mature psyche is 
to create, often around David’s age, an account of oneself with parents other than 
recurs in the story of the developmental-psychological self: Both are linear, closure-driven, 
eschatological, geared towards the future (away from a present that is incomplete and full of 
faults); Freud’s ideas could only become so influential because their ways of self-narration were 
highly compatible with the salvation myth deeply engrained in Western cultures through protes-
tant conceptions of the self and romantic adoptions of biblical narratives (Saving 71-80).
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one’s actual ones.26 Again, this incidence can be read as a token of the “psycho-
analytical imagination” taking hold at the time of the novel’s production, fusing 
the expectation of permanent self-analysis with self-help culture that became the 
most powerful resource of the popular reception of psychoanalysis in America 
(Illouz, Saving 79-84, 253-65). David’s self-invention is inflected with the fantasy at 
the very core of the American self-help myth: You can proactively turn—narrate—
yourself into the person you long to be, the person better equipped to belong. 27
David’s frantic act of self-narration stands out in force and consequence be-
cause it is one of the rare moments in which his narrativizing efforts are not con-
fined to his psyche but acted out and imposed on the world—when narrative ac-
tivity (a basic mode of engagement with the world) becomes narrative agency (the 
capacity of making choices about the telling of one’s story and impose them on the 
world). In terms of content, however, this narrative act is yet another incident of 
hermetic storytelling, performed by a terrified boy to hold the world at bay. It is 
indeed consequential because once uttered, there is no easy way of integrating his 
speech act into the world from which it was meant to create a safe distance. But the 
catastrophic failure of David’s madly fabricated story has a productive side as well. 
It challenges the hermeticism of the boy’s habitual mode of storytelling by expos-
ing it to the world; in doing so, it creates a practical need for the boy to narrativize 
his life in ways that engage with his surroundings rather than withdrawing from 
them into the sheltered sphere of his imagination. If and to what extent the new 
need that is triggered by David’s frantic confession is redeemable depends on the 
outcome of the densely plotted final day, and the stakes are rising in a avalanching 
chain of events: The rabbi calls on David’s parents, and when he gives away Genya’s 
secret recounting David’s story, Albert voices his darkest suspicions: that his wife 
married him and then sent him ahead on a ticket purchased by her impoverished 
family to cover up her illegitimate pregnancy; and that she did so knowing about 
the parricide that left him with no other choice but to leave his home. While the 
parents still fight over this long-suppressed matter, Bertha and her husband arrive. 
They immediately realize the hazard into which the occasion of their visit—break-
ing the news about David plotting sex games involving their daughter—would put 
the boy, but get caught under the spell of Albert’s terrible will. Soon enough the 
26 See Freud, “Family Romance.” For discussions of its exploitation in Call It Sleep, see Altenbernd 
679: Sollors, “A World” 152-54.
27 Freud himself paved the way for this development. Departing from his earlier conviction that 
therapeutic work can ease but not heal a patient’s psychic troubles, he ended his f ifth and f inal 
Clark Lecture on a decidedly more optimistic, “Americanized” note: “Der energische und erfolg-
reiche Mensch ist der, der durch Arbeit seine Wunschphantasien in Realität umzusetzen vermag” 
(quoted in Illouz 84). Henceforth, the psychoanalytical search for the lost or buried self became 
reconcilable with the strife for self-realization that is quintessential to modern yearnings to be-
long—and, as Roth’s novel shows, applicable with staggering universality.
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tension becomes unbearable and David speaks up for himself, is attacked by his 
father, and flees the apartment.
Coinciding with this fateful chain reaction is a structural, or rather contractu-
al dimension of the impact that David’s transgressive narrative act has on the sto-
rytelling operation. In the immediate aftermath of the showdown in the Schearls’ 
kitchen, focalization through his consciousness (the exclusive mediator of the nov-
el’s main narrative until now) is suspended for several short intervals—one focal-
ized through the rabbi, another with the zero focalization of an auctorial narrator, 
and yet another with shifting focalizers and a pluralized narrative voice—with the 
effect of changing the terms of narrative transfer. The first two of these passages 
are strictly excursive; rather than furthering the narrative they neutralize focal-
ization and arrest a narrative agency gone wild. After pages of interior discourse 
turning in circles, focalization through the boy winds down as his narrative capac-
ity reaches degree zero:
The small sputter of words in his brain seemed no longer his own, no longer cramped by skull, but de-
tached from him, the core of his surroundings. And he heard them again as though all space had com-
pelled and were shattered in the framing, and they boomed in his ears, vast, delayed and alien. (409)
In this state of exhaustion, language exceeds him, but it also plants a thought in 
him: “Now I gotta make it come out” (409)—“it” being the redemptive light he 
wants to draw from the rail. The italic type in which the thought is set anticipates 
the typographical form in which David’s exhausted consciousness continues to ar-
ticulate itself while another part of the narrative ventures into the urban space sur-
rounding him. Hence, as his hollow mind becomes occupied with a singular call to 
action, the dominant mode of telling the story is interrupted for a third and final 
time: In an unmistakable homage to the “Nighttown” chapters of Ulysses, it is bro-
ken up and pluralized. Pushing beyond the boy’s consciousness that keeps driving 
the plot through the typographically separated sections, narration dissociates it-
self from the plotting operation, and meanders into the environment. In this ex-
pansive move, it gathers the random activities and vernacular-bent conversations 
of the multiethnic mix of urban dwellers peopling it: a rheumatic old watchman 
who talks to himself, a loud group of sailors, dock workers, promiscuous women in 
a nearby beer salon, the Irish motorman of the approaching streetcar ringing his 
bell, a leisurely Armenian peddler, a fainting woman, a policeman, a doctor. Here 
is a taste of how this works (411-12):
Over momentary, purple blossoms, down the soft incline, the far train slid like a trickle of gold. Behind 
and before, sparse auto headlights, belated or heralding dew on the bough of the night. “And George 
a’gappin’ and me a’hollerin’ and a’teching the ground with the toe of my boot and no wheels under 
me. Ha! Ha! Hmm! Wut cain’t a man dream in his sleep . . . A wheel . . . A bike . . .” He turned away 
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seeking the clock. “And I ain’t been on one . . . not sence . . . more’n thirty-five . . . forty years. Not 
since I uz a little shaver”
 Clammy fingers traced the sharp edge of
 the dipper’s scoop. Before his eyes
 the glitter on the car tracks whisked . . .
 reversed . . . whisked . . .
“Say, listen O’Toole dere’s a couple o’ cozier in de back.” The bar-keep pointed with the beer knife. “Jist 
yer speed!”
“Balls”  Terse  O’Toole  retorted.  “Wudjah  think  I jist took de Bull-durham sack off me pecker fer—nut-
tin’? I twisted all de pipes I wanna w’en I’m pissin!”
“No splinters in dese boxes, dough. Honst, O’Toole! Real clean—“
“Let ‘im finish, will ye!” the hunchback interrupted sourly. “O’Toole don’ have to buy his gash.”
“Well, he says, yea. An’ all de time dere wuz Steve an’ Kekky unner de goiders belly-achin’—Hey trow 
us a rivert. An’ I sez—“
 —Nobody’s commin’!
Klang! Klang! Klang! Klang! Klang!
The fat bunion foot of Dan McIntyre the motorman pounded the bell.
This is more “found stuff” for the plotting operation for sure, but no real sense of 
community emerges from the polyvocal narration employed here. The “odds and 
ends” assembled in this experiment remain too disjointed for that; in fact, they 
converge only in the boy’s yearning for a new way of belonging that drives nar-
ration toward and beyond the point of him losing consciousness when struck by 
the power drawn from the rail. The erratic passages articulating his hallucinating 
mind throughout this chapter (they are set in cursive, justified only on the left 
margin, and at times bracketed) are inserted into the text as a “boxed-in space or 
series of spaces” (McHale 98). Reminiscent of cinematic montage, these “textual 
enclosures” connect by way of separation, and just as in experimental cinema, this 
has the effect of foregrounding procedural matters. In loops of verbal and syntac-
tical repetitions, language itself becomes tangible in both its referential and ma-
terial dimension. But modernist experimentation with language and narrative is 
not boundless in this passage. Rather, the montage-like procedure advanced here 
allows Roth to exploit a transgressive aesthetics while keeping it safely confined to 
the boy’s troubled mind. In doing so, Roth (like his fellow modernists Dos Passos 
and Lowry) “contains the Joycean poetics of reality pluralism by subjectivizing it” 
(McHale 98).28 By the same token, however, the expansive narrative agency probed 
28 I am following McHale’s insightful reading here. He further elaborates this well-taken point as 
follows: “‘Containment’ here is not even a metaphor, but applies literally to the special typo-
graphical conventions of this episode, whereby David’s hallucinations appear in italic type, inset 
from the rest of the text, justif ied to the left margin but not on the right, and even (for part 
of the episode, IV.xii.424-431) enclosed between parenthesis. The effect is to produce a kind 
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here in its capacity to generate a new way of belonging is not pluralized in actuali-
ty; the plurality of voices is the fantasy of a hallucinating mind, not the blueprint of 
a polyvocal mode of dwelling in and through language and narrative.
There is a political or even an ethical side to not endorsing fully a transgressive 
modernist aesthetics as the way to a better, truer state of belonging—a reluctance 
to retreat from the boy’s developing sense of self, from his individual and partic-
ular need for change.29 These narrative agents are decidedly not to be given up. 
Transformation is on its way, but it is not invoked by language spilling beyond the 
confines of the boy’s emerging subjectivity with materializing effects. Rather, it 
takes shape in his exhausted consciousness while it becomes the locus of blending 
the urban environment projected into it with recurring images of light and dark, 
physical and metaphysical power, hammer, coal, the cellar, the Statue of Liberty, 
etc. And as narration expands, the boy’s hermetic storytelling gives way to a nar-
rative agency that engages with his environment in new and unprecedented ways. 
The novel’s ending, reached ten pages later testifies to this transformation. Repeat-
ed like a mantra, the title-giving sentence opening the final paragraph—“He might 
as well call it sleep.” (441)—is the emblem of David’s newly found(ed) narrative 
capacities.
In the meantime, focalization through the boy has been resumed; he has been 
taken home, where the dreadful family constellation shows tacit cracks as the fa-
ther shrinks under the actual possibility of his son’s death, which David registers 
with silent but jubilant satisfaction. His first attempt at telling his life anew takes 
place in the family home, and this puts it to the hardest test right away. Responding 
to his mother’s caring question “Sleepy, beloved?” (441), he refrains from imposing 
premature meaning on his exhausted state. “It was only toward sleep that every 
of textual enclosure, a boxed-in space or series of spaces within which […] the Circe principle 
is allowed free reign. But the walls of this textual enclosure are never breached. Nor, for that 
matter, are the ontological boundaries between the level of discursive f igures and the level of 
the world, between the real world and the world of mystic archetypes. Nothing equivalent to the 
materialization, in ‘Circe,’ of the nymph Calypso […] occurs in Call It Sleep, and the messenger 
angels on Roth’s messianic subtext remain discursive angels only […] Finally, there is here none 
of the ‘ripple effect ’ of Joyce’s ‘Circe.’ No trace of the Circe principle, even in Roth’s attenuated 
and subjectivized version of it, is allowed to spread beyond the confines of Chapter IV (xxi) to any 
other chapter of the book” (97-98).
29 Ever since the novel’s publication there have been heated debates about its political stakes, rang-
ing from disappointed complaints about retreating into the sex phobias of the boy protagonist 
to insisting that the novel is focalized through the consciousness of a maturing political activist. 
For early reviews, see fn4 of this chapter. For two recent discussions of the novel as a political 
failure, see Lesser, “Revolutionary Energy,” and Kerman, “Limits of Typicality.” For an opposite 
discussion of this matter, including the transformative, community-building power of David’s 
near self-electrocution, see Todorova.
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wink of his eyelids could strike a spark into the cloudy tinder of the dark, kindle 
out of shadowy corners of the bathroom such myriad and such vivid jets of images” 
(441), he contemplates, pausing to let these images—all gathered during the novel’s 
final day—take shape in his memory:
the glint on tilted beads, of the uneven shine of roller skates, of the dry light on green stone stoops, 
of the tapering glitter of rails, of the oils sheen on the night-smooth rivers, of the glow on thin blond 
hair, red faces, of the glow on outstretched, open palms of legions upon legions of hands hurtling 
towards him. (441)
Then the accident catches up with him, entering his psychosomatic narration in a 
stream of acoustic and visual sense data from the external world:
He might as well call it sleep. It was only towards sleep that ears had the power to cull again and 
reassemble the shrill cry, the hoarse voice, the scream of fear, the bells, the thick-breathing, the roar 
of crowds and all sounds that lay fermenting in the vats of silence and the past. It was only toward 
sleep one knew himself still lying on the cobbles, felt the cobble under him and over him and scudding 
ever toward him like a black foam, the perpetual blur of shod and running feet, the broken shoes, new 
shoes, stubby, pointed caked, polished, buniony, pavement-beveled, lumpish, under skirts, under 
trousers, shoes, over one and through one and feel them all and feel, not pain, not terror, but strang-
est triumph, strangest acquiescence. One might as well call it sleep. He shut his eyes. (441)
Only after an extensive process of feeling out his experience he tacitly distances 
himself from it. His final assurance of having prevailed, of having defied both fear 
and pain, may indicate a revised mode of self-narrative, a dawning possibility to 
change his place in the family and in the world revolving around it. But what does 
it mean that he feels “strangest triumph, strangest acquiescence”? That it is uncer-
tain how these feelings will affect his world once he opens his eyes again? Toying 
with a new mode of giving voice and form to his need to belong may suggest that 
the young protagonist has, if not mastered, at least subsided in the rite of passage 
imposed on him; that there is hope to improve his displaced state in the life ahead 
of him. He may even be (as some have argued) on his way to becoming the poet 
who will eventually turn his experience into art. But could the strangeness of his 
feelings not also mean that drifting into this sleep-like state is a drift toward death? 
And if yes, what would this death “mean” within the narrative design of this tale? 
The futility of a herculean effort? The redemptive self-sacrifice of a New World 
messiah? That language persists where the need for a place in the world comes to 
an end? Where, in other words, does this suggestive, provisional ending leave us in 
terms of the boy’s prospect of dwelling in the world?
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yearNiNgs for aUtoNomy aNd tHe acHiNg Limits of beLoNgiNg
If the novel’s ending leaves us with an impenetrable uncertainty about the boy’s 
future (and this is something that generations of scholars have failed to acknowl-
edge when projecting their preferred “meaning” on David’s journey), the search for 
meaning-as-form staged and engaged by the novel takes us back to the erratically 
plotted middle ground. And here it is difficult not to be struck, time and again, by 
the vast effort imposed on the boy by his need to belong. He may mature in ways 
that refine his remarkable talent for creative emplotment and equip him with the 
tools and techniques that it takes to narrate himself into a more comfortable state 
of belonging. But the Freudian subtext of the rite of passage plotted here turns 
matters of alleviating the boy’s displaced state into a thoroughly individual(ized) 
responsibility. It is in this pivotal sense that Call It Sleep fathoms the immigrant’s 
struggle—in a sad mix of exaltation and unease—as a strictly private affair.
In fact, the Oedipal script undergirding the novel’s spatial order and rite of 
passage turns individual autonomy into the sine qua non of belonging. In doing 
so, Call It Sleep toys with a notion of belonging that is aligned with psychoana-
lytic redefinitions of autonomy as the freedom to decide for oneself what to do 
with one’s life.30 Prior to this shift, having a comfortable place in the world hinged 
on an autonomy of a different kind: the liberal investment in property—one’s be-
longings—that we saw at work and contested in Edgar Huntly and Pointed Firs. 
Psychoanalysis maintains these conditional ties between belonging and autonomy, 
but in reframing the latter as an internal relation to the self, belonging now comes 
to rest on a highly mobilized, immaterial property in demand of constant read-
justment. Exploring the stakes of this altered conjunction between belonging and 
autonomy is key to Call It Sleep’s narrative politics. The strategic weakness and 
vulnerability of the boy protagonist—and the immigrant population for which he 
synecdochically stands—maximizes the weight of his task to reach an autonomous 
state that may, in turn, redeem his painful lack of belonging. In telling us about 
the boy’s struggle in terms of a world emerging from displacement, we are asked 
to closely participate in his erratic, fearful, and exhausting attempts of dwelling in 
the world. And if ambiguity is yet another technique of reconciliation—of artfully 
rendering uncertain what remains unsayable—underneath the ambiguous state 
30 See Zaretsky 22-24, 235-38. Inherent to the philosophical and religious traditions of all civiliza-
tions, the project of individual autonomy was f irst secularized and universalized in Enlighten-
ment thought. The Second Industrial Revolution, which provides the historical context for this 
novel, extended its meaning to (“extra-moral”) realms such as creativity, love, and fortune; to 
explain why this new autonomy was so hard to attain, psychoanalysts invented concepts such as 
ambivalence, resistance, and sublimation. Previous notions of autonomy were “moral” in endors-
ing nineteenth-century understandings of property along with the liberal consensus that human 
beings could postpone individual interest for the sake of the common good.
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of quiescence reached at the end, autonomous selfhood aches as a contemporary 
limit of belonging.
Yet again, things are not quite as simple. Throughout the novel autonomy as an 
endlessly malleable self-relation imposed with the freedom to dwell as one pleases 
is confronted with two other modes of autonomy: autonomy as the communal 
product of folk authenticity, which comes in tow with a promise of dwelling in the 
nourishing grounds of a shared ethnic culture; and autonomy as the property of an 
avant-garde aesthetics, which comes in tow with a promise of dwelling in grounds 
revitalized by modernist art. None of the three modes of autonomy is endorsed as 
a remedy for the deeply and multiply troubled state of belonging explored in this 
novel. The boy’s effort is too staggering, ethnic culture is not a safe haven, aesthetic 
transcendence is warded in; in fact, none of the three modes is allowed to reign 
over the others at any given point. Rather, they create a force field of idle prospects 
and misguided hopes, wild dreams and sobering truths. Maybe we can say, then, 
that in the—modern, immigrant’s—world of this novel, maturing in matters of be-
longing means shunning ideological alignment of any kind to dwell provisionally 
amidst conflicts, restraints, and imperfections.
5 Of Cranes and Brains
 Richard Powers’s The Echo Maker
With The Echo Maker (2006) these explorations of the novel’s investment in giving 
narrative voice and form to concerns with belonging reach our late-modern pres-
ent, depicted by Richard Powers in an intricate double perspective: as an encom-
passing ecosystem in which human troubles shrink in geological scale, and as a 
tenuous product of a specific narrative economy—that of the human brain. There 
is a striking congruence to these themes that begs to be read as counteracting the 
“hyper-liquefying” tendencies of late modernity. Speaking from a world in which 
daily routines and social relations have become intangible, short-lived and unpre-
dictable to an unprecedented degree, the novel insists on the stoic materiality of 
that world and pairs it with a narrative activity that is located not in the lofty realm 
of the psyche but in the materiality of the brain. And if the brain’s narrative capac-
ity is firmly grounded in the materialist worldview of cognitive science, the novel 
renders it, quite naturalistically, as a product of evolutionary contingency.
Powers is known as a “content-intense” and “brainy” writer. He thinks of the 
novel as “a supreme connection machine—the most complex artifact of network-
ing that we have developed” (Williams 104), and of connectivity as the baseline 
of late-modern problems with belonging.1 His fiction seeks to enhance the novel’s 
1 His novels, says Powers with vast implications for their investment in matters of belonging, 
“work by saying you cannot understand a person minimally, you cannot understand a person sim-
ply as a function of his inability to get along with his wife, you cannot even understand a person 
through his supposedly causal psychological profile. You can’t understand a person completely in 
any sense, unless that sense takes into consideration all of the contexts that that person inhabits. 
And a person at the end of the second millennium inhabits more contexts than any specialized 
discipline can easily name. We are shaped by runaway technology, by the apotheosis of business 
and markets, by sciences that occasionally seem on the verge of completing themselves or col-
lapsing under its own runaway success. This is the world we live in. If you think of the novel as a 
supreme connection machine—the most complex artifact of networking that we’ve ever devel-
oped—then you have to ask how a novelist would dare leave out 95% of the picture” (Williams 
104). Only recently, Powers has become an avid commentator of his own work. The many inter-
views published in the “second” phase of his productivity (since The Time of Our Singing in 2003) 
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connecting powers by blending novel-typical plotlines (of family trouble, ailing 
love, betrayed friendship, torturous disease) with scientific and other nonliter-
ary discourses. Three Farmers on Their Way to a Dance engages with photogra-
phy,  Prisoner’s Dilemma with mathematics, Gold Bug Variations with genetics, 
 Operation Wandering Soul with medicine, The Time of Our Singing with quantum 
physics, and so on. In each case, Powers exploits “the elasticity of the novel to shift 
from strict dramatization to become essayistic, embedding the reader in a flood of 
data that extends beyond the boundary of the merely literary” (Burns xxviii), and 
that is not ornamental but essential to the act of giving narrative form. In The Echo 
Maker, the discursive matrix exploited with the aim of knitting a pervasive net of 
connections is neuroscience—specifically its recent efforts to reframe the cognitive 
operations of the human brain in terms of ontological narrative. In the words of 
Gerald Weber, the novel’s eloquent expert in neuroscientific matters: “Conscious-
ness works by telling a story, one that is whole, continuous and stable. When that 
story breaks, consciousness rewrites it. Each revised draft claims to be the original. 
And so, when disease or accident interrupts, we are often the last to know” (185).2
The Echo Maker both explicates and exploits the narrative drive of conscious-
ness as “a networked ecology that mirrors the networked ecology of all life” (Harris 
232).3 Its narrative world arises from three intersecting and at times colliding acts 
of self-narration: those of the siblings Mark and Karin Schluter, and that of the star 
neurologist Gerald Weber. All three of these narrative acts are trapped in personal 
needs and self-delusions, struggling with the expectations, fears, hopes, and desires 
of the protagonists themselves and of those who happen to be in their lives. Draw-
ing on the notion of identity as narratively produced and continuously revised over 
the course of a life, the novel allegorizes the process in which not one but three 
protagonists intermittently pursue their individual needs to belong in narrative 
make up a powerful body of paratexts. I am engaging with them with mixed feelings. Powers has 
a gift of speaking about his work with insight that is of great resonance to our critical debates. 
But the frequency with which he is quoted in scholarly articles amounts to being imposing. In 
fact, while his commentary seems too relevant to be left out, it is dif f icult to escape the sense 
that the author is trying to control his reader and the discourse about his work. For a careful and 
dif ferentiated take on the issue, see Ickstadt, “Asynchronous.”
2 Quotations from The Echo Maker are cited parenthetically and refer to the William Heinemann 
Paperback Edition, London 2006. Weber, the characters through whom most neurological com-
mentary is articulated, is modeled after a range of experts including the neurologist Oliver Sacks, 
the cognitive philosopher Daniel Dennett, and the Neural Darwinist Gerald Edelman. See Harris 
230-32; Tabbi 225.
3 Some of Powers’s earlier novels also deal with cognitive matters but without turning the theme 
into a major form-giving device. See for example The Gold Bug Variations, Operation Wondering 
Soul, and Gallatea 2.2.
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acts that bounce off and seep into each other as “echo making.”4 And if making 
an echo presupposes a material entity from which sound waves can bounce off, the 
materiality of the human brain rendered as a “storytelling machine” provides this 
substance. Arguing against The Echo Maker’s frequent association with the genre 
of “psychological realism,” Charles Harris makes the following important point:
Whereas traditional psychological realism records the effect on the “inner self ” of external forces 
or deep-seated neuroses, neurological realism foregrounds the effects of largely unconscious neu-
rological activities. Whereas psychological realism affirms, indeed, requires, the concept of a solid, 
continuous “inner” self, Powers, drawing on contemporary neuroscience, challenges that concept at 
every turn, variously describing the self as “hundreds of separate subsystems” (171), “dozens of lost 
Scouts waving crappy f lashlights in the woods at night” (415), “like coral reefs, […] complex but 
fragile ecosystems” (186), a “division” (436), a “community” (383), a “committee of millions” (437). 
Whereas traditional psychological realism continues the longstanding reif ication of dualisms—in-
ner and outer, mind and body, reason and emotion, self and other—Powers […] dismantles such 
dualisms on neuroscientif ical grounds. And whereas traditional novels of psychological realism view 
infringements of the boundaries between self and the world as threatening, Powers’sss novel of neu-
roscientif ical realism exposes ego-boundaries as false demarcations, another illusion generated by 
the brains “spin-doctor subsystem” (444). (243-44)5
The thrust of The Echo Maker’s new brand of realism lies in its extraliterary foun-
dations. In psycho-realism, psychological assumptions serve as the premises of 
narrative motives and mental states, and usually these assumptions are grounded 
in a notion of the psyche that (especially in the Freudian “geological” subdivision 
of the psyche into ego, super-ego, and id) harbors a personal “truth,” buried as it 
may be by repression. The Echo Maker, however, is subtended by “neuroscience, not 
psychology,” which means that the mental states of its characters enact the “in-
ner workings of the human brain” (243; my emphasis). This also means that the 
4 See for example Ricoeur, “Narrative Identity;” Ezzy; Somers; Kraus; Keupp et al.; Kerby. Prag-
matist models of identity formation (like Charles Herbert Mead’s conception of the self, me and 
I) can be seen as forerunners of this concept. Yet, it was not until the concern with language 
unleashed by post-structuralism turned to narration as a highly significant form of language use 
that “narrative identity” began to be recognized as a scholarly concept. Today, its impact can be 
traced across many disciplines, ranging from sociology, psychology, philosophy, semiotics, and 
historiography to literary studies.
5 Harris situates this argument within the larger context of the evolution of the psychological nov-
el: “The Echo Maker is character-driven and adapts the Jamesian central intelligence for its point 
of view. […] Just as James, in inventing psychological realism, elevates to another level of the 
psychological novel, which had been around at least since Richardson, so does Powers, drawing 
on recent neurological research, nudge psychological realism into a dif ferent category. The re-
sult, I would argue, is the f irst fully realized novel of neurological realism” (243).
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neuro-realism charted here does not rest on an ontological notion of a non-narra-
tive “real” (be it situated in raw perceptions or unconscious desires) but in a neu-
rologically authorized notion of ontological narrative that makes all forms of the 
“real” available to our consciousness by means of some form of emplotment. The in-
ner workings of the human brain are fictional reenactments rather than reflections, 
for the novel’s neuro-realism—despite its artfully crafted claims to transparency, 
achieved through what one may call, with Roland Barthes, its neurological “reality 
effects” (“L’Effet de Réel”)—creates artificial textures and surfaces just as any other 
form of fictionalizing. It does not mirror its object of depiction but strategically 
stages and transforms it for specific purposes. 
For classical American realism, these ends have been compellingly described 
as exploiting the depragmatized realm of narrative art to stage a conversation be-
tween text and reader; the ultimate function of its investment in intersubjective 
dialogue is to negotiate—and thus restore beyond the limits of the text—a com-
munity’s values and beliefs as it faces a reality ruptured by the corrosive forces of 
modernization (Ickstadt, “Concepts of Society;” Fluck, Inszenierte Wirklichkeit; 
“Fiction and Fictionality”). In recent “returns” of realism, conversations between 
characters and between the text and the reader may have become epistemological-
ly hollow or obsessed with semantic surfaces, but in Powers’s novels, the commit-
ment to this conversation—perceived as the social obligation of the novelist—per-
sists. “Powers, whose books resonate with Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics, wants 
his fictions to be socially useful, he wants them to transform the awareness of the 
reader, and for that he has to rely on the reader’s ability to read right,” writes Heinz 
Ickstadt, quoting the author himself with the following weighty remark: “The only 
thing that is going to save us is better reading. Reading that knows when narra-
tive is leading us away from the brink and when narrative is leading us headlong 
toward it. The future of the world depends upon our skill as readers” (“Asynchro-
nous” 5). Powers’s work as a novelist, a commentator of his own work and a teach-
er of creative writing and literature is committed to developing this skill with “a 
sense of urgency that has its origin in the discrepancy between the present state of 
scientific knowledge and the general state of social and ecological unawareness on 
which the global reign of corporate capitalism thrives” (Ickstadt, “Asynchronous” 
3)—and that might threaten what Powers himself has called the novel’s function 
as sanctuary from which “we reenter, more fully equipped, the world of reality” 
(quoted in Ickstadt, “Surviving”).
Giving voice and form to contemporary concerns with belonging is closely, if 
not problematically, bound up with didactic “messaging” in The Echo Maker. The 
stakes of the conversation to be fostered among characters, and between text and 
reader, could hardly be higher: The novel exploits the recent approximation of cog-
nitive science and narrative art not only to reframe the educational program of 
classical, psychological realism in neurological terms but also, and perhaps even 
more importantly, to propose a model of reality that is based on its participants’ 
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capacity to tell and listen. New insights in the cognitive operations of the human 
brain, described by Powers elsewhere as “the distributed, modular, massively pre-
conscious, multiply recursive, narrative-dependent model of the bundled ‘I’” (Burn 
175; my emphasis), provide the extraliterary foundations for this narrative exper-
iment. Expanding both the form and the scope of the novel in close dialogue with 
neurological discourse (and in ways structurally similar to and yet very different 
from the Freudian notion of “narrative therapy” that was part and parcel of the 
artistic enterprise of Call It Sleep), The Echo Maker posits and actively propagates 
a scientifically authorized notion of ontological narrative as the only viable means 
by which belonging can be pursued.
Making one’s way across the plotted grounds unfolding from the intersecting 
narratives of the novel’s multiple narrating agents is to familiarize oneselves with 
the neurological assumptions engrained into this world. And if Powers’s novels 
can justly be described as pursuing “narrative therapy”—not only in the sense of 
“therapy through narrative, but also as therapy for narrative; […] an exploration of 
the possibilities of narrative, a recuperation of this currently much-maligned way 
of ordering the world” (Hurt 24)—The Echo Maker epitomizes this project while 
also exposing its limits.
coNNec tiNg midwest aNd mediaL cortex 6
The Echo Maker takes us to the Midwest, a literary region that ever since The Great 
Gastby has been resonating with self-deluded longings for a world still in order. 
More concretely, it takes us to Kearney, Nebraska, a town on the outskirts of the 
Great American Desert. The place is home: to Mark and Karin Schluter, the sib-
lings at the center of the novel, and to countless numbers of cranes that come to 
the shallow banks of the nearby Platte River for a few months every year to mate 
and breed. And as unremarkable a place as Kearney may be, the cranes’ migratory 
routine enchants it once a year with a ritual of archaic beauty. Choosing the excep-
tional over the ordinary state of this place, the novel begins with the spectacle of 
the returning cranes, “the oldest flying thing on earth, one stutter-step away from 
pterodactyls” (3).
Cranes keep landing as night falls. Ribbons of them roll down, slack against the sky. They f loat in from 
all compass points, in kettles of a dozen, dropping with the dusk. Scores of Grus Canadensis settle 
on the thawing river. They gather on the island f lats, grazing, beating their wings, trumpeting: the 
advance wave of a mass evacuation. More birds land by the minute, the air red with calls. (3)
6 The heading is inspired by a question asked to Powers by Michod in his interview for The Believer : 
“Can you talk about the role ‘place’—be it the Midwest or the medial cortex—plays in your work, 
particularly in this book?” (n. pag.)
Belonging and Narrative140
The homecoming scene is described with the awe of an enthralled spectator mar-
veling at the secret script choreographing the eerily synchronized arrival of thou-
sands and thousands of birds “tall as children, crowding together wing by wing on 
this stretch of river, one that they’ve learned to find by memory” (3). Year after year, 
the birds find this place through their mysterious capacities to remember and to 
recognize the route that takes them here at a secretly scheduled time. The time of 
the birds is mystic and ancient to the degree that it seems timeless. They “converge 
on the river at winter’s end as they have for eons” (3). “This year’s flight has always 
been” (4). But then, it is suddenly interrupted. “A squeal of brakes, the crunch of 
metal on asphalt, one broken scream and then another arouse the flock. The truck 
arcs through the air, corkscrewing into the field” (4). An accident must have hap-
pened, but after a short interlude of unrest, the cranes settle back into their well-
worn routine as if nothing happened.
In another world, the disruptive force of the event rapidly spreads as Karin, 
torn from her sleep by a phone call and driving back to Kearney, finds out that 
her brother will survive the car crash but live on under the shadow of a rare brain 
injury known as the Capgras syndrome, which causes severe states of estrange-
ment by interfering with what has just been introduced as the birds’ mysterious 
mastery: making the right connections between recognition and memory. And 
so we arrive in Kearney twice within just a few hours, yet in vastly different life-
worlds. Both worlds belong to the same ecosystem but are separated by their dif-
ferent temporalities. One adheres to the age-old rhythm of migratory routines and 
the glacial pace of evolutionary changes with maps dating back to the Jurassic 
age; the other is sleepless, clock-timed, organized by networks of transport and 
communication, and sustained by modern medicine.7 What connects the two in a 
violent flash is Mark’s car shooting off the highway. Yet while the accident has dra-
matic repercussions in the human life-world, it is quickly bypassed in the world of 
the cranes. Formal differences dramatize this spatial antagonism. The time-space 
of the cranes is narrated in a meditative tone pregnant with an appreciation that 
seems to stem from the humble depths of knowledge. The present tense employed 
here underscores the archaic timelessness of the birds’ migration routine, creating 
an aura of unmediated presence that sets the world of the cranes apart from the 
human world, which is narrated retrospectively in the past tense. Similar passages 
are placed at the beginning of each of the novel’s five parts. Yet even though their 
rare occurrence and consecutive opening function disrupts the flow of the narra-
tive, connections between the two time-spaces—through the missing parent crane 
that may have been killed by Mark’s crashing car, through shared themes such 
7 Powers’s concern with ecological matters is the main topic of the interview that Scott  Hermanson 
conducted with him and Tom LeClair. Ecocritical scholarship on Powers’s work is nonetheless 
strikingly rare. An exception is Heise, whose essay predates The Echo Maker and discusses 
 Powers’s Gain and De Lillo’s White Noise in dialogue with contemporary risk theory.
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as orientation, place-making, or child-rearing—are unmistakable. But, while the 
“crane passages” are clearly construed to articulate an ecological conscience that 
exceeds human needs to belong, they are not focalized through the cranes. Instead 
of trying to familiarize us with these mysterious creatures by offering an imagined 
version of their perceptive world, they render the cranes as radically other. We are 
told about them in zero-focalized voice whose well-informed speculations draw 
from scientific sources, superstition, and myth with the effect of enhancing the 
mysteriousness of its object. “Something in their eyes must match symbols. But 
how it’s done, no person knows and no bird can say” (277).
Within the narrative design of the novel, the crane passages are sanctuaries 
into which narration recurrently retreats from the dominant clock-timed, alarmed 
mode of storytelling. In fact, these insular passages, positioned in effective scar-
city and uncovering utterly unfamiliar grounds, construe the time-space of the 
cranes as the ultimate “spatial other” to the sprawling time-space inhabited by 
the human characters of the novel. And if the by far larger share of the narrative 
presents us with (and confines us to) alternating worlds of individual, self-centered 
concerns, repeatedly reminding us that this time-space is indeed quintessentially 
molded from these concerns, the crane sections present us with the magical world 
of “feathered dinosaurs […] , a last great reminder of life before the self ” (277; my 
emphasis)—to project a distant future of life after the self.
What does a bird remember? Nothing that anything else might say. Its body is a map of where it has 
been, in this life and before. […] Something in its brain learns this river, a world sixty million years 
older than speech, older even than this f lat water. This world will carry when the river is gone. When 
the surface of the earth is parched and spoiled, when life is pressed down to near-nothing, this world 
will start its slow return. Extinction is short; migration is long. […] Nothing will miss us. Hawks’ off-
springs will circle above the overgrown fields. Skimmers and plovers and sandpipers will nest in the 
thousand girded islands of Manhattan. Cranes or something like them will trace rivers again. When 
all else goes, birds will f ind water. (443)
In envisioning—celebrating—the long durée of geological time, the crane passages 
assume a heterotopian function within the imaginary geography of the novel. Not 
utopian but just as real as all other places in the novel, they are located outside 
of them, where they act as “counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in 
which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, 
are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted” (Foucault, “Other Spac-
es” 24). In fact, both the space inhabited by the cranes and the narrative inter-
ludes from which this space evolves relate to all other sites and narrative modes 
of the novel by means of what (again with Foucault) we may call “compensation”: 
of creating “a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as 
well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled” (27). Departing from 
the temporal norm further enhances the crane-space’s compensatory function. Its 
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heterochronic temporality is indeed hyperpotent: It combines an “indefinitely ac-
cumulating time” (akin to the heterochronic temporality of the museum and the 
library) that produces a sense of eternity through the everlasting ritual of migra-
tion with its polar opposite, the “absolutely temporal” of the crane routine (in the 
fleeting, transitory sense that Foucault associates with the festival and the fair-
ground) (26).
The heterotopian implications of the crane passages epitomize the novel’s 
ecological concerns. And whereas articulating these concerns oscillates between 
enthusiastic celebrations of nature’s mystic operations and Cassandra-like warn-
ings of environmental destruction, the self-centered and clock-timed sections of 
the story unfolding from the novel’s human-space explore the messy realities of 
late-modern life. Among them are the deceptive plans of a group of global inves-
tors and local realtors to build a crane-themed vacation resort that endangers the 
breeding grounds of the birds (ironically, the vacation village resembles the crane-
space in drawing together the heterochronic extremes of extra- and fleeting tem-
porality); personal struggles with the dictates of self-realization and professional-
ization, often in conjoined form, and thoroughly intertwined with the widespread 
use of mood-enhancing drugs that complicate the search for an “authentic” self; 
the mixed blessings of the time-space compression through digital technology and 
global travel; the media-enhanced post-9/11 fear of terrorism, the propagandis-
tic protection of “homeland security” through missions such as Operation Iraqi 
 Freedom, and their lure for young men with a lack of purpose like Mark  Schluter 
and his friends. The heterotopian crane sections infuse these troubled realities 
with an ecological imagination—the notion of a shared ecosystem both sturdy and 
fragile that grounds matters of belonging in a thoroughly materialistic worldview. 
In fact, evolutionary biology provides a matrix of total connectivity that at once 
embeds concerns with belonging in a larger environmental scheme and relativizes 
them by insisting that life will go on after humankind has become extinct.
Rendering the novel’s spatial imagination as systematically evolutionary and 
environmentalist as it is done here is significant for the narrative pursuit of belong-
ing as a whole, for it widens the imaginative scope on the macro level in a similar 
way that the neurological perspective expands it on the micro level. In fact, the 
two levels are imagined as interacting ecosystems that conjointly create the novel’s 
world, and they are most powerfully interlinked in the novel’s conception of place. 
“Place has been important to me before in other stories but never quite like it was 
for this one,” Powers notes, going on to expound:
The book is about memory and recognition, but those mental skills are themselves deeply linked to 
the brain’s spatial abilities. The hippocampus—that portion of the brain that orchestrates the forma-
tion of new memories—seems to have developed in large part as a way of mastering place. Animals 
with the greatest navigational requirements also have the most developed memory. […] Some neu-
roscientists have even proposed that the hippocampus may have originated as a processor of relations 
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in space, a “spatial cognition machine,” as it ’s been called. In some strange way, our capacity to form 
and retrieve memories—and with it, our ability to shape stories and construct a sense of self—may 
be a happy by-product of our sense of orientation. Even our social vocabulary reflects that connection, 
when we talk about who’s in and who’s out, who’s up and who’s down, who’s at the center and who’s 
marginalized. For that matter, our vocabulary for the elements of storytelling itself is also highly 
spatial: exposition, situation, plot, reverse, arrival … (Michod n. pag.; ellipsis in the original)
Neurological assumptions thus serve as the foil to fuse memory, narrative, space, 
and place. They do so not only in the usual sense that storytelling unfolds a space 
(the imaginary geography of the novel) and unfolds in space (the space of the page, 
the space between book and reader, the mental space of the reader), but also in the 
sense of engaging narrative as a life-sustaining and distinctly spatial practice of 
orientation and emplacement. In exploiting the tacitly searching and categorically 
improvising narrative activity of the human brain as its main form-giving drive, 
place and self enter the world of the novel exclusively through some brain’s more 
or less oriented storytelling operations. And because narrative acts affect the world 
in which they are conducted (either directly or through the “echoes” they make in 
other narrative acts), the need to belong depicted here engenders a complex and 
dynamic network of intersecting “narrative ecologies.”
What does this mean for the novel’s plotting operation? Throughout this study 
I have stressed how crucial emplotment is to matters of belonging. It is essential 
to conducting the search for meaning-as-form that is both the pragmatic and the 
artistic thrust of the narrative productivity engendered by the need to belong. It 
keeps the story on track or leads it astray, slows it down and speeds it up, connects 
characters and places, and in all of this it can be scarce or overpowering, subtle or 
imposing. But in whatever concrete way it molds the narrative operation, plot is 
what lays out the grounds to be traversed by a story unfolding in space and time. 
And hence it has substantial stakes in where the narrative “journey” takes us. In 
The Echo Maker, it takes us onto the intricately plotted and continually shifting 
grounds emerging from a plurality of narrative voices with notably different “spa-
tial abilities” to remember and recognize. All three are caught up in specific narra-
tive acts of orientation to be further spelled out later on. What can already be said 
at this point is that the story—brought to us by the indirect voices of three “nar-
rating brains”—envisions a rite of passage that is made up of a compound simul-
taneity of rituals, conducted by storytellers who are also listeners. The intersecting 
acts of telling, receiving, and revising their stories accumulate in an erring and 
self-deluded, yet irreducibly dialogic practice of conjoint storytelling. And true to 
the evolutionary biologist’s assumptions undergirding the neurological fusion of 
place, memory, and storytelling, a contingent course of collision is the trajectory 
along which the conjoint operations of emplacement and emplotment unfold.
Gaining momentum through the disruptive force of an accident—an event that 
is in itself an intriguing limit case of storytelling—collision is indeed the novel’s 
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primary connecting device. Making its first meteoritic occurrence in the opening 
passage, the accident that happens on the second page of the novel is surrounded 
by semantic gaps. The mystery about its cause sparks a hermeneutic desire of de-
tection that generates the novel’s most powerful plotline. In fact, in terms of nar-
rative energy, it seems that only when the mystery around the accident’s cause is 
resolved that the colliding, narrative-propelling forces emanating from this event 
weaken enough for the story to come to an end. Underscoring the novel’s concern 
with emplacement, this transformation has a distinctly spatial dimension. As the 
reader is about to see, the network of social relations imagined here becomes de-
cidedly more suitable for matters of dwelling toward the end. But just as crucial as 
the accident is in terms of engendering a narrative drive toward reaching a more 
comfortable state of dwelling, it stirs a chain of events that are both unpredictable 
and unstoppable. It is indeed through the haphazard contingency of colliding mat-
ter that concerns with belonging are made tangible in this novel.
The novel’s “narrative ecology” revolves around Mark’s accident: It connects 
crane-space and human-space; it distances Mark from his two closest friends; it 
brings his sister back to Kearney, causing further collisions between her life and 
the lives of two of her ex-boyfriends; it brings Gerald Weber there as well when one 
of these boyfriends finds out (in the endless connectivity of the world wide web) 
about Weber’s expertise in Mark’s rare brain condition, and encourages  Karin to 
get in touch with him; it makes Barbara Gillespie, a burned-out journalist from 
New York, cause the accident in a moment of existential despair, take on a po-
sition as a nurse in the hospital where Mark is being treated, become entangled 
in Mark’s and Karin’s lives, and romantically involved with Weber. What takes 
shape in this web of lives randomly colliding with one another is an ecological 
version of  Doreen Massey’s notion of place as “formed out of a particular”—con-
tingent, accidental—“set of social relations which interact at a particular location.” 
Its singularity as an individual place is formed from a site-specific collision of 
forces—the needs and desire of individual characters, the reverberating trauma 
of 9/11, the global flow of finance capitalism, the mysterious migration routine of 
the cranes—“which occur at that location (nowhere else does this precise mixture 
occur)” and “will in turn produce new social effects” (168). In a world that is eco-
logically and materially grounded in the storytelling activity of the human brain, 
these effects are by default also narrative. By exploiting the accident as an event 
that not only makes lives collide but also the stories in which these lives are lived, 
The Echo  Maker fuses concerns with place and narrative. It is the disruptive force 
of the accident that initiates and interconnects the three narratives that make up 
most of the story, and the resulting need for readjustment creates collisions with 
other “storied lives” with the effect of redirecting and molding through these sto-
ries the place evolving from their interaction, and the ways of dwelling that are 
possible at this place.
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In moving on to a closer analysis of the narrative fabric produced through these 
colliding forces, another interlocking place- and plot-making feature of the acci-
dent must be addressed: its providing the occasion for exploring the emotional 
dimension of the human brain’s spatial and social intelligence—more precisely, 
the interaction of cognition with feeling in the imagined constitution of this most 
basic capacity of human survival.8 Mark’s recovery soon reveals that he suffers 
from a rare brain injury that eclipses his emotional intelligence and causes him to 
believe that those most familiar to him—his sister, his dog, his home—have been 
replaced “with lifelike robots, doubles or aliens. He properly identifies everyone 
else. The loved one’s face elicits memory, but no feeling” (106).
What did it feel like to be Mark Schluter? To live in this town, work in a slaughterhouse, then have 
the world fracture from one moment to the next. The raw chaos, the absolute bewilderment of the 
Capgras state twisted Webere’s gut. To see the person closest to you in this world, and feel nothing. 
But that was the astonishment: nothing inside Mark felt changed. Improvising consciousness saw to 
that. Mark still felt familiar; only the world had gone strange. He needed his delusions, in order to 
close that gap. The self ’s whole end was self-continuation. (301; emphasis in the original)
The Capgras syndrome thus provides the imaginative matrix to defamiliarize what 
is most familiar to Mark through a narrative delusion produced by his injured 
brain as it struggles to provide his consciousness with a life-sustaining sense of 
continuity. The most daunting effect of Mark’s condition is the strain that it puts 
on his social relations and the troubled sense of place evolving from them. There 
will be more to say about this later. For now, it is important to note that the im-
pact of Mark’s injured brain on the novel’s conjoint operations of emplotment and 
emplacement is not confined to his particular troubles. Rather, Mark’s condition 
allows Powers to illustrate how profoundly “the feeling of what happens” affects 
8 Through its f ictional mediation of the Capgras syndrome, the novel enhances academic discours-
es about space and narrative by connecting them to recent neurological attempts of reframing 
the relation of intellect and feeling. Coming to terms with this relation already played a major 
part in Hume’s model of the human mind, which has been instrumental to conceiving the imagi-
nation as an indispensable motor of human belonging. For a longer discussion of the matter, see 
the Introduction and the “Historical Trajectories” section of Chapter 2. To my knowledge, The 
Echo Maker was the f irst novel to concern itself with Capgras. The fact that it was soon to be 
followed by two further American novels dealing with this condition, Nicole Krauss’ Man Walks 
Into a Room and Rivka Galchen’s Atmospheric Disturbances, underscores its capacity to articulate 
and f ictionally mediate a collective, contemporary state of trouble.
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the life-sustaining conjunction of orientation and narration for all human beings.9 
Exceeding an individual pathology, the Capgras syndrome is used to allegorize a 
collective state of alienation in which “the outline of life […] still looks familiar,” 
yet “the place no longer feels recognizable” (Michod n. pag.).10
In the materialist world and narrative ecology of the novel, Capgras spreads 
through the collision of lives and storylines. Again it is Weber, the character most 
frequently employed to articulate neurological ideas, who voices this option when 
observing, in the midst of his romantic involvement with Barbara, a distorted 
emotional resonance in himself. “He would write it up—first case ever of conta-
gious Capgras—if he could still write” (430). There is a subtle irony to Weber’s 
attempt to distance this troubling thought while still in the act of conceiving it. 
And although no one but the reader can hear it, its meaning spills over and “infects” 
the rest of the narrative. Similar to the trope of sleepwalking in Edgar Huntly) 
Capgras is not exploited as a stabilizing metaphor but as a metonymic trajecto-
ry, “the figure of contiguity and combination, the figure of syntagmatic relations” 
(Brooks, “Masterplot” 281) that destabilizes all certainty of “feeling right” about 
one’s sense of self and place through the sheer circumstance of it being part and 
parcel of the novel’s narrative world. As a looming threat of disjoining emotional 
and intellectual intelligence, its spread causes a “contagious” identity crisis. What 
kind of place evolves from the collateral encounters between such individuals? If 
the novel imagines place to a substantial degree as a shifting network of social rela-
tions, a sense of self that is troubled through the spread of Capgras must affect the 
place evolving from the particular set of social relations imagined here. Ricoeur’s 
notion of self-identity is helpful for gasping this trouble. For Ricoeur, identity is 
a treacherous concept because it is used with two fundamentally different mean-
ings: selfhood and sameness. Identity as selfhood responds to the question “who 
am I?” and is (like concepts such as “being-in-the-world,” “care,” or “being-with”) 
characterized by the capacity “to question itself as to its own way of being and 
thus to relate itself to being qua being.” Identity as sameness, on the other hand, 
answers to the question “what am I?” It belongs to the world of things that are 
“ready” or “present-to-hand” (“Narrative Identity” 190-92). Harking back to these 
different bearings, irritations within self-identity may best be described as a rift 
9 Powers cites António Damásio with this phrase in the Believer interview with Michod. For an 
elaborate discussion of this topic, see Harris 231-38.
10 In the interview passage from which these quotes are taken, Powers ties this collective state of 
alienation to a distinctly national trauma: “Estrangement seems to have become the baseline 
condition for life in terrorized America. After November 2000, after September 2001, after the 
Patriot Act and the detainee bill, after Gitmo and Abu Ghraib, our stories—public and private—
keep scrambling to keep America whole, continuous, and coherent, to place it” (Michod n. pag.). 
Sielke reads The Echo Maker as a post-9/11 novel, a qualif ication that is certainly apt, but limiting 
as a general label for a novel whose narrative scope so clearly exceeds this collective trauma.
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between “being” and “having” that turns the social and psychic demand for iden-
tity into a troublesome affair.11 And yet the two intersect in one matter that is vital 
for both: in the words of The Echo Maker’s eloquent neurologist, the “self ’s longing 
for self-continuation.” For selfhood this means keeping one’s promises and being 
accountable for former actions, for sameness it means maintaining a recognizable 
appearance. Hence, Ricoeur arrives at his influential notion of “narrative identi-
ty”—identity as the endlessly malleable product of self-narrativization—as a way 
of suturing this very gap.12
So yes, one’s sense of self is constantly troubled by having the same properties 
versus being in the same relation to the world, but the resulting tension can be 
eased if selfhood is relieved from the burden of sameness. (In the late-modern 
world depicted here, this burden has increased through an growing specialization 
and compartmentalization of social life; responses to the question “who am I?” 
have multiplied, but flexible, pluralized, and contradictory as they may be, they 
still need to create what Powers has aptly called a “bundled I.”) For Ricouer, the 
project of the modern novel is deeply engaged with the task of reducing the burden 
of sameness, with Robert Musil’s “man without qualities” as an extreme case (a 
better translation would indeed be the “man without properties”); Max Frisch’s 
Stiller or Nabokov’s Humbert Humbert are other examples.13 For Ricoeur, this lit-
erary phenomenon is significant because the loss or rejection of sameness-identity 
does not put an end to the problem of selfhood:
A non-subject is not nothing, with respect to the category of the subject. Indeed, we would not be in-
terested in this drama of dissolution and would not be thrown into perplexity by it, if the non-subject 
were not still a f igure of the subject, even in a negative mode. Suppose someone asks the question: 
Who am I? Nothing, or almost nothing is the reply. But it is still a reply to the question who, simply 
reduced to the starkness of the question itself. (196)
The heading of The Echo Maker’s first part—“I AM NO ONE”—seems to re-
spond directly to Ricoeur’s call for a rejection of sameness-identity. The line soon 
11 Grounding subjectivity in a gap between “being” and “having” also features prominently in 
 Lacan’s “mirror stage.” Despite their very dif ferent approaches to identity formation (visual and 
imaginary vs. narrative), both models are grappling with the same basic problem. In the mirror 
stage, identity is forever split along the lines of “being” (in front of the mirror), which in Ricoeur’s 
reasoning can only confirm itself “qua being,” and “‘having’ one’s image in the mirror,” which 
in Ricoeur’s reasoning belongs to the order of the “present-to-hand,” of things to be had in the 
sense of possessing (and, by extension, being possessed by) them.
12 For Ricoeur’s most concise discussion of this concept, see “Life.”
13 Musil is indeed one of the authors whom Powers credits as an influence on his own writing. See 
Williams 14.
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reappears in the mysterious note that Karin finds next to Mark’s bed in the trauma 
unit of the hospital.
No one could tell her when it had appeared. Some messenger had slipped it into the room unseen, even 
while Karin was shut out. The writing was spiderly, ethereal: an immigrant scrawl from a century ago.
I am No One
but Tonight on North Line Road
GOD led me to you
so You could Live
and bring back someone else (10)
In its cryptic, “ethereal” act of messaging, the note projects a journey of self-era-
sure and spiritual recovery—a journey in which a subject with no claim to same-
ness-identity whatsoever gives up its life for a “You” that then brings back an enig-
matic “someone else,” possibly the transformed “I” or “You” of this note, possibly 
a third party “reborn” in their fateful encounter. A substantial part of the story is 
concerned with deciphering this enigmatic piece of writing and its connection to 
the accident. In fact, solving its mystery disperses the horror vacui of the missing 
cause haunting those who are accidently thrust together by it. The note’s signifi-
cance is amplified by using each of its lines as a heading for one of the novel’s five 
parts, thus repeatedly (and somewhat pedantically) suggesting that it contains a 
secret “masterplot” for the unfolding narrative. But it is the note’s first line with its 
rhetorical erasure of selfhood that is by far the most memorable. It looms over the 
story like a predicament. Anyone could have said it, and most of the characters do 
at some point in one way or another: Karin by calling herself “a stand-in […] one 
of those chameleon people with nothing at the core” (327), Barbara by conceding 
that “she’s finished, she’s nothing now” (446), and Weber by realizing that he is “in 
reclamation,” “nothing […] left of him but these new eyes” (449). These multiple 
disclaimers of selfhood turn the capacity to question one’s being into a recursive 
yet minimal assurance of one’s existence (if I can ask a question does this not mean 
I am there?), but under the impact of this procedure selfhood becomes porous 
(what is the practical value of an empty account?).
Ironically, the only character who does not disclaim his selfhood is Mark. His 
shell-shocked insistence on being “the same” makes him immune to feeling that 
he might be nothing. In fact, Mark’s insistence inverts the evacuation of selfhood 
and makes it spread. His stubborn refusal to recognize his sister turns her into 
being “not the same,” a disclaimer that, once she begins to internalize it, turns her 
into “nothing.” In the end we find out that he, who so obsessively tried to find the 
writer of the note, wrote it himself when caught between life and death but not 
yet unconscious—wrote it to address the woman standing next to his bed in the 
trauma unit of the hospital, and whom he had seen standing, apparition-like, in 
Of Cranes and Brains 149
the middle of North Line Road just a few hours earlier. Seeing her for the second 
time shatters his former self, turning him into “no one”— and in this crucial sense 
the note literally has no writer. The medical records of Mark’s brain activity bear 
a clear mark of this incident, yet it is not until the end of the novel that an actual 
event can be attached to it. Once this mark comes to index Barbara’s guilt-laden 
presence at Mark’s hospital bed, the traumatic fracturing of his former self, sealed 
off and denied through the Capgras state, takes on new meaning: Mark’s brain 
damage is triggered not by the accident itself but by the shock of finding the person 
who caused it through her suicidal walk in the middle of the dark country road by 
his bedside upon walking up from his coma; and the accident is directly connected 
to 9/11. Barbara covered the terror attacks as a reporter, unsympathetically stick-
ing her camera into people’s faces in her desire for authentic coverage, thriving 
on the success of her work until she became so exhausted that her boss sent her 
off to Kearney for a human-interest story on the cranes. But instead of seizing her 
chance to recover, she tracks down another story of disaster: The breeding grounds 
of the cranes are threatened by deceitful plans to build a vacation resort whose 
wasteful use of water is bound to destroy the ancient ecosystem. Upon finding out 
about this complot, Barbara suffers a nervous breakdown, interrupts her nightly 
drive, and steps into the road.
The accident hence “erupts” from a troubled geography in which 9/11 terror 
and ecologic destruction collide with hazardous force; that these connections are 
recovered as the polyvocal narrative moves towards its end intertwines the needs 
for psychic and spatial recovery engrained into the world of the novel. Moreover, 
solving the mystery of the note relocates the source of contagion: Not Mark but 
Barbara is the damaged “cell” in the social organism from which the destructive 
force of emotional uprootedness spreads through the entire ecosystem. Her secret 
involvement in the mystery plot exempts her from being one of the focalizers. But 
leaving her voiceless creates a curious sense of indeterminacy, for she is at once 
central to the story and disconnected from the self-narratives gaining traction 
around her. How does she fit into the social network in which she operates with 
conspicuous ease? Where does she come from? Does she not seem overqualified 
for her job as a nurse? Why is she so committed to Mark’s wellbeing even after he 
leaves the hospital? Barbara’s voicelessness fuels both the “plot of action” driving 
the narrative forward (usually by creating some form of disturbance) and the “her-
meneutic plot” that allows us to reconstruct what has happened.14 Yet if Capgras 
is rendered “contagious” in this novel, the desire for self-continuation—conceived 
here as the narrative program that the evolution has engrained into the human 
brain to secure the surivial of the species—becomes instrumental in spreading the 
pathological state. In fact, it spreads through the collision of storylines fabricated 
for this very purpose.
14 The terms are drawn from Barthes, SZ.
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coLLidiNg Narr atives, coNjoiNt maP-makiNg
Outside of the crane sections—read here as narrative manifestations of the desire 
for a spatialized, selfless Other—the story is told through the alternating narrative 
activities of Mark’s, Karin’s, and Weber’s brains. As I have noted before, all of these 
activities are trapped within the confines of personal concerns and self-delusions. 
But regardless of these biases and limitations, each of these narratives depicts an 
inner state that is deeply entangled with the outer world and its inhabitants as it 
relentlessly seeks to process and integrate the narratives of the others. The form 
that results from interweaving these three voices—all of them indirect, and to-
gether adding up to the polyvocal texture that makes up most of the narrative—is 
the concern of this section. How does this kind of storytelling lend itself to giving 
voice and form to the need to belong depicted here? Does its disseminated yet con-
joint act of voice- and form-giving project a viable mode of dwelling in narrative? 
What kinds of agency does it probe? What kinds of recovery does it pursue? In 
grappling with these questions it is important to note that the conception of the 
brain as a “storytelling machine” aligns the novel with the “narrative turn” in the 
social and natural sciences.15 In fact, it is fair to say that Powers, true to his interest 
in merging science and fiction, lends his narrative art to exploring the conver-
gence of social and narrative agency posited by proponents of ontological narrative. 
The novel’s polyvocal narrative fictionalizes everyday acts of self-narration in a 
neuro-realist mode, and in doing so, it turns these everyday acts into the stuff of 
fictional world-making.
In this compound form, narrative agency is assumed and probed in every voice. 
Each voice is rendered in a specific way, with the effect of maximizing its impact 
on a world that exists only in and through the narrative acts that engage with it. 
Within the world of the novel, these acts and the agencies staged and performed 
by them, are not removed from the messiness of everyday life but closely entangled 
with it. Mark’s rejection of his sister may be the best example for this. After awak-
ing from his coma, his brain injury causes his consciousness to fabricate a story 
in which Karin plays the role of an identical-looking stranger who has replaced 
his real sister. As his life continues, the story prompts explanations for this odd 
situation that gradually grows into a full-blown conspiracy plot in which secret 
government agents are after him, having replaced not only his sister but also the 
entire neighborhood including his house while Karin’s boyfriend trains cranes 
and other animals to spy on human beings.16 A recursive double movement drives 
Mark’s narrative: Implausible experiences need to be emplotted, but emplotment 
is continuously exposed to new experience, with exposure to other storylines (for 
instance, to Karin’s repeated rejection of the fraud character he has construed 
15 I discuss the topic in Chapter 1.
16 Keen elucidates this obviously paranoid kind of self-narration from a psychological perspective.
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for her) being an inevitable part of the procedure. And while Karin’s persistent 
rejections of the role ascribed to her must be integrated into Mark’s story, her 
self-narrative has to cope with being exposed to Mark’s tale of fraud and rejec-
tion—from being supposedly better looking than his “real” sister to wondering 
if she is indeed an impostor playing a part designed to please others rather than 
living a self-directed, authentic life. The self-doubt that being exposed to Mark’s 
story stirs in her makes her turn to her ex-boyfriends, hoping that romantic entan-
glements will stabilize her (and finding out that the lover who makes her feel most 
like herself does so by virtue of taking mood-enhancing drugs). As readers of these 
interlacing self-narratives, we are inclined to observe and compare their respective 
world-making capacities and limitations, and to marvel at their artful revisions 
as lives and storylines keep colliding. In doing so, we may note that the separate 
accounts do not give seamless shape to the world in which they interact; that they 
indeed contradict and rival each other with the effect of continually undermining 
and transforming the selves for which they speak, and the lives they harbor and 
sustain. Yet while individual voices allow for an explication of different narrative 
modes and agencies, the polyvocality of the narrative makes its own claim in these 
matters. This latter feature of the novel—its art of connectivity and “narrative ther-
apy” (Hurt 23)—is key to its vision of dwelling in the world; hence the need to trace 
its design.
The sections that are focalized through Mark initially map the recovery of his 
brain. That the first one of them is only half a page long replicates the fragility of 
its storytelling activity as Mark emerges from his coma. Perhaps the most striking 
feature about the highly fragmentary, impressionistic account of the accident giv-
en in this passage is the absence of self-asserting pronouns. While clearly speaking 
from Mark’s subjective experience, its grammar bears no trace of selfhood.
A flock of birds, each one burning. Stars swoop down to bullets. Hot red specks take f lesh, nest there, 
a body part, part body. Lasts forever: no change to measure. Flock of f iery cinders. When grey pain 
of them thins, then always water. Flattest width so slow it fails to liquid. Nothing in the end but f low. 
Nextless stream, lowest thing above knowing. A thing itself the cold and so can’t feel it. (10)
The next section, already noticeably longer, is equally impressionistic, yet marked 
with first traits of subjectivity. In fact, these traits emerge precisely at the moment 
when Mark starts to feel again. “When sense returns, he’s drowning” (18). The sen-
sation stems from the depths of his childhood, reminding him of the unpleasant 
moment when his father taught him to swim. When this reawakening of sensation 
occurs, he cannot yet differentiate between past and present, but over the course 
of the novel’s first part, and indicated by his increasing capacity of storytelling, his 
sense of self is more or less fully restored again. Yet even after the immediate ef-
fects of the accident are overcome, Mark’s self-narration sounds curiously stacca-
to-like. His sentences are short and often incomplete, reduced to a bare minimum 
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of information. To the extent that he regains his strength, his irritations become 
more forceful and articulate with the effect of making his already mentioned con-
spiracy theories more and more elaborate. Rage is the dominant emotion he feels. 
Crying does not fit into his sense of self, but it does happen once during a visit to 
the farmhouse where the Schluters used to live when Mark and Karin were chil-
dren. Mark’s conviction that his sister is a fraud becomes porous at this site, and 
when she asks him what his real sister was like, he breaks down, emplotting what 
happens as “something must be wrong with Mark Schluter, something from the 
accident that not even the hospital knows about, because he stands there bawling 
like a goddamned child” (374).
Throughout these passages, Mark seems to be in conversation with himself, 
desperately trying to leave semantic marks of orientation in his defamiliarized life-
world. And as his sister is the most important fixpoint in this world, he invents 
ever-new nicknames for her, “Kopy Karin,” “Karin Two,” “Karbon Karin,” to name 
just a few. Mark’s name—turned into “Marker” by his naïve girlfriend—puns on 
his obsession.
[…] he needs to talk to someone, someone who can help to put all the facts together. Bonnie’s out. 
Okay: she’s still Bonnie-Baby. Call it love, whatever. But Kopy Karin has gotten her, turned her, as 
the federales say. Convinced her there is something wrong with him. Even when he lays out all the 
accumulated evidence—his missing sister, the fake Homestar, nobody admitting to the note, the new 
Karin hooking up with the old Daniel, the disguised Daniel following him around, training animals to 
watch him—she says she’s not sure. (279)
Mark’s biggest problem is that his interlocutors do not share the familiarity that 
he regains in his rampant quest for self-continuity. Paranoid narratives like his are 
cataclysmic in the sense that there is no “after,” no social value to be gained from 
the story; “it will not be remembered, the suffering was for naught; the loss is abso-
lute. There is no mourning, no analyzing, no commemorating; there is no redemp-
tion” (Keen 179). In fact, the constant rejection of his self-narration reifies Mark’s 
aching sense of not belonging while making the narrative efforts of restoring his 
place in the world increasingly paranoid and self-destructive—to the point where 
the (com)plot of his own storytelling convinces him that he is already dead, and 
that suicide is hence the action he must undertake to set the story straight. As the 
plotting operations of Mark’s shell-shocked brain go back and forth between his 
sense of self and his surroundings, they have indeed but one aim: to synchronize 
his inner and his outer world again. Eventually, Weber will find the medication 
that helps arrest this erring process by reconnecting Mark’s cognitive operations 
to his emotional intelligence, thus “healing” his narrative capacities and the ways 
in which they emplot his self and emplace him in the world.
But Karin wonders if her brother’s troubled sense of belonging could not be 
older than his accident. She recalls a phase in his life when Mark, still a child, was 
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convinced that he was adopted, and that his only reliable childhood friend was the 
imaginary Mr. Thurman.17 Karin’s memory offers a view on Mark’s condition that 
complicates the medical narrative. Maybe the accident disclosed or intensified a 
sense of alienation in her brother that stems from their troubled family history? 
Karin’s counternarrative is too tenuous to unravel the medical diagnosis—“How 
much had Mark changed? The question dogged Karin, in that hot summer, a third 
of a year on […] She no longer trusted her memory” (235)—and yet it subverts its 
authority. Moreover, the passage brings out a significant difference in Karin’s and 
Mark’s modes of self-narration. Mark’s passages are invested in the immediate 
present. They claim authority by engaging with this present, and respectively, the 
narrative agency that gains shape in these passages is geared toward the present, 
driven by the rage about his distorted perceptions and rejected narratives crafted 
to set them straight again. Karin’s narrative, in contrast, is withdrawn from the 
world around her. It tends to resort to the past, driven by a desire to retrieve memo-
ries in which it can ground itself, and often it is bound up in memories or emotions 
to an extent that makes it difficult for Karen to act.18 Yet while her narrative is rife 
with empathy, it displays a striking lack of emotional distance. Karen constantly 
needs to feel herself against something, if this “other” is not given, she tends to 
dissolve into the environment. Smoking is one way of stabilizing the boundaries of 
her self, unhappy love is another.
Some days his rage was so bad that even lying still infuriated him. Then the therapist asked her to 
leave. Help out by vanishing. She camped out in Farview, in her brother’s modular home. She fed his 
dog, paid his bills, ate off his plates, watched his television, slept in his bed. She smoked only out on 
the deck, in the frosty March wind, on a damp director’s chair inscribed BORN SCHLUTER, so his living 
room wouldn’t stink of cigarettes when he f inally came home. She tried to keep it to one cigarette 
an hour. She forced herself to slow down, taste the smoke, close her eyes, and just listen. At dawn 
and dusk, as her ears sensitized, she could hear the sandhills’ bugle call underneath the neighbors 
militant exercise videos and the long-haul eighteen-wheelers pounding up and down the interstate. 
She would hit the f ilter in seven, and be checking her watch again in f ifteen minutes. (44)
Her cigarette addiction gives this passage an out-of-breath tone (other passages 
have much longer sentences), but it aptly captures the way in which her self-nar-
rative circulates around others, how strongly and emphatically she feels, and how 
much she needs to express her emotions—always on the brink of dissolving into 
17 This act of self-narration echoes the previous chapter as it can be read as Mark crafting his version 
of Freud’s “family romance,” which has been discussed with regards to David Schearl, tapping 
into what Freud specif ied as a child’s early fantasy of exchanging the biological parents with 
made-up ones in search for an autonomous sense of self.
18 For an in-depth discussion of the relation of self-narrative and memory that surfaces here, see 
King.
Belonging and Narrative154
her environment. A moment later, she calls an ex-lover: “Four numbers in she re-
alized that she wasn’t dead yet. Anything might still happen” (44). Alas, Karin’s 
sense of self and the world around her are not disjointed; they are too attuned to 
the outer world. She is emotionally dependent on others, and this dependency im-
pairs her narrative agency. She makes choices about the telling of her story based 
on what other people most likely want to hear. At one point Karin suggests that 
their father was sexually abusive when they were small (“Did Cappy […] did he 
ever touch you?” [374])—a childhood trauma that might explain her difficulties to 
leave the past behind as well as her inclination toward unhealthy codependencies 
with the men around her. But the remark is tentative, more hint than proof, and 
as such not suitable as an anchor for her faltering sense of self. Compared to Mark, 
who stabilizes over the course of the novel and who is in the end finally treated 
with a medication that makes the Capgras symptoms disappear, Karin’s longing 
for change is trapped and endlessly revolving around herself. She does, however, 
manage to shift her codependence from significant others (her brother, her lovers) 
to the cause of preserving the crane refuge—possibly a more livable form of depen-
dency, and yet a merely superficial mode of change as such.
If Mark’s tortured and torturing self-narration is eventually “healed” and 
 Karin’s evens out in a functional dysfunctionality (functional in terms of stabiliz-
ing her life, dysfunctional in terms of outgrowing emotional dependency), Weber’s 
life narrative is in definite decline. He enters the story at the peak of his fame, a 
detached outsider, the eloquent expert flying in from New York, curious about 
the case yet snobbish and unwilling to commit himself truly to the wellbeing of 
his patient. The parts focalized through him enact this disengagement. They are 
strikingly rational, full of scientific jargon and sharp observations, and overall 
marked by a sense of humor that helps him keep emotionally challenging or messy 
situations at bay. He and his wife share a code that mimics this operation. That 
they call each other “Man” and “Woman,” and refer to God as “tour director” tes-
tifies to a biologistic worldview, employed by the couple in ways that evacuates 
what is named of emotional resonance. But as Weber’s reputation falters—he is 
reproached for exploiting his patients for their stories—this narrative mode and 
the emotional vacuum produced by it become a problem. His seemingly superior 
storytelling capacities, which once gained him fame beyond his scientific commu-
nity, plunge into self-defeating registers of alienation, for instance when observing 
himself during a nervous breakdown:
He hated to read talks. Usually, he spoke from an outline, delivering free-wheeling, campfire per-
formances. But when he wandered from the script that night, vertigo hit him. He stood high on a 
towering clif f, water pounding over it. What was acrophobia anyway if not the half-acknowledged 
desire to jump. (232)
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During the night following this talk, his sense of crisis worsens:
For a moment, Weber cannot f ind his shoulder. No sense of whether his hand was underneath or 
above him, palm up or down, f lung out or drawn in. He panicked, and the alarm congealed him, bring-
ing him almost alert enough to identify the mechanism: awareness before the return of the somato-
sensory cortex from sleep. But only when he forced his paralyzed side to move could he locate all his 
parts again. (258)
All of this happens when Weber is jetlagged, displaced to “an anonymous hotel, in 
another country” (258), and upset about the negative reviews of his latest book. But 
besides expressing his social and spatial sense of vertigo, this passage also illus-
trates the hollowness of Weber’s splendid rationality. And along with it, it showcas-
es the practical limitations of a narrative agency habitually employed to hold the 
world at bay. Only when he forces himself to move again can he break the haunting 
spell of dismemberment. This scene can thus be read as a mise en abyme of  Weber’s 
ailing mode of self-narration, and of the rational disposition from which it springs. 
For what initially presented itself as the most capable and advanced kind of cog-
nition turns out to produce the most displaced and alienated sense of being in the 
world. And while Weber finds the right drug to treat Mark’s brain condition, he 
fails to fathom a remedy for himself: He cannot restore his professional reputa-
tion, risks his rock-solid marriage when getting romantically involved with the 
enigmatic nurse who is really an investigative journalist, and when he returns to 
New York in the novel’s final scene, who he is and where he belongs have become 
utterly unclear.
Distinct as they are, the three voices make for a neatly fitting sample of the 
basic types of self-narration posited by the narrative psychologists Kenneth and 
Mary Gergen: stabilizing (Karin), progressive (Mark), and regressive (Weber) 
(“Narrative and the Self” 23-26). The Gergens have developed these types by draw-
ing from Northrup Frye’s basic modes of storytelling, and from Joseph Campbell’s 
idea of a fundamental, psychically grounded “monomyth” with countless local 
applications and an overarching capacity of emplotting negative events as harbin-
gers of positive outcomes. Their interest is with the psychodynamics afforded by 
the three types rather than with the plotting operation driving them; in applying 
their model to the interlacing self-narratives of The Echo Maker, the convention-
ality of the three different modes of storytelling become clearly discernible along 
with their powerful impact on emplotting individual lives. Mark’s self-narration 
can, indeed, not only be read as progressive but also as comic, captured in the 
above-quoted passage in his punning acts of name-giving (“Bonnie-Baby,” “Kopy 
Karin,” “the federales”), or in the hilarious accounts of his belief that his childhood 
friend Daniel Riegel trains wild animals to spy on him. In accord with the comic 
mode, Mark’s narrative progresses towards a happy ending: Assisted by the drug 
that “heals” the Capgras symptoms, Mark crudely affirms his recovered senses of 
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place and self. As he emerges from his nightmare and finds himself recognizing his 
long-lost sister, who cannot stop crying, he says to her with his unfaltering sense 
of humor:
“Hey. I know how you’re feeling. Rough days, for us two. But look!” He twists around to the plate-glass 
window—a flat, overcast Platte afternoon. “It ’s not all so bad, huh? Just as good, in fact. In some 
ways even better.”
She f ights to retrieve her voice. “What do you mean, Mark? As good as what?”
“I mean, us. You. Me. Here.” He points out the window, approvingly: the Great American Desert. 
The inch-deep river. Their next of kin, those circling birds. “Whatever you call this. Just as good as 
the real thing.” (447)
As the story draws to a close, this hopeful statement is the end of Mark’s active 
share in the narrative—and the only happy ending of three self-narratives. Karin’s 
stabilizing mode of self-narration perpetuates her character’s emotional depen-
dency, shifting it merely from her brother and her boyfriends to the cause of sav-
ing the environment. Departing from Frye’s scheme, the narration performed by 
 Karin’s consciousness may best be described as melodramatic. In fact, it thrives on 
a key feature of melodrama: “its compulsion to ‘reconcile the irreconcilable’—that 
is, its tendency to find solutions to problems that cannot really be solved without 
challenging the older ideologies of moral certainty to which melodrama wishes 
to return” (Williams 37).19 Karin’s self-narrative thus confronts us with the “fun-
damental ambivalence of feelings” that is instrumental in providing the receptive 
parameters of the melodramatic mode of narration (Decker 14, quoted in Kelleter 
and Mayer 13; my translation). And if this ambivalence springs from an irresolv-
able tension between evoking and controlling affect, what would better describe 
the emotional deadlock of Karin’s troubled state of belonging than her compulsive 
yearning to reconcile the irreconcilable? The siblings’ final scene that has just been 
addressed stages the melodramatic drift in Karin’s self-narration. As she visits her 
brother in the hospital after his suicide attempt and Weber’s successful medication, 
the moment of their reunion is so precious to her that she wishes it might stay, or 
at least return in a reliable fashion. For once, he complies. “Hang where you know. 
Where else can you go with all hell breaking loose?” he sarcastically suggests, mak-
ing “her nostrils quiver and her eyes burn.”
19 The notion of the melodramatic employed here draws from Peter Brooks, Thomas Elsaesser, and 
Linda Williams, especially their proposition to understand it as a narrative mode. For a lucid 
discussion of this matter, see Kelleter and Mayer, “Revising.”
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She tries to say nowhere, but she can’t.
“I mean, how many homes does one person get?” He waves his hand toward the gray window. It ’s 
not such a bad place to come back to.”
“Best place on earth,” she says. “Six weeks, every year.” (447)
Indicating the proximity of the novel’s ending, narration resorts to the present 
tense; it does so in the entire, very short fifth part, whose title “And Bring Back 
Someone Else” bears the promising lure of a successful rite of passage. Next to 
the obligatory crane section, the final part consists of one section that dialogically 
closes the narratives of Karin and Mark, and one section that closes Weber’s nar-
rative. In the above quote, whose final sentence is the end of Karin’s self-narrative, 
she simultaneously dismisses and embraces the idea of having a home, wants to 
both stay and leave the place that is most prominently and painfully associated 
with it. In response, her storytelling resorts to the migratory routine of the cranes, 
her newly found “stabilizing other,” for the right kind of storyline. (“Best place 
on earth […] Six weeks every year.”) The failure of saying nowhere preceding this 
reconciliation is grounded in a narrative act that thrives on the longing to leave the 
world unchanged in spite of its obvious flaws and corruptions.
Weber’s mode of self-narration can be read as regressive and tragic. His lack 
of emotional involvement with others (including diagnosing himself as the first 
case of “contagious Capgras”) has already been discussed. It is indeed his lack of 
attachment that serves as the main trajectory of Weber’s decline—threatening to 
cost him his professional reputation, his popularity with patients and audiences, 
his romance with Barbara, and his marriage. The downward spiral culminates in 
the novel’s final scene, in which Weber, arriving at a New York airport, anticipates 
his troubled homecoming:
A voice calls to disembark. In the rising crush, he stands and grapples for his carry-on, shedding 
himself on everything he touches. He stumbles down the jet bridge into another world, swapped out 
by impostors at every step. He needs her his wife to be out there, on the other side of the baggage 
claim, though he has lost all right to hope it. There, holding his name on a little card, printed clearly 
so he can read it. Man, the card must say. No: Weber. She will be the one holding it, and that’s how he 
must f ind her. (451)
And while it is uncertain if Weber’s life (and) narrative will recover, the unham-
pered course of decline that we have been witnessing gives these lines a cathartic 
ring. Weber is made to suffer for his snobby carelessness, and regardless of whether 
or not he can turn the tides we may feel for him in a way that makes it possible 
for us to learn from his mistakes. Powers seeks to capitalize on this possibility, it 
seems, by ending the narrative in a moment of surrender. In the closing paragraph, 
Weber feels that he needs his wife to be cured from the Capgras symptoms that 
have turned the inhabitants of his world into an army of impostors, and that he 
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must leave his corrupted name (and self) behind in order to find her. Ending the 
novel with the unraveling neurologist arriving at an unnamed New York airport (a 
prototypical non-place in Augé’s sense, and as such a hostile environment for mat-
ters of dwelling) capitalizes on the tragic implications of the decline imposed upon 
the presumably superior self that Weber embodies. As the splendid storyteller (for 
many the author’s super-ego) surrenders to his longing for his wife, he also gives in 
to his desire to be received in and through his story.
Allegedly, Powers did not have the Gergens’ model in mind when developing 
the three narrative voices at work in his novel, but MacLean’s triune brain: “one 
part reptilian, one part limbic, one part cerebral, and all parts improvised, interde-
pendent, perpetually revised, and mutually self-deluding” (Burn 178). In striking 
resonance with the crane sections, Mark’s self-narration would then follow the 
“reptilian” mode (rage and basic survival), Karin’s self-narration would be “lim-
bic” (emotion and long-term memory), and Weber’s “cerebral” (verbal eloquence 
and rationality). When combining this model with the Gergens’, its evolutionary 
thrust merges with a progression of life narratives moving, in terms of their narra-
tive sophistication, from “comic” via “melodramatic” to “tragic;” and, in terms of 
their implied psychodynamics, from “progressive” via “stabilizing” to “regressive.” 
The question that remains, posing itself with amplified weight from this perspec-
tive, is what modes of dwelling are gained or lost by enlisting this particular narra-
tive form and the kinds of agency that is afford.
back iN oz agaiN
The Echo Maker turns a naturalistic notion of narrative into the ultimate touch-
stone for matters of belonging: Emplacement, rendered here as a survival instinct 
engrained in the human brain, is determined by narrative. But narrative is pre-
sented as an utterly provisional and inescapably self-delusional enterprise in this 
novel. Ultimately, the narrative operations staged and performed on multiple lev-
els and in manifold ways are only as good as their receivers—which brings me back 
to my earlier point about Powers’s urge to educate his readers. The Echo Maker 
translates its author’s desire for better readers into a self-reflexive, self-observing 
narrative operation, a virtual training ground to hone the skills of his readers, for 
which indirect voicedness of the self-narratives is instrumental. Throughout the 
narrative Powers opted for the third person, which has the paradoxical effect of 
creating both a sense of intimacy (through the first-hand insight into the charac-
ters’ inner worlds) and of distance (because the innerness thus revealed is not ex-
pressed directly by the person possessing it). And as the three protagonists relent-
lessly alter their narratives to cohere their interdependent and socially embedded 
senses of self and place, the compound design of the narrative not only demands 
of the reader to move along with the constant shifts between different positions 
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and individual struggles but also demands to continually bridge the structural 
gaps between intimacy and distance. The text thus creates a reading experience 
in which one can sympathize, partake, and identify, but never comfortably settle 
or even gain so much as a lasting sense of familiarity with one of the protagonists.
This constant destabilization undercuts the dire conventionality of the novel’s 
three main characters: Weber, the male rational scientist; Karin, the emotional, 
caring and self-denying female, and Mark, the raging and rebellious male adoles-
cent. What makes this inbuilt mechanism of “reader revision” all the more persua-
sive is that it takes shape from within the self-diluting, ever-shifting texture of the 
narrative. And this is indeed the nucleus of the novel’s greatest achievement: to 
stage and explore the storied nature of human life and the need to belong around 
which it revolves as a practice of “echo making”—by telling one’s story from a 
particular place that only becomes a place through the distorted versions of that 
story carried back to the teller. Echo makers, so the implied “message” of the novel 
goes, are at once sustained and trapped by their storied lives, and because they are 
trapped their senses of self and of place genuinely depend on mediation. Powers 
uses the trope of mapmaking to underscore this point: “There is no place except 
the map, and yet we make the map together, by reading ourselves into one anoth-
er, through conventions and codes, all of them provisional” (178). The map envi-
sioned here is inside as much as it is outside of those who make it. It is improvised 
and ever-changing, the basic form of all storytelling and the messy blueprint of 
all social engagement. The cranes are the ideal mapmakers in the novel’s world. 
Instead of distorting the map with self-centered mediation, they embody it—even 
beyond their own lifespan.
Yet as productive as toying with notions of “echo making” and “mapmaking” 
are for the project of making tangible the inescapably emplaced and mediated 
nature of human being, the investment into these tropes gets daunting over the 
course of the narrative. In other words, the novel suffers from its author’s didac-
tic desire. What Heinz Ickstadt has aptly called his “asynchronous messaging” 
(“Asynchronous”) becomes too synchronous in its relentless plea for communal 
and environmental values, too schematic in its idealization of a selfless, crane-like 
existence as the mystical, utopian opposite to the various late-modern struggles 
with selfhood. On the formal level, Powers’s didactic urge tips the scales when the 
different narrative voices are merged toward the end. To the sophisticated reader 
(who certainly is the implied reader of this book), this move presents itself as a sty-
listic clue, indicating that the collective mapmaking has entered a new level of col-
laboration. And while the shift is subtle its effects are grave. Initially, the changing 
focalizations are used with great persistence and accuracy to produce the shifting, 
polyvocal narrative that has already been described—a narrative that has been 
crafted for a sophisticated reader, and that provides a dense, aesthetically rich, and 
challenging reading experience. Which is why this reader is likely to notice that 
half way through the part four, it becomes increasingly hard to tell whose “brain” 
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is telling the story, and that focalizations are added that cannot be integrated into 
the previous pattern, for instance when Karin’s ex-boyfriend Daniel calls Mark 
after the two have not been in touch since they were teenagers. Another passage 
seems to be focalized through Weber, yet the voice is notably less rational and in 
control than before, more like Karin’s than Weber’s. And sure enough, focalization 
shifts to Karin soon thereafter, yet again the narrative voice has lost some of its 
distinctive characteristics; it is strikingly less emotional and more coolly obser-
vant now. By the end of part four, a less subjective mode of narration is established, 
which remains in place until the end.
The gradual shift from exploring distinct psychological states and self-narra-
tives to resolving the mysteries around the accident also entails a shift of gears in 
terms of emplotment. A closure-driven detective work, which favors the “herme-
neutic code” over the “proairetic code,” interpretation over action, takes over from 
now on.20 And yet this artful maneuver aims for more than mere closure. In fact, 
the new zeal to find out what happened during the night of the accident is bound 
up with a specific quest for closure; the detective work conducted to this end is not 
that of a single individual but of a polyvocal collective. The merging of the different 
focalizations in the novel’s final stretch hence invites to be read as a moment of 
synchronicity between different modes of being, feeling, and telling. It gives voice 
and form to a vision of narrative recovery, the possibility of mutually inhabiting a 
world in flux or even collision—by virtue of a narrative operation that is materially 
grounded, sufficiently permeable, and closely connected. The problem with this 
move, it should now be clear, is that it comes along with a didactical baggage that 
(even though one is likely to agree with Powers on ethical terms) diminishes much 
of the pleasure offered by the virtuoso composition of the narrative. Even so, what 
does it achieve in terms of giving voice and form to contemporary needs to belong?
Toward the end of the novel, “home” comes to provide the common ground for 
the enterprise of conjoint mapmaking; to return there (for Weber), to stay at home 
(for Mark), or to decide whether or not to leave this place again (for Karin) is the 
overarching concern in the novel’s final pages. In fact, all three protagonists close 
their self-narratives (as far as they are still discernible at this point) by addressing 
this matter: Mark by affirming his recovered sense of self and place in a narrative 
act that seamlessly alternates between external dialogue and introspection; Karin 
by framing the relation to her hometown in terms of coming and going just like the 
cranes, and Weber by realizing that recovering his home will ultimately depend on 
his wife’s forgiveness. Even though “home” has long ceased to be a promise of a se-
curity and become a destination or a fantasy instead, concerns with homecoming 
20 Again, the terms are drawn from Roland Barthes, S/Z. Brooks discusses the conjoint operation 
of the two codes, one mobilizing the narrative, the other aiming at closure, as the constitutive 
antagonism of plot-making. See Brooks, Reading 16-17. In the context of this study, they have 
also been addressed with regard to Edgar Huntly’s detective work. See Chapter 2, Fn. 24.
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provide a shared horizon for all three stories—and for the narrative operation as 
a whole. For if, in the world of The Echo Maker, the productive nexus of belonging 
and narrative hinges on providing a kind of recovery that is imaginary and self-de-
luded rather than actual and material, narrative transfer is diegetically geared to-
ward dissolving the individual, self-centered voices with which the novel begins. 
Notoriously erring and provisional as narration may be, the move from a self-ab-
sorbed to a communal mode of storytelling is fathomed and probed as a feasible 
dwelling ground. This prospect is nestled into and indeed artfully constructed 
through a polyvocal narrative that exposes the inadequacies and limitations of 
the self as the autonomous builder of that place called home. A while this place 
may or may not be called by that name, building it cannot do without a semantics 
of familiarity and attachment—just as it cannot escape the narrative forms and 
patterns that this semantics is inclined to assume.
In a way, then, The Echo Maker retells the lesson of the ruby red slippers with 
which this study (or story) began. Just as Dorothy, the main characters in Powers’s 
 novel come to find that calling out for one’s home is a poetic act of taking measure. 
Mark’s story ends happily because he gets to stay in Oz, which either replaces his 
Homestar or reinforces the Oz-like qualities already carried in its name. Karin and 
Weber are doomed if they do not find the way. The Echo Maker thus also affirms 
what is, for Salman Rushdie, the real secret of the ruby red slippers—“that there 
is no longer any such place as home: except, of course, for the homes we make, or 
the homes that are made for us: in Oz, which is anywhere and everywhere except 
the place from which we began” (Rushdie 57, quoted in Kaes 192). And who would 
know better than a diasporic writer in exile that there is no such place unless we 
build it, word by word, sentence by sentence, storyline by storyline. The construc-
tion material is mostly prefabricated, and much of it may even be bluntly imposed. 
But the need to belong draws us into the world, where it leaves us with at least some 
leeway of how to build a suitable dwelling place. And if getting home will not put 
an end to this need, perhaps we might say that dwelling in narrative is as good as 
the next story from which we build.
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